
11 May 2020 | https://hdiplo.org/to/RT21-41
Roundtable Editor: Diane Labrosse | Production Editor: George Fujii

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Introduction by Julia F. Irwin, University of South Florida

Twenty years ago, Nick Cullather published a soon-to-be influential essay, “Development? It’s History,” urging historians to pay greater attention to development as a category of analysis. Over the next two decades, many heeded the call. As a result, the historiography of international development underwent a seemingly Rostovian period of growth. After ‘taking off’ in the early 2000s, the field experienced a steady ‘drive to maturity,’ as more and more scholars began to produce local, national, and international histories of development. Today, we have arguably reached the ‘age of high mass-consumption,’ as historians scramble to consume the myriad monographs, articles, and conference papers on global development that are now produced each year.

What scholars of this subject have been awaiting, however, is a high-quality synthesis, a single volume that weaves together the vast literature on global development into a compelling, readable narrative. As the contributors to this roundtable largely concur, Sara Lorenzini’s Global Development: A Cold War History is just such a book. In a comprehensive yet concise overview, she charts the political and intellectual history of global development in the second half of the twentieth century, in the context of the Cold War. Although the story Lorenzini tells is in many ways familiar, she also enhances that narrative with many novel insights, analyses, and arguments. The product of more than twenty years of research, her book is grounded in a diverse array of secondary literature and informed by the archives of dozens of countries and international organizations. Her authoritative study deserves to be read widely, the reviewers agree, not only by historians of development, but also by scholars working on the global Cold War, decolonization and postcolonial state-building, and twentieth-century international history.

Among this roundtable’s contributors, the general consensus is that Lorenzini has written an important, ambitious book. Nathan J. Citino calls Global Development “a rich and valuable resource,” while Nils Gilman judges it “the best global intellectual and political history of development available.” Christy Thornton admires Lorenzini for bringing “together bodies of secondary literature that are frequently read in isolation from one another.” The other three reviewers—Stephen Macekura, Corinna Unger, and Alden Young—express similarly positive sentiments about the book and the many useful contributions it makes to the field. All agree that Global Development contains much to applaud, even as it raises new questions and leaves some others unanswered.

One of the book’s central arguments is that development projects, although framed in global and universal terms, primarily served the national interests and ambitions of aid donors and recipients. As Lorenzini contends, moreover, “the role of [the] state was crucial” to the history of global development (3). The reviewers find these arguments compelling, and several commend Lorenzini for her attention to the political tensions that development aid produced, both between and among various countries. Macekura, for instance, observes that Lorenzini “ably documents the ways in which development exacerbated international political conflicts.” Unger, likewise, is persuaded by the evidence that development aid often “did more to fuel competition and to trigger conflicts than to overcome them.”

Nation-states and international politics, as these comments suggest, lie at the heart of Lorenzini’s analysis. A number of reviewers discuss this authorial choice. Global Development “can best be characterized as an international political history,” as Unger writes. “It is a history of policies, debates, and politics; it is not a history of practices, approaches, and experiences,” she continues. “The actors are politicians, experts, and high-level administrators; they are not fieldworkers or ‘ordinary’ people.” While generally respecting Lorenzini’s decision to focus on these particular areas, several reviewers nevertheless reflect on what her book ignores by concentrating so heavily on diplomatic history. “For all her excellent analysis of the international politics of development,” as Macekura notes, “Lorenzini provides few glimpses of the material realities of development initiatives on the ground,” making it “difficult to assess just how thoroughly development interventions actually reshaped lives, livelihoods, and landscapes.” Her book “touches only in passing on specific, on-the-ground

development projects,” Gilman concurs, “and pays no attention whatsoever to the quotidian experience of development of the poor people who have been the recipients or subjects of the global development enterprise.” For these reviewers, such points are intended less as criticisms of Lorenzini’s work as they are suggestions for future research.

While some contributors may have wished for more bottom-up analysis, the reviewers are unanimous in praising Lorenzini for her efforts to bring neglected actors, organizations, and states into the history of development. Looking beyond the United States, the Soviet Union, and their superpower competition, as several reviewers observe, Lorenzini focuses considerable attention on the European Economic Community (EEC), analyzing the “third way” toward development that its member states offered to aid recipients in the Global South (7, 143). Through her analysis of these European alternatives, as multiple reviewers note, Lorenzini highlights the material and ideological links between late imperial welfare schemes and postcolonial development projects. In so doing, she demonstrates how the legacies of empire—and not only the Cold War—fundamentally shaped this history. Citino, echoing others, appreciates that the book “disaggregates each ‘side’ in the Cold War,” thereby demonstrating “that the European Economic Community (EEC) made distinctive contributions to development policy apart from the anti-Communist strategy of the United States.” Several reviewers further praise Lorenzini for including actors from Eastern Europe and China, and from throughout the Third World and Global South. As Unger observes, voices from these regions “are much more present in Lorenzini’s book than used to be the norm.”

Although the reviewers praise Lorenzini for attempting to cast a wide geographical net, several lament that she does not go far enough, particularly given that her book is an avowedly “global” history. On this point, Thornton is perhaps the most critical. Lorenzini’s primary focus remains on the decisions and voices of donor nations rather than recipient ones, she observes, with the effect that “the Third World is still rendered as a terrain to be acted upon, as peoples and territories subject to the ideas and policies of a now broadened group of more powerful interlocutors.” While she commends Lorenzini for her “laudable expansion beyond the United States,” Thornton also regrets the relative dearth of attention paid to the rest of the Western Hemisphere, noting that Latin America “emerges as entirely marginal to the history of global development.” Young, meanwhile, asks whether the book’s “division of the world into donors and recipients accurately captures the richness of the global story of development.” He wishes that Lorenzini had done more to decenter the Global North and its intellectual categories, adding that the “challenge is how to narrate the multiplicity of the global without reproducing the conventional hegemons.” Unger, too, would have preferred more evidence from the Global South, particularly pertaining to discussions about the environment. “Incorporating the positions of the so-called developing countries and their actions into the analysis of the history of global development,” she concludes, “will be an important task for future research.”

In addition to discussing the book’s geographical scope, many reviewers comment on the broad chronological frame that Lorenzini employs. Although Global Development focuses primarily on the years after 1945, Lorenzini begins by tracing the multiple roots of this concept in the early twentieth century, locating the origins of development in such places as European colonial welfare projects, Soviet Five Year Plans, and U.S. New Deal projects like the Tennessee Valley Authority. She also “highlights the crucial role of the League of Nations” in the history of global development, as Citino notes admiringly. As the book moves into the Cold War era itself, Lorenzini continues to push against conventional chronological boundaries. Whereas much of the existing literature on international development has concentrated on the 1950s and 1960s, she devotes substantial attention to the 1970s and (albeit to a lesser extent) the 1980s. Young considers these latter chapters “some of the most compelling parts of the book.” Lorenzini concludes her book in more recent years, reflecting on the legacies and lessons of her twentieth century history for today’s development practitioners. As Macekura notes, her analysis offers “powerful conclusions that are relevant for contemporary policy.”

