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The number of works on wartime planning for postwar Japan does not approach the vastness of those on the Vietnam War, Henry Kissinger, or America’s role in the Middle East. But there are a respectable number of entries, including Hugh Bolton’s *American Presurrender Planning*, Theodore Cohen’s *Remaking Japan*, Rudolf Janssens’s *What Future for Japan?*, Nathaniel Peffer’s *Basis for Peace in the Far East* and Harley Notter’s *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation*, in addition to a number of quality studies in Japanese. It is curious that Dayna Barnes’s *Architects of Occupation* has no overview of this earlier literature, nor a description of the place of her work in it. The three reviewers in this roundtable, however, compensate for such omissions in their detailed consideration of Barnes’s work.

Particularly valuable in this regard is Jennifer Miller’s review. It praises Barnes for addressing key reasons for the relative scarcity of scholarship on Occupation planning. Because President Franklin Roosevelt paid little attention to the future of Japan (a point made adroitly by the book’s cover photograph), the core aspects of that planning fell to a host of mid-level officials in various agencies. Barnes’s thematic focus, which considers each of these agencies in turn, rightly centers, in Miller’s view, on the Department of State. State planners championed a systemic approach that would avoid the errors of the Versailles peace and emphasize a world order based on free trade and other liberal principles internationally and the democratization of Japan internally.

Andrew Johnstone and Peter Mauch give less emphasis to the placement of Barnes’s work within Occupation historiography, but they broadly agree with Miller that *Architects* is splendidly researched. Johnstone stresses its strengths in discussing both the views of specialists outside the government and their dialogue with officials inside it, as well as the impact of media figures who thought and wrote about foreign affairs such as journalist Walter Lippmann and Time magazine publisher Henry Luce. His review also draws attention to planners’ intentions to incorporate Japan deeply into a western international system well before the Cold War, or even concerns that would eventually lead to the Cold War, came into play.

Mauch notes that Barnes’s research confirms Roosevelt’s reservations about such incorporation. By all rights, a presidential alliance with the State Department’s China experts, and a Congress and public with no love lost...

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for Japan, should have produced far harsher post-war plans than materialized or were effectuated. Mauch lauds the deftness of Barnes’s analysis in demonstrating why this did not happen.

While all three reviewers find a great deal to like in *Architects of Occupation*, all three make several broad criticisms. The book’s structure lends itself well to analysis of the various actors and institutions involved, but is not well suited to a weighting of their importance. In particular, the State Department receives relatively short shrift, and could not get much more without its chapter eclipsing all others. There is a tendency to flatten change over time, particularly for the later war years as the military departments and Joint Chiefs of Staff became more centrally involved in post-war planning. The very emphasis of the Department of State planners to look at problems in the international system sometimes overlooked concerns raised especially by academic specialists on Japan about its domestic sources of aggression and militarism—a point raised with particular salience by Miller, who notes the unhappy and facile references to the Japanese experience by advocates of the 2003 attack on Iraq.

These qualifications aside, all three reviewers, and this reader, can highly recommend *Architects of Occupation* as a valuable contribution to our field.

**Participants:**

**Dayna Barnes** is a lecturer (assistant professor) in modern history at City, University of London. She completed her Ph.D. in International History at the London School of Economics in 2013. Dayna is currently writing an article on the fate of American diplomats interned in Tokyo after Pearl Harbor, and working on a project comparing the occupation planning for Japan and Iraq. *Architects of Occupation* is her first book.

**Michael Barnhart** is Distinguished Teaching Professor in the Department of History at Stony Brook University. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard in 1980 and has published *Japan Prepares for Total War* and *Japan and the World Since 1868*. He is currently working on a survey of American diplomatic history tentatively titled, *E Pluribus: A Political History of American Foreign Relations from Jamestown to Obama*.

