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INTRODUCTION BY EREZ MANEVA, HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Daniel Immerwahr wants us to rethink the shape of U.S. history. He wants us to think of it as taking place not just within the conventional ‘logomap’ of the 48 contiguous states, perhaps with the disembodied outlines of Alaska and Hawaii tacked on. Rather, he wants us to include all the territories that are, or have at some point been, under formal U.S. control—the Philippines, Puerto Rico, Guam, Cuba, etc.—fully within the narrative of U.S. history. Not, mind you, within the history of U.S. empire, or the history of U.S. expansion, or the history of U.S. colonialism, but within U.S. history, period. And he wants this not only for professional historians of the sort that write (and read) roundtable reviews. He wants this also, perhaps even primarily, for that most elusive of audiences, the ‘general public’ in the United States, where students in K-12 schools are still taught a U.S. history that is framed by that hoary continental logomap.

These dual intended audiences, one scholarly and the other general, no doubt created one of the major challenges of writing How to Hide an Empire, and one of the great tests of its reception. For some scholars of U.S. history, Immerwahr’s focus on the U.S. territorial empire, that is only those parts of the world that Washington formally controlled, might seem too narrow, neglecting, among other things, the economic aspects of U.S. power as the fountainhead of global capitalism. Indeed, Immerwahr’s territorial delineation of U.S. empire in this book conflicts with the historiographical approach that sees all of U.S. history as a history of empire and sees the scope of that empire, at least in the twentieth century, as unremittingly global. On the other hand, the notion that any significant part of U.S. history has been imperial is at variance with the perceptions of many laypeople in the United States (though not, as one reviewer notes, in most other countries) and with how it is usually taught in U.S. schools.

Considering this, it is hardly surprising that the three reviewers in this roundtable, while commending Immerwahr on his ambition and writerly flair, also have a few bones to pick with his approach. Oliver Charbonneau, for example, would have liked the book to have included more discussion of the concept of ‘empire’ and the myriad ways in which it has been used historiographically by U.S. historians and others. (I would have liked that too, but such an extended discussion would likely have turned away many of the readers that Immerwahr wanted to reach.) Rebecca Tinio McKenna, on the other hand, rightly notes that the book has relatively little to say about the role of capital in U.S. empire and about the role of women in it.

In his response, Immerwahr readily concedes that the book, despite its considerable length, leaves much out that could be said about U.S. empire. He explains that he set out to write a history of U.S. empire through a specific lens, one that focused the reader’s view on territories that Washington claimed formally and controlled directly, rather than on other vectors or manifestations of U.S. global power. Much more, he agrees, remains to be written on those aspects of U.S. empire that the reviewers would have liked to have read more about. Still, Immerwahr’s territorial approach is useful for instructing Americans about important parts of their country’s history that have to date remained, as he says, largely hidden in the popular mind. It can also, particularly with his exploration of the postwar ‘pointillist empire,’ serve to advance historians’ understanding of the U.S. role in the transformation of what Charles Maier has called “territoriality” in the twentieth century.1

Perhaps the most interesting debate that this roundtable raises is embedded in the one reviewer critique that Immerwahr rejects most forthrightly: the question, raised by Sarah Miller-Davenport, about the role of ideology in Americans’ pursuit of colonies in the early twentieth century and then in their adoption of anti-colonial rhetoric and their transition to another type of imperial formation beginning in the 1930s and through the postwar years. To this Immerwahr replies that he regards this mid-century ideological transformation as “a second-order effect, a reaction to changing conditions.” With the strengthening of anticolonial movements and the rise of new technologies that made direct control of colonial territories less

important for the exercise of global power, he says, Americans on the mainland found it more convenient to reject colonialism. Otherwise, he suspects "they would have happily continued to tolerate it" (4).

This disagreement is interesting not only because it is arguably the most direct and fundamental one to arise from this roundtable, but also because the view that Immerwahr presents here seems to run counter to recent trends in the field of Cold War history, where there has been a renewed emphasis on the importance of ideology for explaining both elite decisions and popular opinion (among Americans but also among Soviets, Chinese, and others). At the same time, this view also runs up against a different but no less influential ‘cultures of U.S. imperialism’ literature that has focused on the cultural tropes that motivated and supported U.S. imperial expansion in the twentieth century. If Immerwahr is right that ideology and culture are merely second-order effects, then what should we make of these literatures that emphasize their role? It is here, perhaps, that How to Hide an Empire most directly challenges the historiography of U.S. empire.

Participants:

Daniel Immerwahr (Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, 2011) is an associate professor at Northwestern University. He is the author of Thinking Small (Harvard University Press, 2015) and How to Hide an Empire (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2019). He is currently researching a book on environmental catastrophe in the nineteenth-century United States.

Erez Manela is a professor of history at Harvard University. His most recent book, co-edited with Stephen Macekura, is The Development Century: A Global History (Cambridge University Press, 2018).


Rebecca Tinio McKenna is an assistant professor of history at the University of Notre Dame. Her first book, American Imperial Pastoral: The Architecture of US Colonialism in the Philippines (University of Chicago Press, 2017), was awarded the Myrna F. Bernath Prize by The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations. She has received a National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship for her second project, a history of the piano.

Sarah Miller-Davenport is Lecturer in 20th Century U.S. History at the University of Sheffield. She is the author of Gateway State: Hawai‘i and the Cultural Transformation of American Empire (Princeton, 2019). Her next project, Capital of the World: New York City and the End of the 20th Century, explores the rise of New York as a “global city” in the 1970s and 1980s. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Chicago.

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3 Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, Cultures of United States Imperialism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1994) is a foundational text.
In April 1899, shortly after the start of the Philippine-American War, the Chicago Daily Tribune published an article titled “All the Facts Concerning Our New Empire.” With text enclosing a large map of the archipelago, its two pages boldly promised readers a comprehensive education on the islands. What mineral and agricultural products found there might generate wealth? Was the environment suitable for long-term Euro-American inhabitation? Were the Igorots of Northern Luzon or the Moros of Mindanao ideal candidates for civilizational overhaul? Read and find out. The Tribune presented its efforts as a public service – crucial knowledge for Americans unschooled on the nation’s overseas territories.¹

The piece was hardly unique. Making the empire legible was the stuff of endless reportage, opinion columns, academic articles, public debates, speeches, novels, songs, cartoons, and other cultural products in the early twentieth century United States. Government officials and missionaries spoke of solving the “colonial problem” and compared their efforts to those of European counterparts, while opponents of expansion formed anti-imperialist clubs.² School programs and labor regimes targeting racialized groups on the continent and in overseas colonies drew from (and were sometimes exported to) other empires.³ As late as the 1950s, former Governor General of the Philippines William Cameron Forbes contended that global decolonization was only occurring because the United States had perfected colonialism.⁴ Empire was frequently argued over but rarely hidden. This has changed in the intervening decades. So what happened?