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Yet, as Lorenzini writes in her response to this roundtable, if the book is “a history of the twentieth century read through the lens of development,” its central focus is admittedly on the four decades spanning the late 1940s through the late 1980s. As its subtitle promises, the book is fundamentally a “Cold War History.” One of the book’s central arguments, moreover, is that the Cold War played a critical part in defining the ideas, practices, and structures of international development—and that development, in turn, determined the history of the Cold War in critical ways. Several reviewers are persuaded by these claims. In “a single, accessible volume,” Macekura writes, Lorenzini “elucidates how Cold War international politics shaped the history of development and how international development initiatives influenced the course of the Cold War.” While she agrees with this point, Unger also appreciates that the “the connection between development and the Cold War is told from a variety of perspectives, thereby reflecting the multcentric nature of the conflict,” calling this “a notable step forward in the existing historiography.”

Several reviewers, however, raise critical questions about the book’s Cold War framing and its limitations. Putting the matter concisely, Citino asks, “is development a Cold War story?” After all, he continues, Lorenzini “portrays development as part of the longer and ongoing history of imperialism,” and not simply a function of the Cold War. Gilman, in a similar vein, wonders “whether a ‘Cold War history’ is the best way to think about the global project of development as a totality,” calling this “the one questionable interpretive point about the framing of the book.” Young, perhaps most critically of all, expresses considerable “discomfort with the use of the Cold War to structure a book on global development.” Such a framing, he notes, ignores the “different temporalities” we might consider “when contemplating the problem of development.” Young urges Lorenzini — and indeed, all of us — to remain attuned to alternative time scales and concepts when writing histories of international development, particularly those that stem from intellectuals, policymakers, and other actors in the Global South.

In spite of their respective critiques, the six contributors to this roundtable concur that Global Development marks both a compelling synthesis and a welcome contribution to the field. Although Gilman quips that “a total history of global development continues to await its Braudel,” he and other reviewers nevertheless commend Lorenzini for having written a book that is at once impressively thorough yet “admirably succinct,” as Citino puts it. Concluding this roundtable, Lorenzini offers a gracious response to the reviewers, engaging with their respective compliments and criticisms in constructive, thoughtful ways. Echoing several of the reviewers, Lorenzini hopes that her book will not be the last word on the subject. “Further research on topics that are still understudied,” as she writes, “will shed new light on aspects that are not yet at the forefront of this global history.” Lorenzini looks forward to seeing the historiography of international development grow in new and exciting directions in the years to come. Her book will surely be an excellent starting point for scholars writing these future histories.

Participants:

Sara Lorenzini is a Professor of Modern History at the School of International Studies and at the Department of Humanities of the University of Trento, Italy, where she also holds a Jean Monnet Chair (2018-2021). She has written extensively on the history of the Cold War. Among her works: Una strana guerra fredda. Lo sviluppo e le relazioni Nord-Sud (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2017) and L’Italia e il trattato di pace del 1947 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007). Global Development. A Cold War History (Princeton University Press, 2019) is her latest book.

Julia Irwin is an Associate Professor of History at the University of South Florida. Her research focuses on the place of humanitarian assistance in 20th century U.S. foreign relations and international history. Her first book, Making the World Safe: The American Red Cross and a Nation’s Humanitarian Awakening (Oxford University Press, 2013), is a history of U.S. international relief efforts during the First World War era. She is now writing a second book, Catastrophic Diplomacy: A History of U.S. Responses to Global Natural Disasters, a history of U.S. foreign disaster assistance and emergency relief during the twentieth century.


Stephen Macekura is Associate Professor of International Studies at Indiana University’s Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies. He is the author of *Of Limits and Growth: The Rise of Global Sustainable Development in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge, 2015) and co-editor, with Erez Manela, of *The Development Century: A Global History* (Cambridge, 2018). He is finishing a book on the history of debates over the meaning and measurement of economic growth during the twentieth century, tentatively titled *The Growth Critics* and under contract with the University of Chicago Press.

Christy Thornton is an assistant professor of sociology and Latin American studies at Johns Hopkins University.

Corinna R. Unger is Professor of Global and Colonial History (19th and 20th centuries) at the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. In recent years, her research has focused on the history of development and decolonization, the history of international organizations, and the history of knowledge. She is the author of *International Development: A Postwar History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018) and of *Entwicklungspfade in Indien: Eine internationale Geschichte* (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2015).

Alden Young is an assistant professor of African American Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles. He is also a member of the International Institute at UCLA where he teaches courses in the International Development Program. He is the author of *Transforming Sudan: Decolonization, Economic Development and State-Formation* (Cambridge University Press, 2017). He is a member of the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton during the 2019-2020 academic year.
I gladly accepted the invitation to join this roundtable and the queue of reviewers lining up to praise Sara Lorenzini’s impressive book. For someone contemplating a future course on development history, and the challenge of grappling with what has become a vast literature on the subject, Global Development arrived just in time. While I read, I imagined plugging some of Lorenzini’s pithy quotations into class lectures. “Academics had discovered poverty,” she proclaims, “and this discovery led to the gradual sacralization of economics” (30). President Dwight Eisenhower’s foreign policy “nourished the kind of revolutionary violence the Americans most feared” (52); “During the Cold War era, multiple, often incompatible modernities were on offer” (107); sustainable development became “the most famous oxymoron in the history of international relations.” (141); and (divorcé) President Ronald Reagan presided over the “divorce of American hegemonic projects from development” (160).

Admirably succinct with just 178 pages of text, Global Development achieves several objectives at once. It offers the best synthesis yet of the history of twentieth-century development, from its origins in colonial policy to its zenith during the Cold War in the 1960s and subsequent decline in the 1970s and ‘80s. Building on the author’s previous work, this book also disaggregates each ‘side’ in the Cold War by examining conflicts within the Soviet bloc and, especially, by arguing that the European Economic Community (EEC) made distinctive contributions to development policy apart from the anti-Communist strategy of the United States. Finally, Lorenzini uses these insights to criticize both what she calls the “global myth of development” and “simplistic readings of Cold War era development” based on “US hegemony and Western predominance” (170, 174). My review touches on each of these contributions and concludes by considering the implications of her critiques for the maturing field of development history.

On one level, Lorenzini tells a story about the rise and fall of development that is broadly familiar to those who have read works by Michael Latham, Joseph Hodge, Gilbert Rist, and others.3 According to this arc, explicit white supremacy and race-thinking, as represented by Lothrop Stoddard’s The Rising Tide of Color, gave way after World War Two to technical formulas for improving poor societies in colonized regions of the globe.4 President Harry Truman’s Point Four Program mobilized development as a cold-war weapon, United Nations (UN) technocrats defined universal standards for development, and after Stalin’s death the Soviet Union competed with the U.S. for influence by aiding the Third World. Leaders of developing countries played the superpowers against one another and in 1955 proclaimed the birth of the Afro-Asian world at Bandung. The proliferation of postcolonial states made the UN into the forum where the Global South pushed back against the legacy of colonial economic relations and eventually demanded a New International Economic Order (NIEO). But “faith in the state, discourses of self-betterment, and the fundamental role of science and rational thought in replacing traditions ended in the late 1960s,” after which “the myth of invincible scientific-technological progress crumbled” and “development entered a long era in which there was a crisis of vision” (6).