**Andrew Johnstone** is an Associate Professor in American History at the University of Leicester. He is the author of *Against Immediate Evil: American Internationalists and the Four Freedoms on the Eve of World War II* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014) and *Dilemmas of Internationalism: The American Association for the United Nations and US Foreign Policy, 1941-1948*, (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009). He is also the co-editor (with Andrew Priest) of *US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2017) and (with Helen Laville) of *The US Public and American Foreign Policy* (London: Routledge, 2010), and his articles have appeared in *Diplomatic History*, *Global Society*, the *Journal of American Studies*, and the *Journal of Transatlantic Studies*.

**Peter Mauch** is senior lecturer of Asian history at Western Sydney University (Australia). He specializes in modern Japanese history. Among his publications are *Sailor Diplomat: Nomura Kichisaburō and the Japanese-American War* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011), and a chapter in the *Cambridge History of the Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). He is currently writing a study of the wartime relationship between the Shōwa Emperor and Tōjō Hideki.
Jennifer M. Miller received her Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison and is an assistant professor of history at Dartmouth College. A scholar of U.S.-East Asian relations and the early Cold War, she is currently working on a book manuscript that examines the impact of American and Japanese understanding of democracy on the development of the U.S.-Japanese relationship after between 1945 and 1963. Portions of this project have been published in Diplomatic History and the Journal of Contemporary History.
In Architects of Occupation, Dayna Barnes explores American wartime thinking about post-World War II Japan. The book examines the views of a wide range of actors, from Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry Truman through the State Department, Congress, and—crucially—non-governmental organizations. Starting in the late 1930s, well before the Pearl Harbor attack, and concluding after the Japanese surrender in 1945, the book charts the evolution of American thought and planning. Based on an impressive body of research, it outlines who was at the heart of the planning process, and why postwar plans for Asia ultimately took the shape that they did.

The chapters are organized thematically rather than chronologically. The first chapter examines Roosevelt’s views on Japan, the future of Asia, and his broader stance on post-war planning (which was extremely hard to discern given the President’s unwillingness to publicly commit to any one plan before the end of the war). Roosevelt is portrayed as a president who kept his cards close to his chest and gave little direction to those charged with more detailed planning beneath him. Those figures are at the heart of chapter two, which examines the Asia specialists in the State Department, including less well-known government figures such as Eugene Dooman, George Blakeslee, Joseph Ballantine, and Stanley Hornbeck. These figures, some more sympathetic to Japan, others to China, sketched out the main contours of U.S. post-war planning. Internal debates related to key issues including Japan’s economic future, the punitive nature of the peace, and how to reintegrate Japan into the international community. In terms of planning detail, chapter two is the heart of this book.

Chapter three moves away from the executive branch to focus on ‘unofficial officials.’ The focus here is on think tanks, notably the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR). Given the relative lack of expertise on Asia in the State Department, Barnes argues that these non-governmental organizations became increasingly important in providing information, reports, and ideas about the future of Japan, and that the State Department effectively “outsourced its long-range planning activities” (82). This was especially the case in the early years of the war, when a great deal of work was done by the CFR’s War and Peace Studies Project. Chapter four examines media coverage of the war in Asia, and the relationship between media elites and both government officials and think tank members in particular. Notable figures here are Walter Lippmann and Henry Luce, before the coverage turns to the elite publications of the IPR (Pacific Affairs) and the CFR (Foreign Affairs). This is a rather narrow definition of the media, but it follows effectively from the previous chapter.

Chapter five examines the attitudes of Congress, which theoretically had great potential to influence planning but in the end had only limited impact on thinking about post-war Japan. The final chapter examines the final months of the war after Franklin Roosevelt’s death, and how planning shifted under Harry Truman. Unsurprisingly, Truman had his own ideas, but planning was also affected by the nature of the war itself, as the focus quickly shifted from war to peace in the aftermath of the sudden end of the war. As a result, the book concludes by arguing that the broad plans created in the early years of the war ultimately acted as a basis for the postwar years, even if those plans were amended and altered by the reality of post-war Japan.

The strongest parts of the book are those that examine wartime planning in detail. The material on the State Department’s Subcommittee on the Far East is particularly impressive in highlighting how the U.S. developed a policy that would eventually allow Japan to remain part of the international community. More punitive alternatives existed, as did visions of a post-war world where China was a more dominant power in Asia. Of
course, an outward-looking internationalist United States willing to engage with East Asia was certainly not inevitable in 1941. Yet long before Cold-War concerns made a strong alliance with Japan seem essential for the United States, Asia experts in Washington were promoting that very scenario.