There is a large body of scholarship on the history of U.S. empire, much of it produced in the past several decades. That ‘empire’ and ‘imperialism’ now appear frequently in the titles of serious studies of American foreign relations attests to a widespread terminological acceptance in the field.⁵ But while empire has become a standard analytical tool for interrogating U.S. history, its precise application remains unsettled. Disagreements increasingly turn on how this malleable term should be applied to the United States, a nation whose globe-spanning influence mutated and grew while land-based imperial formations receded. Should empire only be deployed to describe ‘traditional’ overseas colonial arrangements or can it be extended to contain racialized power dynamics within national boundaries? Does empire exist after decolonization, and how do we square it with tentacular overlaps of political power, capital, and inequality in the global twenty-first century?

¹ “All the Facts Concerning Our New Empire,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 2 April 1899.

² For an example of this mindset see John P. Finley, “Race Development by Industrial Means Among the Moros and Pagans of the Southern Philippines,” The Journal of Race Development 3:3 (1913): 343-368.

³ These borrowings were manifest in the intra- and inter-imperial exchanges occurring at places like Lake Mohonk. See, for instance, Report of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples (Lake Mohonk: Lake Mohonk Conference on the Indian and Other Dependent Peoples, 1916). The many varietals of U.S. anti-imperialism are explored in Ian Tyrrell and Jay Sexton (eds.), Empire’s Twin: U.S. Anti-Imperialism from the Founding Era to the Age of Terrorism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

⁴ Essay, 19156, Box 1, Edward Bowditch Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.

Compelling debates over how to periodize, scale, and otherwise contain U.S. empire ensure the continued production of dynamic new material on the topic.⁶

Apprehending the degree to which this scholarship has filtered into the U.S. public imaginary is challenging. The proposition that American history has, at minimum, imperial characteristics is uncontroversial in most parts of the globe – apart from the United States. Primary and secondary school history texts cover early twentieth century territorial conquests as aberrations, or not at all. Government officials loudly declare the United States has never been and will never be an empire. Nativist isolationists and liberal internationalists alike avoid or deny the term lest it sully their vision of the nation (although some neoconservatives have embraced a model of an exceptionalist empire). That even narrow acknowledgements of an imperial past can still be tarred as revisionist fantasy in certain news outlets gives some indication of the state of affairs. Amidst this silence and noise, U.S. empire is at once less visible and more controversial in public discourse than it was a century ago. Remedyng these omissions and distortions is an emerging imperative for historians of the United States in the world, who have begun translating the specialized lexicon of empire studies for wider audiences. The resulting magazine articles, opinion pieces, and books represent the early stages of a collective project to reintegrate empire into the popular history of the United States after a prolonged absence.⁷

Daniel Immerwahr’s *How to Hide an Empire* arrives amidst these developments. The work presents itself as a remedy to textbooks and surveys that treat American territorial empire as “an episode rather than a feature” (14). These studies, Immerwahr argues, maintain the fiction that colonies, semi-incorporated frontier territories, postwar occupations, military bases, and other sites of U.S. power outside of the state system have little to add to the arc of American (or global) history. In its 400 or so pages, *How to Hide an Empire* provides a compelling narrative-driven account of why the United States is better understood as the ‘Greater United States’ – a territorial tapestry that blurs lines between nation-state and empire. The result is a jaunty and highly readable global journey spanning two hundred plus years. Its narrative is bolstered by Immerwahr’s clear fascination with cartography and knack for locating idiosyncratic-but-illustrative stories. For all its strengths, however, the book is at times selective and occasionally leaves the reader wishing certain contours of American imperialism had been further explored.

The book’s first section—‘The Colonial Empire’—considers U.S. continental and overseas expansion between the Revolutionary Era and the Second World War. Nineteenth-century American identity emerged from the recasting of unruly white frontier populations as heroic pioneers, and the creation of the category of ‘territory’ as a means of asserting sovereignty without the political complications of statehood. Conquering and removing indigenous groups to an ever-narrowing ‘Indian Country’ was integral to this process of settler colonial naturalization. Here the book channels scholars of the nineteenth century west, who in recent years have called for the integration of Euro-American interactions with Indian peoples into the history of U.S. foreign relations.⁸ The remaining chapters move beyond the terrain of the continental ‘logo’

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Immerwahr is interested in how knowledge circulated between colony and metropole, a topic that has animated some of the best recent scholarship on U.S. empire.9 The book uses spatial planning in the Philippines and medical programs in Puerto Rico to reveal how colonies functioned as laboratories of modernity, where new ideas could be tested without the limiting features of representative democracy. The section concludes by exploring the paradoxes of imperial control during the interwar period and the Second World War. Empire receded in public discourse, politicians wrangled over independence for the Philippines, immigration restrictions increased, and protective tariffs sheltered continental agriculture and industry from competition in the colonies. At the same time, the perceived need to maintain control in the Pacific led to intensifications of rule in colonially-governed territories like Alaska and Hawai‘i. The imperial struggle between the United States and Japan, and its aftermaths, serves as a bridge linking old forms of territorial control to updated ones.

How to Hide an Empire’s latter half uses the postwar era to build a case for why U.S. global power looks the way it does today. The United States “reshuffled its imperial portfolio” after 1945, “divesting itself of large colonies and investing in military bases” (344) and becoming a “pointillist empire,” as per the section title. The basing system created a means to manage large swathes of the Pacific and the Greater Middle East without the financial burdens and public scrutiny of large colonies. Elsewhere, Alaska and Hawai‘i cast off their colonial status as they were absorbed into the nation (still others like Puerto Rico remained unincorporated). The Second World War acted as a catalyst in these transitions, spurring the creation of the supply chains, weapons systems, and communications networks that would fuel post-conflict hegemony. Multiple chapters explore the role of globalizing technologies and cultural practices that shepherded these new spatial arrangements. Promoting standardization, plasticizing everything, enshrining English as the lingua franca of the global elite, and intensifying commercial mobilities all played roles here. The result, Immerwahr argues, was a new form of imperial power that largely evaded irksome charges of colonialism while still using selective territorial control to maintain its global reach. The book concludes by noting that “about four million people” presently live in territories under U.S. control, “subject to the whims of Congress and the president” but unable to vote (399).