Through wide reading in the development literature, however, Lorenzini enhances this familiar story in ways that signal her interpretive contribution. For instance, she highlights the crucial role of the League of Nations as “an incubator for international technical organizations.” The League’s standardized development techniques eclipsed the local expertise

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claimed by colonial officials and gave it what technocrats portrayed as a “civilizing mission without empire” (91). She also describes the Marshall Plan as the “trait d’union” linking foreign aid with cold-war development (30). Marshall Plan administrator Paul Hoffman would go on to help author the UN Special Fund for Development and direct the UN Development Programme. It was the UN’s Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East that first envisioned a hydroelectric dam in the Mekong Delta, a project that because of the Vietnam War has been misremembered “as the schoolbook example of American-style modernization” (101).

The Soviet Union’s disappointing record with development assistance in Indonesia, Egypt, and, notably, Sekou Touré’s Guinea set the stage for Moscow’s subsequent conflicts over development policy with eastern bloc and Third World states. The NIEO faced criticism not only from conservatives in rich countries but also from the Soviets and leftists in the West such as world-systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein, who saw its emphasis on progress through trade as compatible with global capitalism (123). From the Global South’s perspective, new calls to respect individual human rights seemed hollow “given the decades the West had spent supporting anticomunist dictators.” Such “cultural arrogance” provided no substitute for “distributional justice” in the global economy (159). In Lorenzini’s telling, development was a legacy of empires (including America’s) before Truman applied it to Point Four, and the publicity around U.S. policies often overshadowed work by UN technocrats. Moreover, there was no global discourse of development, because its meaning was bitterly contested and linked to the antagonistic interests of various states in the West, the Communist bloc, and the Third World.

Lorenzini’s original contribution is to present European states on both sides of the Iron Curtain as actors in the history of development independent of the superpowers. This contribution is based on wide research in the archives of European countries, including the former East Germany, and EEC records. Her formidable bibliography also includes research in U.S. and UN archives, as well as in numerous manuscript collections. “European countries had their own national interests and disparate visions on aid,” she writes, “regardless of whether they were allied with the Americans or the Soviets” (6). Individual states approached development through their experiences with internal underdeveloped regions, such as Italy’s poor southern Mezzogiorno (which my great-grandparents fled). Lorenzini features the 1954 Milan Conference and debates about developing the Mezzogiorno to illustrate the range of influences that each contributed to shaping development, from David Lilienthal’s Tennessee Valley Authority to Paul Rosenstein-Rodan at the World Bank, Albert Hirschmann, then serving on the Federal Reserve Board, and Gunnar Myrdal at the UN Economic Commission for Europe (31). The Soviet Union’s inability to enforce ideological conformity around socialist industrial development mirrored the difficulties faced by the U.S. in imposing anti-Communist modernization theory on its allies. The Soviets offered developing states turn-key industrial plants and technical assistance, but its offers of aid were often motivated by the need to obtain raw materials. In analyzing the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), Lorenzini is struck by the absence of socialist “solidarity.” Although Eastern Bloc states deferred to Moscow, countries such as Romania and Bulgaria “rejected the Soviet Union’s idea of an international division of labor that meant they would continue producing low-added-value supplies and thus remain relatively backward” (83). Later, East Germany partnered with Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya as part of an extensive development policy in Africa. This initiative came as the Soviet Union rejected the NIEO for grouping the U.S.S.R. with imperialist countries of the Global North and as Moscow closed the door to membership in Comecon by non-European states.

Lorenzini focuses most on the EEC, however, which because of France’s influence, carried forward the legacy of French Eurafrica and initially made European integration into “a venture for joint imperial management” (56). Plans for association with colonial Africa shifted as many continental states gained independence in 1960 and “development aid, once considered domestic welfare policy, became foreign policy” (59). Western European states shunned U.S. leadership through the Organization of Economic Cooperation in Europe. Rather, led by the “éminence grise of EEC development aid”

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Jacques Ferrandi, they negotiated trade preferences and invested through the European Development Fund (58). EEC policies were the subject of disagreements between France and West Germany, with the former favoring a regional and the latter a global approach. As part of Ostpolitik, West German Chancellor Willy Brandt also pursued development projects in Africa with eastern European states. Most of all, Lorenzini shows how the EEC “stood up as a distinctive actor” in relations with the Global South following the 1975 Lomé Convention (143). Under the leadership of French diplomat Claude Cheysson, the EEC moved beyond Euroafrica and “association” to place Africans in leadership positions and offer regional states some stability for commodity prices. Europe’s “remarkably inventive thinking” provided an “affirmative answer” to the NIEO, she argues, and an approach that was “complementary with nonalignment” (147-48). The EEC followed up on the “Lomé Revolution” with a Mediterranean-focused, Euro-Arab Dialogue. Although not as successful as initiatives in Africa, it represented an inter-regional strategy that made the EEC into a global leader in development at a time when the U.S. and U.S.S.R. had become status quo powers.

In terms of development history, the most important questions raised by this study emerge from its very title. Is development a Cold War story? Lorenzini’s focus on Europe and the ways that EEC development initiatives evolved out of colonial policies portrays development as part of the longer and ongoing history of imperialism. Even her opening vignette, about the Cahora Bassa Dam on the Zambezi River in Mozambique, illustrates how various actors contended to benefit from the legacy of a Portuguese colonial project. She convincingly argues that the Cold War shaped the “global aspirations” and “institutional structures that still rule foreign aid today” (3). But the idea of development first appeared in places such as British India, French West Africa, the Dutch East Indies, and the American Philippines. At issue is the larger struggle to control the natural resources and human labor of the Global South, a conflict that has moved through successive phases for over a century and more as colonized societies achieved nominal independence and as the scope of “development” shifted to encompass trade policy, human rights, and climate justice. In the case of the U.S., the ‘divorce’ between hegemonic projects and development turned out to be just a trial separation, given the failed post-Cold War attempts at nation-building in Iraq and Afghanistan. As the Cold War with the Soviet Union recedes into the past (our students have no first-hand memory of it), historians are retreating from the notion that it constituted a distinct historical period and have gone looking for its origins in nineteenth-century industrialization and imperialism. Development has become uncoupled from Cold War history. Lorenzini notes that “historiography identifies 1945 as a moment of political cleavage,” but she also associates that “idea of discontinuity” with publicity surrounding Point Four and the Truman administration’s global ambitions (22, 26). The sense that the Cold War constituted a new, postcolonial era proceeded at least partly from the exceptionalist ideologies promoted by the two most powerful states after World War Two and from claims to political authority made by elites in the Global South.