The book is also effective at illuminating the interconnected world of Asia specialists inside and outside of government. The network of officials and unofficial officials revealed here highlights the blurred line between governmental and non-governmental, and between public and private interests. This was particularly the case for the years up to 1942, before post-war planning became a significant priority in the State Department. The CFR and IPR clearly had an influence on early planning efforts, and were important in keeping conversations going through the later years of the war. That said, it would have been useful to see more detail on the dynamics of these relationships, to assess just how influential these think tanks were on official plans.

Indeed, given the wide ranging planning conversations that occurred, the book’s title is a little misleading. The book is about far more than occupation. As Barnes states in the conclusion, it is a “prologue to occupation histories” (167). In fact, there is very little here on planning for military occupation itself. Yet the book is also broader than the subtitle suggests, as it is more about planning for the future of Japan’s role in Asia, and indeed the wider world. It is also as much about American attitudes towards East Asia in a broader sense as about specific plans for post-war Japan. Given all this, a longer introduction would have been beneficial and would have helped to explain the book’s scope, argument, and originality in greater depth.

The book is certainly very readable, and it does not get bogged down in unnecessary detail. Yet there were times when I was left wanting more information. While the book impressively outlines the planning process and the key figures involved, there is surprisingly little on the plans themselves. A little more on what was actually proposed would have been useful for those unfamiliar with the specific policy documents. The conclusion dismisses the idea that the plans of the Subcommittee on the Far East were so broad as to be abstract and useless (168), but it is hard to judge based on the material presented here. It also makes it more difficult to see how the wartime plans created by these architects ultimately became post-war reality.

Nevertheless, the book is a carefully researched examination of how a small network of thinkers both in and out of government worked to plan American policy on the post-war future of Asia. It is a valuable addition to literature on wartime planning, and especially to the growing volume of work on the links between the U.S. government and non-governmental advisors.
This book is a welcome addition to the literature. A study of what Columbia historian and World War II-era State Department policy planner Hugh Borton once called “American pre-surrender planning for postwar Japan,” it traces the involvement in the policy-planning process of U.S. politicians, bureaucrats, think-tank operatives, and journalists. The author, Dayna Barnes, opens the book with a series of thought-provoking questions: “How could a stable peace be created in the Pacific? If imperial Japan, the most powerful country in Asia, were defeated, what might replace its regional dominance? What had caused Japanese militarism, and how could its resurgence be prevented?” (1). It was precisely such questions which illuminated wartime planning, and which underpin her excellent book.

The first substantive chapter seeks to elucidate on President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s answers to these basic questions. Roosevelt is—as anybody who has studied him even casually will know—a sphinxlike figure who left precious little documentation to posterity; this chapter nonetheless convincingly portrays him as particularly punitive in his wartime thinking about postwar Japan. Barnes does an especially good job of tracing his wartime statements and commitments to allies, including the all-important commitment to ‘unconditional surrender’ which he made at the Cairo Conference of November 1943. Roosevelt was vague on the details, but he evidently believed that not only Japan’s unconditional surrender but also its subsequent treatment would render it powerless and unable to threaten the peace again. Barnes ties this notion into the President’s admittedly hopeful thinking about the rise of postwar China: he saw China filling any gap left by Japan’s disempowerment.

The next chapter examines the State Department’s involvement in the policy-planning process. It follows with precision the various State Department bodies, including, for example, the Inter-Departmental Area Committee on the Far East, which played a major role in that process. It provides excellent pen-sketches of the State Department’s principal planners, including Joseph Grew, Eugene Dooman, Joseph Ballantine, and Robert Fearey, and it traces their beliefs concerning the origins of Japanese militarism and expansionism. It expertly outlines the gap between the State Department’s Japan experts (who favored a so-called soft peace) and China experts (who argued for a harsh peace), and it delves deftly into the bureaucratic maneuvering that saw the Japan experts’s plans for a soft peace take hold within the State Department. Importantly, it also notes the inability of the State Department’s policy planners, particularly after Undersecretary Sumner Welles’s forced resignation in 1943, to make any impression on Roosevelt.