There is much to commend here. The prose is fluid and Immerwahr is a talented storyteller. Exploring individual lives is an effective way of introducing empire to broader audiences, and the book does an admirable job marshalling topically, geographically, and culturally diverse tales to do so. Nationalist politician Pedro Albizu Campos’ struggle for Puerto Rican independence or the sordid (but celebrated) career of the pathologist Cornelius Rhoads, for instance, bring features of colonial rule into clearer view. The narrative is likewise effective at highlighting the ways that imperialism has been woven into American popular culture. The frontier idyll of Little House on the Prairie and rowdy romance of Rodgers and Hammerstein’s West Side Story should probably not be consumed without some reflection on the histories of conquest, displacement, and migration that inform them. Befitting its subject matter, the book also excels at describing the mutating territorial arrangements of the ‘Greater United States’ and highlighting them through well-placed maps. All of this has the intended effect of unsettling readers’ ideas about the fixity of national boundaries. Immerwahr’s attention to multidirectional exchanges of peoples, ideas, and goods between colony and metropole likewise complicates notions of ‘home’ and ‘abroad.’ Among the book’s strongest chapters are those that use language and technology to explore the post-1945 imperial shift. ‘World-proofing’ goods, creating synthetic rubber, refining insecticides, and promoting octagonal stop signs helped an imperial formation rewrite itself to compensate for diminishing territorial control.

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As in any work of this scope, there are omissions and missed opportunities. ‘Empire’ can be a contentious designation, and the book would have benefited from a longer discussion of its shifting applications and reputation in the Euro-American world, perhaps giving the reader a clearer idea at the outset of why territory is no longer the only metric by which the category is assessed. Additionally, nineteenth century continental expansion and proto-colonial ventures in Central America and the Caribbean Basin are given less space than they deserve. The logo map arose from warfare, occupation, legal absorption, and retroactive denial, providing a powerful template for how non-contiguous zones would be handled. While we should be careful not to draw 1:1 comparisons between the pre-and post-1898 empire, there are salient points of transfer in a number of areas, including personnel, governance strategies, modes of violence, spatial rationalization, and civilizing fantasies.10

The Spanish-American War embedded the United States deeper within a European-led global imperial system. Erasure of empire surfaces not only in outright denial, but also in softer forms of compartmentalization. Reading U.S. expansion through a metropole-colony binary can unintentionally reinscribe exceptionalism. Augmenting the book’s analysis with explorations of how early twentieth century Americans understood themselves as participating in a global colonial mission—one grounded in prevalent notions of racial and civilizational capacity—would strengthen its narrative. One of the key successes in hiding American empire has been removing (in public memory, at least) the idea that the nation collaborated and competed with other empires. This phenomenon was especially evident in cases like the Philippines and Puerto Rico, where colonial authorities inherited from one European empire and drew from others. President Woodrow Wilson’s problematic construction of self-determination (and all of its implications for colonized peoples) arose from decades of imperial exchange, with Americans modelling themselves alongside and against their European peers. The Philippines’ imperial neighbors in Southeast Asia deeply influenced U.S. colonial policy there well into the 1930s, and, if we move backwards in time, the continental frontier was also shaped by border-crossing currents.11 How can reintegrating U.S. history into the larger story of global imperialism help reveal it?

Other questions emerged as I read this book, which I will pose here in the spirit of critical conversation. Immerwahr discusses environmental transformation in segments on Baguio and Bikini Atoll, albeit to illustrate different phenomena (transfers of architectural knowledge and the human costs of nuclear colonialism). American empire-builders fixated on land and its many uses. They redirected rivers, levelled forests, mined the earth, and established plantations, and did so from Oklahoma to the Visayas. What, if anything, do environmental histories of U.S. empire add to this story? American colonies were also preoccupied with human transformations. In most colonies redeeming the native and policing racial boundaries cohabitated tensely. Immerwahr dives into the complex dialectic of citizenship and subjecthood in several chapters, although is relatively quiet on topics like education, domesticity, and sexuality. How might a closer look at the role of tutelary schemes and the intimate realm texture our understanding of U.S. empire? Finally, the Cold War shadows Immerwahr’s narrative in the second half of the book. The military bases, nuclear test sites, and cultural initiatives of the ‘pointillist empire’ grew not only out of decolonization, but also ideological competition. What can territory tell us about


Cold War conflicts in regions like Southeast Asia and Latin America? The U.S. bases with the most outsized impact on an overseas population were arguably those in South Vietnam. Could this contribute anything to the story?

As Immerwahr shows, contemporary U.S. empire is hardly oblique to garment industry workers on Saipan, indigenous Guamanians threatened by North Korean missiles, or Puerto Ricans devastated by Hurricane Maria. Nor is it hidden from Pashtun communities targeted by drone strikes, West African villages suddenly playing host to special-forces units, or maquiladora factory laborers paid a fraction of their American counterparts just over the border. Today’s empire, however, frequently invisible to those who benefit from it. In an era where the term widely connotes unsavory power imbalances, it is often simpler to avoid it altogether. Evasion appears in milder forms as well. The disaggregation of U.S. expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from the global history of colonial empire is one method. Another paints empire as something that existed once but now bears no relation to twenty-first century U.S. power. “Empire is still around,” Immerwahr writes in his conclusion, directing our gaze across the contemporary world (394).

When studying empire, territory is a good place to start. As institutionalized representations of sovereignty, maps help us visualize ever-evolving zones of imperial control. They do not tell the entire story, however, and like any human construction are subject to distortion or falsification. Likewise, a territorial lens cannot always fully capture the complex dynamics – hierarchies, violence, mobilities – that constitute imperial encounters. But there is a solidity and accessibility to territory that makes it a crucial tool for introducing empire. In the final chapter of the book, Immerwahr discusses al-Qaeda, whose worldview in the 1990s developed in part as a response to U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia. The larger story threads its way back through twentieth century international history, but the bases provide an entry point that is less daunting than the emergence of Qutbist ideology or the fractious politics of 1980s Afghanistan. Legibility is a valuable dimension of the spatial turn.