Lorenzini renders a more definitive verdict on the second question suggested by her title: was development global? Despite “worldwide aspirations,” she concludes, the various projects that constituted the history of postwar development were “clearly framed for national purposes and within regional dimensions” (13). Her focus on Europe, the EEC, and Comecon reconstitutes development as a regional or inter-regional story, given the EEC’s Lomé and Euro-Arab Dialogue initiatives, as well as East Germany’s outsized role in Africa. Some of Lorenzini’s most vivid examples, such as her account of China’s aid to Tanzania and work on the Tazara Railway (116-19), show how development projects motivated by global ambitions nevertheless played out in specific regional contexts. This book therefore suggests a final question about the relationship between the temporal and spatial framing of development history. Does skepticism about the ‘global’ nature of development also undermine the case for portraying it as a Cold War story? Although Lorenzini does not advocate “taking off the Cold

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8 See also Gregg Brazinsky, Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry During the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017).
War lens” altogether, her study successfully challenges the myth of global development. It acknowledges that societies’ experiences with development are tied to their distinct histories of colonialism and anticolonialism. Those in the field owe her a debt for raising such questions and for giving us such a rich and valuable resource.

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For many years, when I edited the journal *Humanity*, I wondered to myself whether it was possible to write a truly comprehensive history of global development. My tacit answer was No; it’s just too vast and variegated a topic, the archives are too enormous and multilingual, the boundaries too undefined. It would need to combine intellectual history, economic history, political history, gender history, business history, international history, social history, and cultural history. It would need to draw on sources from the United States, Britain, France, India, Russia, China, as well as myriad sites in Latin America and Africa—many of which are probably unavailable. In short, the fully synthesized and integrated global history of development would entail an historical *Gesamtkunstwerk* of the wildest sort.

Given this impossibility, Sara Lorenzini’s *Global Development: A Cold War History* makes about as good an effort as we are likely to get for some time, admirably synthesizing into a readable narrative the recent secondary literature on the history of development history, a subfield that has exploded over the last two decades. Lorenzini structures the book around three main arguments: that the Cold War fundamentally shaped global aspirations and ideologies of development; that even though development projects were usually framed in global terms, they were distinctly national, state-centric projects; and that while development institutions tried to forge a universal and homogenous concept of development, they ultimately failed in the face of the pessimisms of the 1970s concerning technology and Malthusian limits to growth.

Methodologically, Lorenzini’s approach is to write what she calls a “plural history,” by which she means that the global history of development was “made up of projects with worldwide aspirations but clearly framed for national purposes and within regional dimensions” (170). The basic challenge for any historian of development is that developmental efforts, from the specific local project up to the grand conceptual schemas, always seem to be designed to address multiple challenges at once. A given project may simultaneously try to attack inequality, malnutrition, poverty, and economic stagnation, while also balancing environmental and gender equity concerns. Lorenzini rightly emphasize the pervasiveness of the “security nexus,” e.g. the idea that development would help alleviate local or regional security threats, be they Communism during the Cold War, or more recently Islamic extremism. Lorenzini’s solution to the problem of how to write a global history of development is thus to focus on the contradictory aspects of the different projects lumped into that rubric—the competing definitions of development between the capitalist West and the Communist East, between the Global North and the Global South, between donors and recipients, between national governments and international financial institutions, and so on.

*Global Development* is primarily an account of the evolving doctrines of development emanating from various points across the globe: the competing and metastasizing statements by intellectuals and politicians concerning the objectives, desires, principles, priorities, and measures of development. It provides little analysis of the economic history of development. It touches only in passing on specific, on-the-ground development projects, and pays no attention whatsoever to the quotidian experience of development of the poor people who have been the recipients or subjects of the global development enterprise. This is not a criticism per se – any history inevitably focuses on some dimensions of the total historical complex and not on others. But it is to underscore that a ‘total history’ of global development continues to await its Braudel.

Still, there are trajectories in the overall history of development that *Global Development* underplays. For example, the definition of development, while continuously contested over time, has as a whole undergone a steady broadening from the colonial period (when it focused at first just on the development of exploitable resources, before eventually conceding that ‘the well-being of the natives’ also needed to be taken into account), to the early post-war years (when the first priority was ‘reconstruction’ which then morphed into ‘economic growth’ as decolonization accelerated), to the high modernist period of the 1950s-60s (when increasing the capacity of the postcolonial state became seen as a crucial objective, and foreign aid reached its greatest vogue), to the drift and disillusion of the 1970s (when the Basic Needs of the poor became the primary focus of the World Bank, while the G-77 emphasized the importance of reducing inequality between nations, and environmental concerns became a bone of contention), to the 1980s and 1990s (when ‘human development,’ centered on education and health outcomes, and new goals were additions to the previous goals, rather than replacing the prior ones. In short, the equation that development
practitioners were trying to balance became continuously more complex. One simple measure of this continuous scope creep has been the steady expansion of the number and variety of ‘development indicators’ that the World Bank has issued in its annual flagship World Development Report. With so many competing objectives, no wonder it is debatable whether development as a global or local project has been a ‘success.’

The one questionable interpretive point about the framing of the book is whether a “Cold War history” is the best way to think about the global project of development as a totality. It is already twenty years ago that Matthew Connelly warned that seeing development primarily through a Cold War lens involved an implicitly Eurocentric view of the history of the Global South.10 To some extent, Global Development avoids this trap: the book quite rightly begins in the first half of the twentieth century, long before the Cold War, when colonial powers first began to speak of development. And the era of development has now carried on for thirty years since the end of the Cold War; indeed, by the end of this decade, the history of development since the Cold War will have lasted longer than the Cold War itself did (assuming that we take the Cold War to have run from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, and that development continues to be a concern). Given the many continuities of development practice and personnel across the two caesurae marking the beginning and end of the Cold War, one must wonder whether the Cold War framing is the most useful one for the understanding the global project.

In particular, the rise of China seems all but certain to call forth a dramatic rethinking of the global history of development, in ways that Lorenzini’s book touches on only in passing. Three points in particular stand out concerning the significance of China’s rise for framing the overall global history of development. The first is that, of all the poverty reduction and North/South rebalancing that has taken place over the last three decades, the lion’s share is due to China’s successful industrialization and creation of a middle class. Some five hundred million former Chinese peasants have moved from the countryside into cities, and the quality of China’s nutrition, education, and health care have improved dramatically, almost to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) levels. Second, all of this improvement has taken place entirely outside the Western developmental matrix. Virtually none of it is due to the effects of foreign aid or the transmission of best practices, even if some of this growth is a result of technology transfers from the West, albeit much of that taking the form of intellectual property theft. Combining these points ought to be a profound source of embarrassment for the development industry: despite trillions spent in foreign aid, most of the human improvements have come from a place outside their scope. Third, China’s great economic growth, in particular when compared to the tepid growth rates in the West since the 2007-8 Global Financial Crisis, has increasingly encouraged observers to present it as a ‘model’ for others to follow. As Branko Milanovic, the former lead economist in the World Bank’s research department, argues in his new book Capitalism, Alone, once again, as during the Cold War, we find ourselves in a world with competing developmental models, with the West’s tottering “liberal meritocratic” form of capitalism arrayed against “political capitalism,” of which China is the emblematic case.11 While it is fair to doubt the reproducibility or exportability of China’s developmental example, it is already clear that the global history of development will have to be completely rethought in light of recent Chinese history.