Subsequent chapters examine the role of think tanks, media, and U.S. Congress. Barnes makes a good case for the role of think tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute on Pacific Relations: when official planning was stunted by a lack of resources early in the war, the think tanks took up the cudgels. And, throughout the war, the think tanks provided a necessary meeting space for official policymakers and think tank members, as well as academics. Journalists and editors like Walter Lippman, Henry Luce and Hamilton Fish Armstrong “ensured that ordinary Americans were not strangers to the broad outlines of Japan policy” (112). Congress came during the war to support an active postwar foreign policy, but unlike the State Department, Congressmen were exposed to “rage, war hate, and calls for vengeance” (139).

The final substantive chapter examines the impact of Harry Truman’s assumption of the presidency on the policy-planning process. Barnes offers three basic contentions (with which this reviewer is in essential agreement): (i) Truman was adamant that he must steer Roosevelt’s wartime policies to their logical conclusion, (ii) Truman was nonetheless woefully uninformed as to Roosevelt’s policies, and therefore relied
heavily on such figures as Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew, and
(iii) this changed the dynamics of American policymaking, from Roosevelt’s chaotic administration to a
“more conventional style of information gathering” (146). Barnes notes, correctly, that this offered the State
Department’s policy planners (who had joined with their counterparts in the War and Navy Departments on
the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee) a chance at impact which had hitherto been lacking.
Nonetheless, the final wartime plans for postwar Japan “represented a toughening of accepted postwar
planning aims” (155).

For all of this book’s strengths, there are a few striking omissions. The introduction notes the lack of scholarly
attention given to wartime planning for occupied Japan; it nonetheless declines to mention Makoto Iokibe’s
(五百旗頭真) outstanding Beikoku no nihon senryō seisaku: sengo nihon no sekkeizu (米国の日本占領政策: 戦後
日本の設計図).1 Harley Notter’s huge microfiche collection of policy planning papers also goes unmentioned
in this otherwise thoroughly-researched book.2 Finally, this reviewer wishes that Barnes had examined in
greater detail the policy planners’ debates over the Emperor and the emperor system, as well as Grew’s
ultimately futile efforts to include a commitment to retention of the emperor system in the Potsdam
Declaration.

These criticisms should not detract from what is a fine piece of scholarship. This book is a pleasure to read,
and will become required reading for anybody interested in the occupation of Japan.

1 Makoto Iokibe, Beikoku no nihon senryō seisaku: sengo nihon no sekkeizu [U.S. policies for the occupation of
Japan: the blueprint for postwar Japan], (Tōkyō: Chūō Kōron, 1993).

2 Harley A. Notter and U.S. Department of State, Post-World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department
Despite a bevy of excellent studies about the Allied occupation of Japan, the process of planning for this occupation remains surprisingly underexplored. This absence has not simply left a curious gap in the scholarly literature about World War II and the postwar occupation. It has also allowed commentators and politicians to twist and obscure this occupation’s goals and character. This was especially true in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, when policymakers invoked the United States’s decision to radically transform and democratize its former enemy as a prescription for Iraq’s future. Rather than the outcome of an extensive policy process developed in a specific historical context, the occupation of Japan was instead framed as the expression of innate American character, as evidence of its generosity, superior political system, and wise global leadership. Dayna Barnes’s wonderfully written and deeply researched *Architects of Occupation* is therefore a much-needed book that tells the vital story of wartime planning, exploring the personnel, policy processes, assumptions, and goals that facilitated an occupation of unprecedented scope. In doing so, it offers new insights about American understandings of World War II’s origins and consequences, and the construction of American postwar international hegemony.