The re-centering of empire in the study of U.S. history, which emerged in the wake of the Cold War and accelerated after the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, shows few signs of ebbing. As in European contexts, empire has become an umbrella under which intersecting histories of race, gender, labor, environment, violence, discipline, education, and capital can be uncovered. It is Janus-faced and requires many approaches. Territory is one of them. The recent publication of this book and others that incorporate empire into their narratives of U.S. history is a hopeful sign. At the risk of premature optimism, it suggests we may be reaching a critical mass, where the voluminous and compelling scholarship on the topic translates into a more visible presence for empire in popular histories, textbooks, media coverage, and public conversation. There is still much to be done, and debates over how best to approach and translate empire will assuredly continue within the field, but here is hoping for a coming wave. ‘All the Facts Concerning the United States’ Past and Present Empire,’ we could call it.
In *How to Hide an Empire*, Daniel Immerwahr tells a history of the United States as “if the ‘United States’ meant the Greater United States” (16). With this term Immerwahr intends to signify the nation’s entire territorial reach over time: the “mainland,” or the “contiguous portion,” and U.S. territories and colonies, too (21). While recent volumes like Frank Ninkovich’s *The Global Republic: America’s Inadvertent Rise to World Power* (2014) and A. G. Hopkins’s *American Empire: A Global History* (2018) explain American Empire within global and inter-imperial frameworks, a good portion of Immerwahr’s story takes shape inside the narrower structure of the United States’ territorial empire since independence and especially since 1857.¹ “[A] lot has happened in the territories, occurrences highly relevant to mainlanders,” he writes (19).

And, indeed, one comes to better appreciate Daniel Boone, musicals like *Oklahoma!* and *West Side Story*, and even James Bond films in the context of the “Greater United States.” The same goes for the design of national maps, flags, currency, and how and when references to ‘America’ succeed ‘the United States.’ Immerwahr shows how colonies and territories served as the “proving ground” for the birth control pill, atomic bombs, and chemical weapons (248). “Only by including” the territories and colonies “in the picture do we see a full portrait of the country,” he writes (19).

For some, Immerwahr’s objective may bespeak a form of what Paul Kramer has referred to as “methodological nationalism.” This orientation is evident “in historiographic arguments that the point of broadening the frame of U.S. history is to ‘enrich’ accounts of the United States’ past.”² But Immerwahr’s book is not just a “full[er] portrait of the country”—the restoration of an otherwise “cropped family photo” (13). It also offers an explanation for the changing shape and scope of the United States’ territorial expanse and what this has meant for the ways in which the United States projects power in the world.

Through his twenty-two chapters, Immerwahr explains how and why the United States gained continental and then extra-continental territory, “decolonized” and shed portions of its formal empire following World War II, and then came to preside over the “pointillist empire” of bases and outposts that exists today (315). While Immerwahr marks 1898 as significant to this history, a moment when “a rapidly expanding empire of settlers that fed on land” became an empire that “conquer[ed] subject populations and rul[ed] them” (78, 79), he spends far more time accounting for the “replacement of colonialism with globalization” and the creation of the post-World War II “pointillist empire” (315).

Immerwahr observes that following the war, the United States claimed “thirty thousand installations on two thousand overseas base sites” and enjoyed jurisdictional authority across overseas territory on which more people dwelled than inhabitants of the mainland (219). Yet, the U.S. government did not annex new lands. Instead, it released its hold on “its largest colony (the Philippines), fold[ed] up its occupations, [and] nudg[ed] its European counterparts to abandon their empires” (229). “[A] global anti-imperial resistance movement,” or what he calls “the Asian Spring,” helps to explain this (230, 231). So do developments in chemistry, industrial engineering, and logistics. If the former delegitimized formal colonialism, the latter rendered it unnecessary, he contends.

The development of synthetic replacements for raw materials previously sourced on colonial peripheries; airplanes, which “changed the laws of geopolitics” (286); the “space-hopping” technology of radio (289); and the standardization of manufacturing methods and even language (with the dominance of English), allowed for the emergence of a “new pattern of global power” (216). Rooted “less on claiming large swaths of land” or “colonialism,” it operates through the control of

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“small points” (216). Immerwahr refers to these innovations as “empire-killing technologies,” a somewhat confusing expression in that he argues that these technologies helped to produce the “pointillist empire” of military bases and “tiny specks of semi-sovereignty strewn around the globe” (343-344).

While the first part of Immerwahr’s book evokes imperial studies that have emphasized the mutual constitution of ‘the domestic’ and ‘the foreign,’ this second part references work centered on matters of space and geography. Historian William Rankin’s recent After the Map: Cartography, Navigation, and the Transformation of Territory in the Twentieth Century (2016) gets express mention in his narrative, and it is from Rankin’s study that Immerwahr draws the concept of the pointillist empire. Geographer Neil Smith in American Empire: Roosevelt’s Geographer and the Prelude to Globalization (2003) also made an argument about the shape of U.S. empire similar to Immerwahr’s (his book is cited twice in the notes). Smith asserted that U.S.-styled “globalism,” which emerged after World War II, “represents a long-term strategic rebuttal of European colonialism and anticolonial movements alike.”

Yet Immerwahr’s and Smith’s books diverge in telling ways. Where Smith stressed “the more abstract geography of the world market” as the space across which U.S. power was being exercised, Immerwahr accents the continuing import of territory—if ever smaller “specks” of it. This distinction between Smith’s and Immerwahr’s work also highlights the kind of power that is emphasized through Immerwahr’s account. It’s not the market or the logic of capital accumulation as it was for Smith and some revisionist scholars of “new empire” like Walter LaFeber. Immerwahr’s focus on territorial empire drives our attention to the U.S. state and military. World War II and the state’s prosecution of it launches those “empire-killing technologies” (264).