As the best global intellectual and political history of development available, Lorenzini’s book should become the standard assignment in classes on the history of development, perhaps well-paired with the primary sources collected in Sharad Chari and Stuart Corbridge’s The Development Reader. It is certainly more readable than Jan Nederveen Pieterse’s Development


Theory; more historiographically synoptic and global in perspective than Michael Latham’s *The Right Kind of Revolution*; and less polemical than William Easterly’s *The Tyranny of Experts*.\(^\text{12}\) It deserves wide readership.

Sara Lorenzini’s *Global Development: A Cold War History* is a valuable overview of international development policy and politics during the Cold War. Lorenzini uses a mixture of archival documents and the substantial secondary literature on the topic (primarily English-language sources, but also relevant scholarship in French, Italian, and German) to analyze the foreign aid policies and priorities of the major powers. Over the course of ten chapters, the book develops three arguments. The first focuses on the significance of the Cold War in shaping the history of international development. “Cold War politics,” Lorenzini writes, “determined the stakes, timing, and distributed of aid” (4). In other words, the Cold War conditioned how and why national governments distributed foreign aid for development. Second, Lorenzini argues that development served as a “tool of bloc consolidation and solidarity” as projects functioned both as a “promotion of cultural values” and as “security ventures” (4). Development, in this view, deepened Cold War tensions as the superpowers and their allies engaged in a global “tug-of-war for influence and clients” that reinforced East-West divisions (4). And finally, though development experts often promoted development as a “universal application,” in practice Lorenzini suggests that development projects “mainly served the national purposes of both donor and recipient countries” (5). Development was a global endeavor, but one that ultimately reinforced the power of territorial nation-states and the elites who governed them.

Lorenzini ably documents the ways in which development exacerbated international political conflicts. She demonstrates the many “tensions and competing interests” that shaped the international politics of development (6-7). She accomplishes this through a survey of many different intergovernmental organizations that served as sites of contest and deliberation in which different approaches to foreign aid produced little consensus. Though international development generated conflicts between the superpowers, it also led to fractures within their respective blocs. Her study of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC), for instance, reveals that U.S. officials and their West German counterparts held different views of how aid should be delivered that often hampered cooperation between the two allies. U.S. officials favored broad, national programmatic aid whereas their West German counterparts preferred project-based funding that gave donors greater control over how funds were used. (72-73) Likewise, the Soviet Union and its allies debated development ideas and strategies. Some Socialist Bloc countries, such as Romania and Bulgaria, rejected the Soviet notion of a fixed international division of labor, with poor countries producing low-added-value supplies, in part because they identified with the recipient countries in the Global South. The Soviet Union, despite its efforts to work cooperatively through the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), often funded major projects entirely on its own with little support from the Eastern European countries. (84) In these instances, international development policy served less as a force to unify allies around a shared purpose than to illuminate differences in national and regional identity and competing visions of foreign policy priorities.

While Lorenzini is attuned to distinctions between the ‘First World’ and ‘Second World’ approaches to aid, she does well to highlight mutual frustrations that the two superpowers shared. During the global Cold War of the 1960s, she writes, “neither side was really able to achieve serious, permanent success using aid as a political tool.” Moreover, “[b]oth East and West worried about mounting debts” and neither had “many political gains to point to” despite over a decade of sustained development assistance effort (87). Likewise, during the 1970s, the attempts by countries of the Global South to rewrite the rules of the global economy and challenge Western hegemony provoked anger and disappointment among policymakers in both East and West. As many scholars have shown, U.S. officials attempted to derail and undermine the New International
Economic Order (NIEO). Lorenzini notes that the Soviet elite found little to celebrate in the North-South conflict. Soviet leaders “took a harsh view of dependency theorists,” especially Samir Amin, for grouping the powerful socialist countries with the capitalist powers as part of a shared core of industrial states. They also rejected the NIEO supporters’ framing of the North-South divide as “inopportune” for Soviet interests (113; 122). Officials from the United States, Western European countries, and Soviet Union all rejected and sought to contain the Third World’s collective assertions of power.

For all her excellent analysis of the international politics of development, Lorenzini provides few glimpses of the material realities of development initiatives on the ground. The book almost exclusively focuses on the creation of international development policies within powerful countries and intergovernmental organizations. As a result, it is difficult to assess just how thoroughly development interventions actually reshaped lives, livelihoods, and landscapes. There are scarce, passing examples of specific development programs and projects. For example, Lorenzini provides a short overview of Tanzanian leader Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa program and China’s support for the Tazara railway project, but the description and analysis of the project last only a few pages (116-119). More sustained analysis of the ground-level experience of individual projects would have provided a helpful complement to Lorenzini’s focus on international politics.

The absence of analysis about the material dimensions and consequences of development also raises larger questions for how historians narrate the legacy of international development during the Cold War and beyond. Although Lorenzini addresses how activists levied environmental criticisms of development, there is less consideration of the aggregate ecological consequences of the global quest for development. For instance, consider all the carbon emissions from fossil fuels; all the pesticide use; all the soil erosion; all of the ways in which the construction of a vast built environment reshaped human bodies, the surface of the earth, and the atmosphere. A more thorough accounting of Cold War development interventions and their legacy should address these transformations. Lorenzini argues that foreign aid could “never accomplish the many diverse goals all the different actors” who promoted it had hoped it would (171). But to assess aid only in terms of the extent to which it met its designers’ goals limits the scope of historical assessment. Development interventions funded by foreign aid have long lives; development projects continue to alter the land, atmosphere, and human settlements long after developers leave. Historians of international development should draw fruitfully from the work of environmental historians and historical geographers to develop critical ecological assessments of what the global quest for development has wrought worldwide.

Lorenzini also touches on another way in which historians can assess the history of international development, with an eye towards engaging in interdisciplinary conversation and contemporary policy. In her conclusion, she acknowledges the ongoing debate among political scientists, economists, and practitioners about the aggregate economic “effectiveness” of foreign aid (172-173). Lorenzini notes that historians can contribute to these debates by providing “examples of both failure and success” to challenge the historical “amnesia” afflicting so many contemporary policymakers (177). But historians can provide more than a laundry list of stories about individual development interventions. Lorenzini’s own analysis points to other powerful conclusions that are relevant for contemporary policy: international development has never existed as an apolitical endeavor; it has always been shaped by strategic considerations; there have always been a multiplicity of definitions of what “successful” development entails. Such conclusions invite skepticism about contemporary fads and the latest silver bullets to development quandaries – including ones that garner Nobel Prizes. Historians might also enter into these debates by asking how well other development experts make use of historical evidence in their claims about the


generalizability of any one development ‘solution’ and critically question the ways in which scholars and practitioners might adopt ahistorical and reductive definitions of success. After all, if, as Lorenzini shows, aid served multiple and contradictory purposes – security provision, social uplift, symbolic power, and material change, for instance – then why should aid ‘effectiveness’ be defined in narrow economistic terms?