The peculiar institutional dynamics of wartime planning have likely contributed to this dearth of scholarship. As Barnes notes, President Franklin D. Roosevelt thought little about Japan during the war. Beyond sporadic statements, and territorial commitments at wartime conferences like Cairo, his plans for Japan remained unclear to both key advisors and later scholars. As a result, those who were in charge of the formal planning process in the State Department operated in the dark for much of the war, isolated from Roosevelt’s wartime diplomacy. Though the State Department team, which included both diplomats and leading scholars of East Asia, was expected to create a “basket” of plans from which Roosevelt would choose, it was unclear if he would actually do so (8). According to Barnes, Roosevelt’s death was a thus a key turning point, thrusting this State Department work to the center of American policy. Suddenly a wartime president, Harry Truman was far more willing to rely on wartime planning; recommendations and goals that had originated in State Department discussions became the core guidelines for the American occupation. Barnes therefore contends that ultimately, the wartime planning process was deeply significant. It articulated a set of policies that sought to pacify Japan by reincorporating it into the global economy, a vision that Barnes argues remained consistent throughout the occupation.

According to Barnes, this vision emerged directly from wartime planners’s understanding of World War II in the Pacific. These diplomats and scholars understood the war primarily as a failure of the international system to address legitimate problems, especially economic stability, population growth, and territorial demands. While they abhorred Japan’s violence and international aggression, many still believed “that Japanese expansionism had been caused by economic necessity and the requirements of an increasing population” and “the flawed peace agreement after the Great War” (171, 172). Numerous planners, especially those with Japan-based academic or diplomatic careers, therefore believed that a punitive approach to postwar Japan would do little to secure a lasting peace. Instead, they argued that prosperity and trans-Pacific economic ties were the key to Japan’s pacification, a goal they believed would be best achieved through the construction of an open and integrated global trading order after the war. This policy, which also sought to facilitate willing Japanese cooperation, was not inevitable. Nor was it simply the product of a desire to go easy on the Japanese, though some wartime policymakers (especially those focused on China), Congressional representatives, and media critics would have certainly understood it in those terms. Rather, it reflected the belief that free trade was the core of both a functional international system and American global hegemony; reorienting Japan in such a way thus served American interests, which planners took as synonymous with global stability. There
were, of course, some willful blind spots to this belief. For example, as Barnes notes, Japan was one of the United States’s largest trading partners before the war, which did little to curb aggressive Japanese expansion overseas or conflicts over trade and resources.

Though the main wartime planning took place in the State Department, Barnes takes an expansive approach to planning, examining the influence of think tanks, the media, and Congress. Each receives a chapter, alongside chapters on Roosevelt and the State Department; all of the chapters are based on extensive and detailed primary research from a wide array of archives. This broad approach is both a strength and weakness of the book. On the one hand, by looking at the interplay between these different actors, Barnes restores an important and necessary sense of contingency to the process of wartime planning. She carefully pieces together Roosevelt’s opinions on Japan from his limited statements on Japan, thoughts about Germany and China, and wartime diplomatic commitments to claim that he likely would have pursued a harsher policy, in contrast to Truman’s willingness to rely on State Department planning. She notes not only the significance of Roosevelt’s death, but also the transformation of Congress during the war, particularly the growing adoption of an internationalist agenda premised on American global leadership; such a stance was a necessary foundation for a lengthy occupation focused on transformation rather than punishment. What is more, Barnes highlights the importance of organizations like the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute for Pacific Relations as crucial sites of discussion and even basic information at a time when America’s pool of expertise on Japan was remarkably small. She aptly shows how ideas and expertise circulated between policymakers and experts through publications, conferences, and social engagements. Paying attention to these different sites of discussion, both inside and outside government, allows Barnes to draw a compelling picture of the various personalities involved in wartime planning, their background and experiences, and their relationships to each other. It also demonstrates the selective and isolated nature of wartime planning; for example, though members of the media, Congress, and the public claimed that Japan should be totally destroyed, the formal planning process never seriously discussed it as an option.