In his introduction and conclusion, Immerwahr does recognize U.S. economic power as an expression of the nation’s imperial bearing. He even sets his final chapter in Saipan, one of the Northern Marianas, a U.S. commonwealth. Saipan became known as a center of garment manufacturing by exploited workers who labored on U.S. territory but outside the reach of U.S. labor regulation, conditions that benefited many American retailers. Still, Immerwahr tends generally to bracket capital and how the state has exercised power in the world by structuring capitalist markets and the international institutions that shore these up. Undoubtedly this is a major story of the second half of the twentieth century and a leading way through which U.S. imperial power has managed to remain hidden. It is also worth pointing out that capitalist markets do not stand at a remove from the problem of territory; they also have a territorial dimension in sites like ports and foreign trade zones.

It could be that Immerwahr’s framework of the “Greater United States” restricts him (perhaps mercifully) from pursuing the relationship between the state, capital, and territory. Such work would require Immerwahr to move beyond the

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6 Smith, 19.


constraints of the mainland and U.S. territories and colonies, something that trans-imperial and global approaches to U.S. empire can do readily. Attention to the state’s role in the process of capital accumulation, however, might provoke reconsideration of one of Immerwahr’s major arguments—that “colonialism” was succeeded by globalization. And, even if one discounts the insights of dependency theory and concepts like neo-colonialism, Immerwahr’s own approach to territorial empire begs questions about the supposed transition. As he notes in his chapter “Baselandia,” U.S. military personnel have generally confined neither their work nor their recreational activities to the confines of bases. Consequently, for local neighbors, these occupations “could feel like colonialism” (356).

If How to Hide an Empire invites us to continue thinking through the historical intersections of geography, the state, and capital, it also points to the importance of asking how settler colonialism fits into the broader history of U.S. empire. Relatively little recent work relates colonialism in the western part of the American continent to that overseas. Even as scholars might recognize settler colonialism and extra-continental colonialism as distinct but related chapters within United States imperial history, disciplinary habits, the very real risk of obscuring distinct colonial histories in latching onto imperial continuities, and the disparate trajectories of these territories have tended to hold these histories apart.

Immerwahr’s two first chapters on white settlement beyond the borders of the original colonies are thus notable. Immerwahr introduces the founders’ creation of ‘territory’ as a political category; he briefly discusses the formation of Indian Country as lands held at a remove from white settlement; and he stresses the racial violence and dispossession that undergirded white settlement. These two chapters read largely as a brief set-up to the history that follows. Yet how the U.S. state reckoned with matters of sovereignty, property, and the building of an administrative apparatus to govern territories are a few threads that might relate ‘westward expansion’ to the annexations that followed the formation of the lower 48 as the United States (46). In short, Immerwahr’s book is a welcome prompt to continue analyzing, at minimum, the legal and administrative links between settler colonialism and overseas colonialism.

Needless to say, no one book, especially on the subject of United States empire, can do it all. But for me, there is one especially regrettable omission in How to Hide an Empire: women. In making the case that the U.S. territories are due his readers’ attention, Immerwahr lists the 1940 populations of these places (11). Unless they went uncounted, then, women are about half of the millions of subjects who help to justify Immerwahr’s project. In light of this and how adroitly he weaves topics like science and technology, health, and popular culture through his narrative, it is disappointing that women appear infrequently (a notable exception to the rule is the German-Jewish chemist Clara Haber, Immerwahr’s distant relative). If only as agents of U.S. territorial empire—as consumers of colonial products, as empire’s photographers, as missionaries and teachers—women merit attention. The historical literature has shown that ‘boots on the ground’ belonged not to men alone.9

Immerwahr’s sum project, however, is an achievement. Relatively few historians of the United States or of U.S. foreign relations have written of the territories and colonies collectively and over the haul of the twentieth century.10 Most work has

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focused on individual colonies or territories. Not only is Immerwahr’s book valuable, then, but it is also a story that he tells compellingly. Immerwahr laces his narrative with arresting details and strikes an effective balance between the specific and the general. He is attentive to a host of historical forces from science and culture, to ideas and individuals. Quite familiar figures like President Theodore Roosevelt and General Douglas MacArthur make appearances. But Immerwahr also brings forward historical actors who are likely lesser known to many readers in the United States, like Pedro Albizu Campos, a Harvard-trained lawyer, who established the nationalist ‘Liberation Army’ in Puerto Rico, and the Filipino architect Juan Arellano, who continued architectural work begun by Chicago urban planner Daniel Burnham on the archipelago in the early twentieth century.

In attempting to tell a history of the “Greater United States” and capture the full ‘family photo’ of the country, How to Hide an Empire really sets in relief lines of demarcation. Immerwahr presents a picture of a U.S. state that has consistently exercised and expanded its power by restricting the reach of the Constitution, the law, and norms and prerogatives enjoyed especially by those recognized as white men.

*Patterns of Empire: The British and American Empires, 1688 to the Present* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) come to mind as a few exceptions.
Studies of American colonialism often insist on foregrounding the parallels between the imperial formations of the United States and its European counterparts. In this anti-exceptionalist narrative, American imperialists modeled themselves on the Europeans to create their own rival empire. There is great value in these comparative imperial histories, not least of all because they help puncture the myth—still powerful in non-academic history—that the U.S. colonial empire was a short-lived aberration that magically fell into America’s lap in 1898. Yet in doing so they fail to account for one of the distinguishing features of America’s overseas empire: its conspicuous absence in domestic American politics and culture. (Indeed, this is one reason why imperial denialism remains so potent in the United States today.) American colonialism is there if you know where to look, and at key inflection points—such as during and immediately after the wars of 1898-1902—its presence is impossible to miss. But the fact remains that however much empire is crucial to understanding American history, denial of empire is perhaps more so.

How to Hide an Empire, Daniel Immerwahr’s sweeping account of American empire, manages to illuminate both phenomena, and to great effect. It demonstrates how empire was woven into American life and at the same time obscured from sight in the metropole. The influence of empire on the U.S. mainland, Immerwahr shows us, tended to be implicit rather than explicit. The first overseas territories acquired by the U.S. were uninhabited islands mined for their guano—bird excrement that made for excellent fertilizer. Few U.S. farmers knew or cared where the guano came from, or that by 1902 the U.S. claimed dominion over nearly 100 tiny islands scattered throughout the Pacific and the Caribbean. And yet America’s agricultural boom, which helped launch the United States as a global economic power, would have been impossible without unfettered access to its “white gold” archipelago. Puerto Rico’s contributions to American advancement similarly went unnoticed. It was there that American and Puerto Rican doctors discovered the cure for hookworm, which had a significant health and economic impact on the U.S. South. More infamously, but still unknown by most Americans, it was also where U.S. researchers developed the birth control pill, in the process conducting patently unethical experiments on Puerto Rican women.