Finally, Lorenzini’s book also points to important topics that warrant further research. The deepest and strongest chapters cover the early and middle parts of the Cold War. This period has received the lion’s share of historical attention in recent years. The time is ripe for more studies that cover the major transformations of the 1980s, the so-called ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s. In addition, there is also need for more articles and monographs that examine the role of multinational corporations (MNCs), commercial banks, and other private sector actors in the history of international development. This does not mean that historians should neglect or deviate from the focus on national governments. A fruitful avenue of research would examine the enrollment of private actors by the state, especially the use of investment promotion agencies and the dense thickets of contractors and sub-contractors that have come to define foreign assistance. Such research might reveal not only why policymakers promoted development but how development assistance in all its forms wended its way across the world.

Lorenzini’s book marks a valuable contribution and useful guide for scholars and students of international development history. She has condensed the many insights from the recent wave of development scholarship into a single, accessible volume that elucidates how Cold War international politics shaped the history of development and how international development initiatives influenced the course of the Cold War. Her book is an excellent starting point for researchers who are beginning work on related topics, and it would be a welcome addition to graduate seminars on international and global history.
Sara Lorenzini has written an expansive new history of development ideas and programs, tracing their evolution in the post-war period through the lens of the Cold War. Paying close attention to the ideological conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies, Lorenzini argues that development was “molded by the Cold War, and in turn, actively designed some of its structures” (4). Her argument makes important correctives to what she calls the “myth of US hegemony and Western predominance” (174) in the history of development, and admirably brings together bodies of secondary literature that are frequently read in isolation from one another.

Lorenzini’s story starts as most histories of development now do, by comparing the institutions of European late-colonial management with the programs of President Harry Truman and his Cold-War modernizers. But while the book’s first two chapters trace this North Atlantic axis with which we are already familiar, Lorenzini follows them with an examination of “socialist modernity” (33), putting the Soviet vision of the Third World in dialogue with the conventional history. This is a complicated story, as Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was concerned less with the struggle between colonizer and colonized, she argues, than with the global battle between capitalists and workers. Eventually, however, Stalin’s skepticism of the bourgeois nationalism of Jawaharlal Nehru, Sukarno, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, for example, gave way under Nikita Khrushchev to an ideology of aid as solidarity. This transition set up development as a Cold-War competition over the means and ends of modernity.

In subsequent chapters, she brings these multiple perspectives together, comparing the Alliance for Progress with the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the European Economic Community’s aid programs, and the socialist bloc’s Comecon. By the 1960s, Mao Zedong’s China had joined the fray, promoting its own aid programs, particularly in Africa, lending an “East-South” axis (111) to the conventional story, and opening different paths to modernity within the socialist camp. Soon the German Democratic Republic also began its own technical assistance programs in the Third World. In surveying these often-conflicting alternative programs on offer, Lorenzini treats readers to a history of development that is considerably broadened from the focus on the U.S. and Western Europe that marks so much of the existing literature.

If Joseph Hodge identified the new trends in development scholarship as lengthening its periodization, deepening its engagement with development practice on the ground, and widening its geographic scope, Lorenzini’s book certainly fits within the third category: rather than being portrayed as being thought up only in Washington, London, and Paris, development is now also understood to have been conceived in Moscow, and East Berlin, and Beijing. While the aperture has widened, however, Lorenzini’s lens still largely only captures a story of development as a project of what we might think of as the ‘developers’—that is, the donor/creditor countries with the expertise and capital to lend in the service of their visions of the future. Assessing Comecon’s priorities, for example, she writes, “the developing countries’ needs hardly figured in the equation” (83). Too often, however, the book takes the actor’s perspective to be that of the historian’s, rarely asking what drove the recipient/debtor countries, and how their theories, actions, and demands might have shaped the project of the development in its origins or evolution.

As a result, officials in and of the Global South are only of occasional consequence; in much of the book, the Third World is still rendered as a terrain to be acted upon, as peoples and territories subject to the ideas and policies of a now broadened group of more powerful interlocutors. Lorenzini acknowledges that “to the formerly colonized, foreign aid was a form of reparation” (3), but reparations are rarely paid without a demand for them. Where the recipients do enter the picture, their actions are almost always nationally bounded and local, as they work to “manipulate the interests of the donors to their own ends” (5). Actors in countries like Tanzania and India therefore appear in this account as always reactive to the actions of the donor countries, working to play Soviet, U.S., or Chinese officials off of one another as they formulate inward-facing

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national plans. Further, Lorenzini uses the terms “aid” and “development” interchangeably; there is little discussion regarding differences between the development programs that operated on concessional terms versus those that relied on both commercial and official loans, which not only had to be paid back but were intended to make profitable use of Northern surplus capital. This slippage has the curious effect of reproducing the idea that became dominant in the 1980s that development consisted mainly of “government to government subsidies,” as one economist put it (161); development here is, in the main, charity with a political purpose.

The emphasis on a broader set of Cold War ‘developers’ results in a sometimes distorted narration of events in the Third World. The overthrow of Guatemala’s President Jacobo Arbenz is not one in which land reform, which was intended as part of a national strategy to reverse decades of economic neocolonialism, threatened U.S. interests; instead, it appears as one example among others where “nationalist leaders opted to strengthen their ties to socialist countries” (54). Such an interpretation offers an unsettling echo of the Eisenhower administration’s own justification for intervention in Guatemala. Similarly, Maoist guerrilla tactics failed to take hold on the African continent because, Lorenzini tells us, “the discipline required by Chinese guerilla warfare was more demanding than what most Africans were willing to embrace” (115), an claim which is made without a citation and whose implications are troubling. Subsequently, in a section on Tanzanian socialism, she argues that Julius Nyerere sought a future “independent from the international economic system built on an artificial idea of premodern autarchy” (117), ignoring his simultaneous advocacy for a New International Economic Order. Of course, no global history as wide-ranging and synthetic as this one will get all of the details precisely right—particularly where it builds from the interpretations of existing secondary scholarship, which has long been focused on the U.S. and Western Europe. These three small examples, however, are indicative of how a larger concern with broadening what counts as the ‘developer’ North can result in overlooking the interests, perspectives, and ideas of the developing South.