On the other hand, the structure of the book restricts some aspects of Barnes’s analysis. The different agents she explores exerted very different levels of influence on wartime planning. The State Department planning process, which Barnes argues laid the key foundations for the occupation, suffers the most from this organization. As Barnes notes, State Department planners met regularly and held extensive discussions on a range of issues related to Japan, from the economy to postwar territories to religion to the displacement of ‘ultranationalism.’ Yet because this process is confined to one chapter, there is not enough space to give these rich and extensive debates the analysis they deserve. This has the unfortunate effect of flattening these discussions and imposing unanimity by minimizing the debates that took place over issues like the future of the Japanese Emperor or whether Japan’s transformation was even possible (some wartime planners, like Stanley Hornbeck, felt that Japan was simply unredeemable). Barnes claims that the final, non-punitive nature of the occupation was not inevitable; it would have been helpful to have a much fuller picture of the debates and discussions that led to the choice to redeem, rather than subjugate, Japan.

The book’s structure also raises questions about the key actors who receive less attention, especially the War Department and the military. While it is true that the State Department was the central organ for postwar planning, and that many of the key occupation policies originated in State Department discussions, it was far from alone in crafting formal policy. Beginning in late 1944, planning shifted to a joint committee that included the War Department and the Department of the Navy (the State-War-Navy Coordinating
Committee, or SWNCC), whose plans were reviewed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As Barnes notes in her last chapter, which departs from her previous framework to examine the end of the war, the influence of the military and the Department of War was significant in shaping the foundational premises of the occupation. War Department representatives, most notably Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, envisioned a harsher occupation and edited crucial policy documents to limit American responsibility for rebuilding and reviving Japan’s economy (154–156). These differences extended into the conduct of the occupation itself. As Eiji Takamae has argued, in contrast to State Department policy statements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff document utilized by General Douglas MacArthur as the key guideline for the occupation was a “larger, more detailed, and much tougher” document that called for “radical reform.” Barnes briefly discusses some of these differences in the last chapter. But more background, especially about McCloy, would more fully explain the personnel, interactions, and policy shifts that were so crucial to the final outcome.

Beyond these structural constraints, some elements of Barnes’s analysis raise questions about the extent to which wartime planners understood the war—and Japanese international aggression—as a failure of the prewar international system. As Barnes notes, for example, the influential Canadian diplomat E.H. Norman argued that the rise of Japanese militarism was the consequences of lingering feudal inequalities and legacies (48); this belief led planners to emphasize internal economic changes such as land reform and the dissolution of *zaibatsu*, which sought to foster economic equality. Other planners, like historian Hugh Borton, underscored the problematic structures of the Japanese government, which was overly centralized and gave the military outsized control over the operation of government power. Barnes notes these beliefs, but she spends less time on the planners’ discussions of domestic affairs in Japan. She dedicates less attention to their writings and discussions about why and how the military had accrued such power in Japan, even though displacing militarism and the military was a primary goal of the occupation. The question of democracy—why Japan’s prewar democracy failed, what postwar democracy would look like, how the occupation would create it—is also under-emphasized throughout text. This is especially striking because the key documents that Barnes highlights, such as SWNCC 150/4, elevated democratization as a fundamental goal alongside the emphasis on developing a functional and stable peacetime economy. In order that Japan was no longer “a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world,” SWNCC 150/4 declared, “the authority of the militarists and the influence of the militarism will be totally eliminated from [Japan’s] political, economic, and social life.” In order to do so, “The Japanese people shall be encouraged to develop a desire for individual liberties and respect for fundamental human rights... they shall also be encouraged to form democratic and representative organizations.”

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In documents such as these, the question of Japan’s internal political, economic, religious, cultural, and social arrangements was crucial. Indeed, many policymakers believed that there was a deep connection between a state’s domestic structures and values and its behavior in the international community; as planner Eugene Dooman noted, the question was “how to ‘fit Japan for future international cooperation’” (171).