In showing how Americans ignored their empire, Immerwahr has set himself a difficult task: proving a negative. But he makes a compelling case through astute use of evidence, calling attention to the many large and small ways that empire was rendered invisible. He has an eye for the telling detail—informing us, for instance, that the “date which will live in infamy,” was 7 December 1941 only in Hawai’i and Midway. Nine hours after Japanese bombers ambushed Pearl Harbor, they struck the U.S. Pacific fleet in Manila; by then it was December 8, Philippine Standard Time. President Franklin Roosevelt’s dating the event was part of a speech that highlighted the attack on Hawai’i, while the Philippines, along with other U.S. possessions in the Pacific, was included as part of a “verse list of Japan’s other targets,” including the British territories of Malaya and Hong Kong (6). Hawai’i—the only overseas colony with a sizeable white settler population—was now unquestionably American, while the Philippines, home to some 17 million U.S. nationals, was treated like an afterthought. Immerwahr provides similarly striking examples and anecdotes throughout the book, upending traditional narratives and defamiliarizing well-worn events by widening the frame of U.S. history to include its colonies.

It is remarkable how little attention mainlanders paid to U.S. empire, even at the height of American colonialism, between 1898 and World War II. No one was encouraging them to worry about it. Newspapers barely covered the colonies. Maps and textbooks labeled them as ‘foreign.’ There was no dedicated colonial office or school to train colonial administrators, as was standard in Europe. Instead, America’s colonies “were ruled by a haphazard and improvised set of bureaucratic arrangements” across multiple federal agencies (155). The British had an official holiday, Empire Day, celebrated throughout the United Kingdom with dedicated parades and songs. Americans had a day to celebrate the national flag, one that displayed “a star for each state but no symbol for territories” (112). As an American who has lived in Britain for nearly half a decade, I can attest to how these different histories of empire have played out. Nowadays the two nations are plagued by very different forms of imperial amnesia. If a shockingly high percentage of Americans do not know that Puerto Rico is part of the United States, there are English people who assume that Ireland is still under Britain’s thumb. The British often willfully ignore the horrors of colonialism in favor of extolling India’s railroads; many remember the empire fondly, so much
so that they want to leave Europe in order to recapture a time when Britain was the most powerful nation on earth, 
beholden to no one. In the United States, hardly anyone remembers the empire at all.

This, Immerwahr’s book implies, is one of the main reasons for America’s current global supremacy. The second half of the 
book tracks the rise of the United States as a superpower after World War II, when it “did something highly unusual: [it] 
won a war and gave up territory” (229). The correlation Immerwahr draws between the two is persuasive: just at the moment 
when the United States was seeking to erase its colonial history—granting independence to the Philippines in 1946 and, 
over the course of the 1950s, transforming the legal status of Alaska, Hawai’i, and Puerto Rico so that they no longer 
qualified as non-self-governing territories under United Nations rules—it was dramatically expanding its global reach.

Significantly, the United States did keep some of its colonies and acquired new lands after 1945. After the war, the United 
States transitioned from a territorial empire to what Immerwahr calls a “pointillist” one, wherein America “reshuffled its 
imperial portfolio, divesting itself of large colonies and investing in military bases, tiny specks of semi-sovereignty 
strown around the globe,” today some 800 in all (343-344). These specks of land served a role similar to that of the old colonies—as 
fueling stations, as seedbeds of Americanization, and, of course, as sites for the projection of military power. But the overall 
physical size of America’s territorial footprint shrunk considerably.

Territorial control was no longer an end in itself. And the United States did not need a massive colonial empire to exert 
world power. It now had other, less cumbersome means of ensuring U.S. dominance. Here Immerwahr points to a series of 
technological advances, many of them invented or perfected by the United States during the war as part of the effort to 
supply and distribute materiel. These developments had the added benefit of helping to make colonial possession obsolete, 
or at least less necessary, by reducing reliance on natural resources and counteracting various other administrative and 
economic advantages of the colonial system. Synthetic rubber allowed for the meteoric growth of the automobile and 
aviation industries without needing to harvest the natural kind from colonies in Asia and Africa. For numerous other 
colonial products, from silk to tung oil, American scientists created synthetic stand-ins. “Throughout its economy,” 
Immerwahr tells us, America “replaced colonies with chemistry” (271). Meanwhile, other “empire-killing technologies,” 
such as airplanes and wireless communication, “allowed the United States to move easily through foreign lands it didn’t 
control, substituting technology for territory” (279, 295). A U.S.-led campaign to create a worldwide system of standards— 
on the measurements of basic industrial parts, traffic signage, modern agricultural practice—meant America "could force 
other countries to adopt its screw thread angle in the name of international cooperation" (315).

Immerwahr thus offers a largely materialist argument for why the United States made the “highly unusual” move of 
shedding territory after World War II. Though he acknowledges the force of Third World nationalism in pressuring the 
United States to support decolonization, it is stuff—the humble screw thread, the B-52 bomber, long-range radios—that 
drives the book’s post-1945 story. Decolonization, too, is portrayed through a mostly materialist lens, as a challenge to the 
smooth operation of empire. For pragmatic reasons, the United States decided it was easier to accommodate it rather than 
divert resources to uphold an outmoded colonialism.

However, given the relative dearth of materialist reasons for American overseas colonialism—the continental United States 
provided most of the raw materials, save guano, that powered early American industry and the nation’s rise as an economic 
power—it would follow that we need more than stuff to explain why the United States gave up territory after the war. 
Ideology, politics, and culture surely played a role in this transformation, but they are mostly overlooked.

They are given more weight in the first half of the book, where New York Governor Theodore Roosevelt’s vision of the 
‘strenuous life’ and the anti-imperialism of writer Mark Twain and Democratic politician William Jennings Bryan jockey for 
influence. By 1945, the key figures are rational actors and technocrats seeking to overcome the practical problems of running 
a pointillist empire.