As a result, the book gives little indication that actors in developing countries might have had ideas about the “global development” of the book’s title, or that those ideas might be consequential for the history under study here. Crucial moments like the 1955 Bandung conference are registered only in passing; while Lorenzini acknowledges that “Bandung rang the bell for economic decolonization” (41), there is no analysis of what the participants thought such decolonization might entail. Instead, she renders the final communique at Bandung as a “call for help” (41) which was directed at both socialist and capitalist powers. Other crucial formations like the Group of 77 appear in a similarly fleeting fashion. We learn that in 1964 Comecon discussed at length “how to react to the requests of the G77” (86) that the developed world import processed and semi-processed goods, but Lorenzini is more focused upon explicating East Germany’s role within Comecon than with the “requests” being made collectively by the developing world.

One particularly striking casualty of Lorenzini’s otherwise laudable expansion beyond the United States is that, as in so many of the new global histories written from European perspectives, Latin America emerges as entirely marginal to the history of global development. In such a frame, it is perhaps not surprising that a work like Eric Helleiner’s Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods, which places Latin America at the center of the development debate even before the end of WWII, is absent from the source material—but it is still a striking omission. Cuba is the only Latin American country that appears in the index (though many others are mentioned throughout the text), and when Latin American actors are mentioned, they appear to be strangely passive. In the section on the UN as a forum for alternative development thinking, for example, the key actors are Northern economists like Hans Singer and former Marshall Plan administrator Paul


Hoffman, who, together with the West Indian economist Arthur Lewis, are found “voicing the impatience of the leaders of the newly independent countries,” who themselves are strangely voiceless (101). Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch appears as the economist who “pointed out the political consequences of Singer’s work” (99), and his leadership of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is covered only in a brief on the group’s institutional failure. From this treatment, the reader would get little sense that Prebisch was a consequential figure in the history of development, or that he was joined at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and UNCTAD by thinkers and political figures from the rest of Latin America and the broader Third World who themselves produced knowledge about and engaged in political struggle over the contours of development.

Even as it broadens the lens through which we understand the history of development, then, the book does little to uncover or explain the agency of Third World actors on the global stage. Such an interpretation perhaps stems from Lorenzini’s argument that development “served mainly the national purposes of both donor and recipient countries” (5): if the U.S., Soviet, Chinese, and East German economists and theorists who are central to the book’s analysis were concerned with mainly national ends, how could we expect Third World figures to see beyond their own national boundaries? In the end, there is little space in this history for what Adom Getachew has recently called the “worldmaking” vision of Third World actors—those whose ideas and struggles would be necessary for a truly global history of development to be written.
When Sara Lorenzini, in 2017, published *Una strana guerra fredda: Lo sviluppo e le relazioni Nord-Sud*, it was, to this reviewer’s knowledge, the first comprehensive overview of the history of development written by a historian and based on original archival research. A number of accounts of the history of development had been published earlier, but those were written and edited by scholars from fields like anthropology and development studies and differed notably in method, approach, and narrative. Given the breadth of the account and the important interpretations it offers based on an array of primary sources from numerous national archives and the archives of several international organizations, it is fortunate that Sara Lorenzini’s book, in translated and revised form, is now accessible to a larger audience. While the title suggests that the book is a study of development in a Cold War context, it in fact contains much more than that. It covers the entire twentieth century, starting before and leading beyond the Cold War, and it integrates a variety of perspectives that range from the most visible Cold War representatives to little-known and previously overlooked figures.

Apart from the wealth of information the book contains, three features stand out in particular: For one, the book actively engages with the research that has been conducted on socialist development in recent years, much of which productively challenges the Western-centric notion of development that was predominant in earlier years. Similarly, actors from the so-called Global South are much more present in Lorenzini’s book than used to be the norm in development history, which tended to focus on the providers of development assistance in the Global North. Third, European experiences with and approaches to development are given systematic attention, both with regard to individual European countries and with regard to the intergovernmental level of European development policy-making. By integrating the different geographical and political levels, the book is what many other books only claim to be: a global history.

Like any good global history, the book’s outlook is a specific and, to a degree, a limited one. *Global Development* is a history of policies, debates, and politics; it is not a history of practices, approaches, and experiences. The actors are politicians, experts, and high-level administrators; they are not fieldworkers or ‘ordinary’ people. The book can best be characterized as an international political history; it is not a history from below, a cultural or social history, a collection of micro histories, or a transnational history. In fact, the nation state is the key unit in Lorenzini’s account, which reflects and carries her argument that national interests were the drivers of development politics. If one takes into consideration the plurality of national interests that co-existed and conflicted with each other during the twentieth century, particularly during its second half, it is only logical that, as Lorenzini argues, “development institutions tried to create a universal and homogeneous concept of development but ultimately failed” (3). Rather than trying to show that the idea of development had the power to promote international cooperation or global coherence, Lorenzini, from a realist point of view, focuses on the divisive effects development policies could, and often did, have. She argues that development assistance, for all its constructive rhetoric, did more to fuel competition and to trigger conflicts than to overcome them, and that this was the case both for the providers and the recipients of development resources. This finding is linked to her interpretation of the meaning of the Cold War for development: “Development was molded by the Cold War and, in turn, actively designed some of its structures” (4).

The fact that the connection between development and the Cold War is told from a variety of perspectives, thereby reflecting the multicentric nature of the conflict, is a notable step forward in the existing historiography. The book’s sections on the development policies of socialist countries are particularly valuable, given that this side of the history of development has been neglected for a long time. Two findings are especially noteworthy: First, Soviet policy vis-à-vis the so-called Third World was far from being a mirror image of an assumed Soviet ideology but was in fact very pragmatic in nature and,


accordingly, changed over time. Second, the power of the Soviet Union in defining socialist development policies was not unlimited – in fact, the socialist countries used development assistance in their own interest, not the least to create some room for maneuver vis-à-vis Moscow. These findings add not only to our understanding of the history of development but also contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the history of the socialist world, away from the notion of the ‘Soviet bloc,’ which itself was the product of Cold War ideology.

Similarly, the book helps to provide a more complex and more balanced account of the international history of development by including, on an equal level, the development policies and structures of the European Economic Communities (EEC) and the European Communities (EC). As several studies have shown and Lorenzini highlights based on her own research in European archives, imperial connections and late colonial practices shaped the development policies of several European countries significantly well into the 1960s. With France as the most powerful imperial power in the EEC, the degree to which French national and imperial interests influenced the country’s trade and development agreements with African countries remained very high for a long time, and development projects were pursued along established colonial lines and practices. In trying to understand the North-South conflict as it came to the fore in the 1970s, it is crucial to take these legacies into consideration, as the international economic order and the development institutions against which the leaders of many so-called developing countries protested were tied to imperial structures that for many years had co-existed and, in part, overlapped, with structures emerging from the postwar period.