Reintegrating Japan into the (American-led) international community as a peaceful, non-aggressive state meant that the occupation had to firmly displace the military and what planners called “ultranationalism” from its central role in Japanese politics, governance, and culture. Democratic structures and values became the key way that both planners and the occupation authorities hoped to do this. Wartime planners, and the occupation authorities, took a very broad definition of democracy, one that drew from a wide array of social, cultural, racial, psychological, and political assumptions and was rife with paternalist impulses. Building democracy in Japan, they believed, entailed not only representative political institutions or fostering economic equality, but also imposing specific models of religious freedom, a new emphasis on the right to free thought and expression, remaking family structures and gender norms, rethinking the emperor system, reforming the entire educational system, and changing labor structures and practices. The occupation thus sought to fundamentally alter Japanese social, cultural, political, and psychological practices and attitudes in the name of building a stable, “mature,” and “responsible” state and citizenry. Barnes notes in her conclusion that the occupation, and the massive reforms it unleashed, was “broad and radical” (171). Yet by focusing on Japan’s position in the international system, she does not fully explain the political and ideological agenda that drove this broad program of reform.

Ultimately, Architects of Occupation offers a vital exploration of a highly consequential moment and convincingly explains how policymakers could conceive of resurrecting Japan after four years of brutal war. In doing so, it offers intriguing and necessary perspective on the birth of postwar liberal internationalism, particularly the belief that economic revival was an essential component of preventing radicalism. Indeed, Barnes’s desire to explain this broader shift in U.S. policy is clear in the subtitle of the book, which describes “planning for postwar Japan.” This subtitle captures her emphasis on how Japan, as an entity, could be re-integrated into the international system as a sovereign and independent country. It also fosters her close attention to discussions over the respective roles of Japan and China in the postwar regional and global order, an important subject to which Barnes successfully dedicates admirable consideration. Yet it is difficult to separate American planning for the future of East Asia from planners’ conceptualizations of Japan’s internal political, economic, cultural, religious, and social arrangements. At least when it came to Japan, American thinking was never able to separate the international from the domestic.

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5 For a fuller exploration of the discourse of maturity during the occupation, see Naoko Shibusawa, America’s Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), especially 54-96.
First, I would like to thank Thomas Maddux for organizing this roundtable, Michael Barnhart for writing the introduction, and the reviewers for their thoughtful comments. It is a special pleasure to have scholars I admire engage with my work and share their insights. I appreciate the time and effort they have taken to provide both praise and criticism.

I will address their reviews in turn. Andrew Johnstone’s review begins with a cogent distillation of the book and its core arguments. He makes the case that the book’s title is somewhat misleading. As he correctly points out, the book is “about far more than occupation,” as it also encompasses planning for Japan’s future role in the world, and American attitudes towards East Asia broadly. It is interesting that Jennifer Miller specifically praised the book’s title in her review for capturing that wider focus. During my research I found that questions about Japan’s future were inextricably linked to Asia as a whole and China in particular. The book reflects that finding.

I appreciate Johnstone’s point that I included somewhat limited detail of the planning documents themselves. While I poured over small wording changes across iterations of developing plans, I had hoped to spare my readers from minutiae by presenting instead a synthesis. However, in presenting my analysis without including extensive language from the source material, I may have painted with too broad a brush for an expert reader. Particularly because the three key documents are not very long, an annex would have been a helpful addition.1 This would have made more detail readily available without bogging down the main text or boring the reader. It is a solution I will consider in future works.

Peter Mauch also offers an excellent overview of the book in his review, and I am gratified to see that my key arguments came across successfully. He points out two omissions from my research, one of which was simply missed by the reviewer. Mauch writes that the Notter microfiche collection “goes unmentioned in this otherwise thoroughly-researched book.” However, I did use this source; it is both cited and included in the bibliography.2 However, the omission of Makoto Iokibe’s Beikoku no Nihon senryō seisaku: sengo Nihon no sekkeizu (米国の日本占領政策: 戦後日本の設計図) is entirely my own error, and I thank Mauch for drawing my attention to it.3 Although I did not refer directly to Iokibe’s book in my text and therefore did not cite it, this classic work absolutely deserves inclusion in the literature review and bibliography.