And yet they were certainly driven by ideology as well. Postwar anti-colonialist rhetoric, as well as America’s reluctance to 
take on large swathes of new territory, represented a widespread belief among liberal policymakers that the United States was
a force for global good, one invested in promoting democracy and the independent nation-state. And of course it had a useful foil in all this—the Soviet Union, which, together with Third World nationalists, forced the United States to articulate a new world vision that broke with the colonial past. At the same time, the Cold War, which is mostly missing in How to Hide an Empire, had domestic implications as well. Soviet propaganda helped drive home the idea that the Cold War and decolonization demanded both an end to Jim Crow and some form of self-government for (some) U.S. territories if the United States wanted to appear credible as leader of the “free world.”

Ordinary Americans were enlisted in the ideological battle with the Soviet Union too, with many actively espousing liberal anti-racism and support for Third World nationalism as part of the effort to project an altruistic image of the United States.

Indeed, Americans’ idealistic self-conception was conditioned by the fact that, as Immerwahr points out, the United States did not require a vast territorial empire to assert global power in this period. But ideology determines notions of self-interest as well as the other way around. Spending time in the archives of U.S. foreign policymakers, one is struck by the sense that they truly bought into their own claims of global benevolence, however at odds those were with actual policy. Other scholars will dispute the sincerity of such claims, but it seems incontrovertible that, whatever the true intent, the assertion that the United States was not an empire shaped its actions on the world stage after World War II. It generally eschewed outright colonization in favor of building up a system of capitalist nation-states and it spent millions on propaganda and cultural exchange programs in a bid to convince the Third World of its anti-colonial bona fides.

The United States in this period wanted to have it both ways—to be imperial without a formal empire, to endorse anti-colonialism while ensuring the Third World remained in its orbit. This, as Immerwahr’s book makes clear, was a way of thinking and behaving honed over decades of hiding America’s empire from view.


Having a roundtable on one’s book is an honor, but a dangerous one. The family resemblance between scholarly roundtable and firing squad can be close. I will confess that I felt a shiver of fear knowing my reviewers would be Oliver Charbonneau, Rebecca Tinio McKenna, and Sarah Miller-Davenport. I relied on all of them—their work and their advice—in writing *How to Hide an Empire*, and I did so because they are among the most exciting, formidable scholars of the United States’ colonial empire.¹ Now I have to thank them for these characteristically thoughtful reviews—and for their kindness in aiming away from my head.

The reviewers summarize my book well, relieving me of the burden of doing so myself. It was particularly helpful of McKenna to compare it to the late Neil Smith’s provocative volume, *American Empire*. Smith’s argument, nutshellled, is that the U.S. Empire defined its power “through the more abstract geography of the world market rather than through direct political control of territory.”² In Smith’s understanding, the 1898 War with Spain, the occasion for Washington to seize a large colonial empire, was “an anomaly,” a deviation from the true pattern of U.S. imperial history.³ So unimpressed was Smith with U.S. colonies that he managed to write a 586-page book titled *American Empire* that mentioned the Philippines only three times and Puerto Rico and Hawai’i not at all. Smith is not alone in this. The emphasis of markets over territory is a common (though by no means universal) feature of accounts of U.S. empire.⁴

And that is where *How to Hide an Empire* differs. As some journalists follow the money, I made it my mantra to follow the territory. Doing so convinced me just how important U.S.-controlled areas outside of the states—western territories, overseas colonies, occupied zones, uninhabited islands, and military bases—have been. It is not an accident that World War II began, for the United States, in its overseas territories. That is true of the First World War, too—the first U.S. shot fired in that conflict was from Guam. Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden’s jihad against the United States and thus the Global War on Terror can be traced back to a U.S. military base at Dhahran in Saudi Arabia. Beyond wars, other historical developments, from the creation of the birth control pill to the rise of the term “America,” can be better understood once the parts of the United States beyond the contiguous clump of states are brought into the picture.

Every viewpoint, however, has its blind spots. As Charbonneau writes: “A territorial lens cannot always fully capture the complex dynamics—hierarchies, violence, mobilities—that constitute imperial encounters.” He will hear no argument from me. Readers should recognize that the territorial lens is just that, a lens. It brings some objects into sharp focus and relegates others to the blurry background. For that reason, *How to Hide an Empire* does not profess to be a full account of U.S. Empire. It is about territory specifically, which is but one of the faces of empire.

Even restricting its account to territorial empire, my book is not exhaustive, and all three reviewers identify subjects or themes that I might profitably have included. Writers always face questions about what to leave out, but in this case they

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⁴ An influential account along these lines is Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
were sharpened by genre. I wrote *How to Hide an Empire* for a commercial press with an eye to luring that elusive and possibly mythical beast, the 'general reader.' That meant making hard choices. Writing for non-specialists does not require dumbing down, but it does require focusing. Unfamiliar ideas, people, and places must be given significantly more time, in order to help the reader understand and care about them. When scholars write for each other, we can make quick side-hops to topics that are not our main interest but that are nonetheless relevant. We write sentences like, 'The history of empire is political history, but it is also the history of space, the environment, race, gender, sexuality, capital, migration, and discourse.' Such gestures to adjacent pockets of scholarship place our work in context. But they also (I suspect) trip ordinary readers up, and I learned to avoid them.

All this is to say that there are many important aspects of the subject that I do not fully engage and some that I do not even mention. I am thrilled that Charbonneau, McKenna, and Miller-Davenport identify various omissions, in part because it gives me a chance to address them, but more because these three reviews can be collectively taken as a game plan for how the field might move forward.

McKenna observes, correctly, that my account of empire is state-centered and “tends generally to bracket capital.” It would be useful to know “how the state has exercised power in the world by structuring capitalist markets and the international institutions that shore it up,” she writes. The story of the Bretton Woods system and, later, the World Trade Organization are beyond my remit. However, I hope my book can nevertheless contribute to an understanding of how the U.S. state has structured capitalist markets, even though I do not address that topic directly in those terms. In discussing the United States' partial decolonization, I describe key technologies that made it easier to project power without controlling territory. These technologies were deployed by the U.S. military for strategic purposes, but they served capital as well. For example, the global U.S.-centered standardization campaign after World War II was led by the military (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I argue, was among other things a standardization organization). But then the circuits connected by the military gave shape to capitalist international supply chains. One story my book tells is how the military occupation of Japan gave rise to a U.S.-facing Japanese electronics industry that first served the U.S. market and then came to dominate it. In other words, I agree with McKenna that “capitalist markets do not stand at a remove from the problem of territory; they also have a territorial dimension.”

Continuing, McKenna notes "one especially regrettable omission": women. They are not absent from *How to Hide an Empire*, which includes a chapter on female contraception and sterilization in Puerto Rico and a section on Filipino nurses. Nevertheless, McKenna is right that my book, which dwells on high politics and the military, does not feature women prominently among the ranks of the “agents of U.S. territorial empire.” Beyond agreeing with McKenna, I will add that one especially fruitful avenue of research would be on Boasian anthropologists and empire. The anthropologist Franz Boas at Columbia was unusually supportive of female students, and three went on to become major public intellectuals: Margaret Mead, Zora Neale Hurston, and Ruth Benedict. All engaged with empire in substantial ways, Benedict among Native societies in North America, Hurston in U.S.-occupied Haiti, and Mead in American Samoa. And yet these women are usually contextualized within the history of anthropology, literature, or mainland race relations, rather than colonial

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6 Another important way markets have a territorial dimension is via the use of islands as tax havens and anomalous economic zones. In my book, I discuss Saipan’s serving this function, but for an excellent general account see Vanessa Ogle, "Archipelago Capitalism: Tax Havens, Offshore Money, and the State, 1950s–1970s,” *American Historical Review* 122:5 (2017): 1431-1458.
history." I had contemplated a chapter on Mead, but it did not fit my narrative frame as well as chapters on other colonial experts (doctors in Puerto Rico, architects in the Philippines). And so Mead appears only briefly in my book, as a prominent example of an empire-obscurer, for writing a high-profile book about American Samoa without disclosing that she was describing a U.S. colony.

Among the omitted subjects Charbonneau identifies is the environment. "American empire-builders fixated on land and its many uses," he writes. "What, if anything, do environmental histories of U.S. empire add to this story?" Quite a lot. Environmental transformations in the territories are a classic example of imperial standardization, attempts to plug different parts of the planet into globe-spanning imperial circuits. In How to Hide an Empire, I discuss the standardization of people via nursing practices. One could similarly discuss the standardization of land via agricultural ones. The creation of a vast cane sugar economy encompassing the mainland (in semitropical regions like Florida) and the Caribbean and Pacific colonies was one such achievement. Rough standardization of agricultural practices within an imperial frame also encouraged networks, such as the one carrying Filipino workers to Hawai'i, the west coast of the mainland, and Alaska.

Something else that deserves emphasis, in Charbonneau’s view, is “how early twentieth century Americans understood themselves as participating in a global colonial mission.” Though I contextualize the U.S. territorial empire within global history, I do not highlight the many borrowings and shared practices that united the sometimes rivalrous powers. This is an area where slight caution is necessary, though. It is indisputably true that the more animated imperialists looked to Europe for guidance. Colonial administrator Cameron Forbes, building a raj-style hill station at Baguio in the Philippines, is a good example. And, certainly, racial views in the Greater United States were shaped by a larger Atlantic discourse. But it should be remembered that many of the men who governed U.S. colonies were not prepared for the task. Officials like Robert Gore, a life insurance salesman and publisher who became the governor of Puerto Rico, did not rise through the ranks of colonial affairs but were appointed despite their utter lack of experience (Gore, whom political leader Luis Muñoz Marín deemed an “imbecile,” reportedly couldn’t locate Puerto Rico on a map). Compounding the problem, top officials often rotated rapidly out of their jobs to return to the mainland—Gore served only six months. All this placed a limit on how fully they self-consciously identified with a worldwide imperial mission and joined conversations about it.

Miller-Davenport raises a question of ideology, and she raises it not just as an omission but as an interpretive challenge. In my book, I describe a post-1945 tilt in the United States away from the colonial pattern of empire toward a "pointillist" one. I explain this in terms of two factors: (1) the global anti-imperial revolt, which drove the cost of colonies up, and (2) the deployment of new technologies that allowed the projection of power across space without controlling large swaths of land, which drove demand for colonies down. Miller-Davenport asks where ideology fits in, and posits a third explanation: an ideological transformation that led would-be colonizers to put down the white man’s burden in exchange for "liberal anti-racism." She also notes the role of the Cold War in speeding that transformation along. Driving her point home, she argues that this was not merely a strategic shift in official rhetoric; leaders "truly bought their own claims" and "ordinary Americans" did, too.¹⁰

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¹⁰ Miller-Davenport explains how these developments affected decolonization in her book, Gateway State.
I would not dispute a word of that argument. The contrast between Roosevelts—Theodore the Kipling-style imperialist versus Franklin the circumspect decolonizer—illustrates just how much had changed between 1898 and 1945. Yet the reason I do not stress mainland ideology is that I am not convinced that it was the fundamental change. I regard the transformation Miller-Davenport describes as a second-order effect, a reaction to changing conditions. With colonized resistance on the rise and new options available, mainlanders found it convenient and congenial to disapprove of colonialism, and to do so genuinely. Yet without those political or technological developments, I suspect they would have happily continued to tolerate it.

Miller-Davenport’s question touches on a deeper feature of *How to Hide an Empire*: its emphasis on military, political, and material history rather than intellectual history. Much scholarship on empire, including that of the United States, has been about ideas, images, and discourses. Studies of the metropole, following William Appleman Williams, have asked about imperialism as a cast of mind. Studies of the colonies, influenced by the theorists Michel Foucault and Edward Said, have zoomed in on the nexus between knowledge and power, between the colonial gaze and the act of oppression. *How to Hide an Empire* engages with such topics, but my sense is that the U.S. colonial empire does not always fit these models. The reason is that U.S. leaders have often been indifferent colonizers. The imperialist spirit filled them as they acquired overseas territories, but that was not always the spirit in which they governed. Officials were less likely to subject their territories to panoptic scrutiny than to forget about them altogether. Hence my title, emphasizing obscuring rather than knowing, and my dedication, “to the uncounted,” rather than, as a Foucauldian might put it, to the relentlessly counted.

At the end of his review, Charbonneau proposes that “we may be reaching a critical mass” in the study of empire, whereby “the voluminous and compelling scholarship on the topic translates into a more visible presence for empire in popular histories, textbooks, media coverage, and public conversation.” I share that hope. And it is for that reason in particular that I am grateful to Charbonneau, McKenna, and Miller-Davenport for pointing to areas my book did not cover and thereby nudging the field forward, closer to that critical mass. There is much left to do, but with such scholars as these three reviewers at the helm, I feel confident.

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