Mauch also asked for more emphasis on the question of retaining the Emperor. In the book, I discussed this question in the context of unconditional surrender. Several key figures argued that Japan would surrender

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1 The documents in question are PWC108b “Japan: The Postwar Objectives of the United States in regard to Japan,” SWNCC150/4 “United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan,” and JCS1380/15 “Basic Initial Post Surrender Directive to Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan.”


more quickly and easily if the Allies gave assurances that the imperial system, an ancient symbol of the nation, would be allowed to remain. (150-151) I did not discuss the Emperor question outside of this context because the issue was not resolved during the planning phase. However, my current research comparing plans for Japan and Iraq has highlighted the significance of a nationally recognized figure acting as a legitimizing force to an occupation. I have become more aware of the value the Emperor had for American plans and would give the issue more attention if I were writing Architects of Occupation today.

Jennifer Miller provides a penetrating and lengthy analysis of my work. She too did a brilliant job reviewing my arguments and identifying my intentions with the book. Architects of Occupation examines a wide informal policy network rather than looking solely at the actions of official bureaucratic planners. For clarity, I structured the book thematically, with each chapter save the last devoted to a different policymaking group in the informal network. I agree with Miller that this break with traditional chronological format has both benefits and drawbacks.

Architects of Occupation devoted space to nontraditional and unofficial sites of policymaking to create a broad and complex picture of the policymaking environment, which all three reviewers agree is a particular strength of the book. However, this required giving less attention to traditional forms of policymaking. Each planning group was covered in a single chapter even though some groups (especially bureaucratic planners) were more influential and complex than others and would merit further attention. I tried to combat that by varying chapter length and weaving connections between the groups into the text whenever possible. Bureaucratic planning plays a role in every chapter. On balance I thought, and still think, that the costs of my inclusive and thematic approach are outweighed by the benefits.

Miller is also correct that the book gives comparatively short shrift to the War and Navy Departments. This is because the book’s focus is on politics and grand strategy, and because the State Department played by far the largest role in bureaucratic planning, especially before the spring 1945 battle of Okinawa catalyzed planning for an impeding invasion. The War Department began to play a lead role in planning as the date for surrender neared. (34-37, 149-160) To give adequate weight to that change and the upheaval of an executive transition from Roosevelt to Truman, I broke from the thematic structure to cover the summer of 1945 in its own final chapter.

Architects of Occupation is not intended to be the last word on military planning for occupation. My aim was to strike a balance between depth and breadth in examining networked planning groups, while keeping the focus on international politics. I also deemphasized military planning because much of it was directed toward logistics or responding to problems which never arose. (169-170) As I point out in the book, there was no invasion of Japan, and the expected mass insurgency never materialized. However, in an occupation setting, the military has the crucial task of creating stability and security in recently hostile territories. As my current research on planning for Iraq makes painfully clear, the sort of grand strategy created by civilian planners is useless without the prerequisite of basic security. Even more than I realized while writing this book, military planning matters.

Miller’s final criticism is a question of emphasis. Architects of Occupation is a book about America’s efforts to create a new international order in East Asia after the defeat of Imperial Japan. This is related to but distinct
from domestic social and cultural issues. I absolutely agree with Miller that international relations and domestic politics are connected. *Architects of Occupation* includes American domestic responses to the Japan question, especially in chapters on Congress and the media. Policymakers’ ideas about Japan and what the Japanese people were “like” or “capable of,” and why that was so, underpinned their planning for Japan’s future place in the international system. For this reason, a considerable amount of this book is given over to examinations of American racial biases and religious beliefs, and to identifying the sources of individual planner’s ideas, knowledge, and assumptions about Japan. Miller states that “American thinking [on Japan] was never able to separate the international from the domestic.” She is right. Domestic social and cultural assumptions are relevant here and appear as a theme throughout *Architects of Occupation*. However, they are not the primary subject of this book.

I would like to end with a challenge for future researchers. *Architects of Occupation* focuses on the planning phase between 1937 and 1945 and includes some connections to postwar policy implementation. However, the book gives rise to new questions. How useful was long range planning during the occupation itself? What problems were foreseen and missed, and how effective were the solutions offered by wartime planners? These are questions with important implications for foreign policymaking in general, and are ripe for further study.

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