One of the book’s most notable arguments is connected to the crisis of the development in the 1970s. Lorenzini argues that “widespread discontent with the prospects of growth created new tensions between North and South, tensions born of trade issues that exploded during discussions about the environment.” (171). She is certainly right in pointing out that environmental consciousness and neo-Malthusian sentiments dramatically intensified in the Western world in the 1960s and 1970s, and that the so-called developing countries became increasingly outspoken about their demand to have control over their natural resources. Yet the argument that it was the concern with the environment that triggered the conflict between North and South does not seem entirely convincing because it is based mostly on Western countries’ debates about the material and ideational challenges of ‘modern societies.’ For the argument to hold for the countries of the Global South alike, their debates and positions will have to be analyzed in much greater depth. Incorporating the positions of the so-called developing countries and their actions into the analysis of the history of global development will be an important task for future research.

Review by Alden Young, Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton

The Cold War and the Pinnacle of AID Diplomacy

In Global Development: A Cold War History, Sara Lorenzini takes up the long-standing challenge of writing a global history of that elusive twentieth century concept, ‘development.’ In her conclusion she returns to the problem of finding a universal conception of development, writing: “This book shows that development was—and is—bound to national projects of both donors and recipients” (170). In the process Lorenzini is setting up several of the central conceits of her learned diplomatic history of the twentieth century. The first is that foreign aid is the principal means through which we should look at the question of development, and second, that the story of development should be told as a tale of diplomatic history.

This approach allows for Lorenzini to make a number of surprising findings as she combines and nuances several fairly standard narratives about development in the twentieth century. She draws adeptly from the literature on modernization as ideology by authors like Michael Latham and Nils Gilman23 as well as the Global Cold War literature, which was given a new birth by scholars like Odd Arne Westad.24 Others, like Jamie Monson and Jeremy Friedman, have increasingly centered China within the Cold War competition for the hearts and minds of the Third World.25 These insights are then combined with the newer literature on the making of the Third World as a diplomatic force and the rise of new visions of international order as exemplified by the increasingly researched New International Economic Order (NIEO). This literature has grown dramatically in scope since the special issue of the journal Humanity on the topic in 2015.26

The major innovation of Lorenzini’s work is the insertion of the Europeans as a messy fourth element in the story of development, which is told as a fraught history of donors and recipients. This insight allows for some of the book’s most compelling moments. Lorenzini writes that,

“One regional actor that rarely shows up in economic histories of the Cold War is the European Economic Community (EEC), which offered what it called a third way in development...Regionalism, in this case, was a legacy of empire—the French especially cherished the geopolitical dream of Eurasia—and this book tells the story of how it transformed itself into an alternative to the superpowers, something resembling Third World demands for a New International Economic Order” (7).

It is in chapters 5 through 9 that we get some of the most compelling parts of the book, as Lorenzini tells the story of the construction of the West as a donor block through the story of the G-7 and its numerous false starts and other iterations in chapter 9. She does an equally great job of capturing the contradictions and false starts of the Communist countries as they


attempted to figure out how to relate to the anti-colonial nationalists coming to power in the emerging Global South. Lorenzini demonstrates this with the excellent line, “The Soviets were excellent support in a war of liberation, but with peace their aid went back to risible levels” (148). Even more fascinating is the story she tells about the efforts of the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to divide the emerging Third World into different groups in order to shatter their dreams of challenging the economic division of labor on a global scale or to reform international trade. Here I found the story of the emergence of a “Fourth World” or the story of the Less-Developed Countries (LDCs) and the US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger’s desire for these nations to see their interest as fundamentally different from those of the larger or more successful postcolonial nations as well the oil-producing nations as a seldom-told story.

Yet after reading Lorenzini’s work, I was left to wonder if her choices to focus on the diplomatic history of foreign aid and its division of the world into donors and recipients accurately captures the richness of the global story of development. Lorenzini writes that, “In the 1970s, these tensions exploded within the United Nations, where the North-South divide inherited from decolonization and initially articulated through trade controversies became more prominent than the East-West divide” (5). I doubt the temporal nature of this split. Is it really true that the Cold War was the dominant frame during the 1950s if one looks at the issue from the decolonizing world, and that the tensions shifted, or is this perception a bias of the diplomatic sources that Lorenzini uses?

My discomfort with the use of the Cold War to structure a book on global development in many ways echoes the questions raised by Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga, who asked in 2011:

“Does it make sense to talk about the “Cold War,” let alone “the Global Cold War” in the Global South? What happens to local time when “watershed moments” in the Global North are extended uncritically to mark global time?”

If the politics of reconstruction and development aid were decentered in the history of global development, what sorts of stories could be told? Is the story of development really reducible to the politics of foreign aid? Even on the global level one imagines that the history offered here could, for instance, be enriched with a discussion of the writings of intellectuals like W.E B. Du Bois or George Padmore, or further discussion of the writings of Sun Yat-sen. Did India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian constitutional lawyer and champion of the Dalit Movement Bhimrao Ramji Ambedker or the Guyanese intellectual and political activist Walter Rodney really follow the time scales of the Cold War? Recent work by scholars Adom Getachew or Ellen Centime Zeleke highlights the emergence of different temporalities to think with when contemplating the problem of development, and therefore highlighting possibilities of intellectuals using historical concepts like slavery, colonialism and underdevelopment without aligning with the temporalities or agency of the constructed Global North. The challenge is how to narrate the multiplicity of the global without reproducing the conventional hegemonies. In the end Lorenzini cites Jurgen Osterhammel to argue that in the end global history is “a set of multiple globalizations, a series of contradictory developments.”


Response by Sara Lorenzini, University of Trento

Allow me to start my response by thanking Diane Labrosse for organizing this fantastic roundtable and Julia Irwin for chairing and introducing it. I am impressed by the remarkable array of reviewers who agreed to discuss my book, and I am flattered by the generous words of appreciation of Nathan J. Citino, Nils Gilman, Stephen Macekura, Christy Thornton, Corinna R. Unger, and Alden Young.

*Global Development: A Cold War History* is a history of the twentieth century read through the lens of development, which I describe as the main channel for North-South relations during the Cold War and after. It tells the history of development as a contentious and elusive concept from the late 1940s to the late 1980s, arguing that the development business, as we know it today, is a legacy of the Cold War and that the global history of development can be described as a patchwork of national and regional plans with global ambitions more than as a coherent global project. I am thrilled that many of the reviews see in my work a response to the widely perceived need for a comprehensive history of development. How did I come to the idea of writing a global history of development? When I first became interested in development, more than twenty years ago, I was struck by the lack of a general political history of development that could be used as a background reading guide by people who were working in the field, students and practitioners alike. I decided to write an account that would cover an extended period, including bilateral and multilateral aid, that was not told as a narration centered on the United States engaging in soft power to fight the Cold War.

Nils Gilman starts his review by questioning whether it is possible “to write a truly comprehensive history of development,” and concluding that it is an impossible task. It was admittedly a challenging undertaking. *Global Development* is the result of years of research in a variety of archives (national, private, and international organizations), and a study of the mounting multi-lingual secondary literature. When writing a book, one is immediately confronted with a whole range of decisions including what kind of approach to adopt and ultimately what to include and what to leave out. This process is even more dramatic when writing an all-encompassing work. Inevitably, some readers may want the story to have been told from a different angle or to have been more global in its scope.

As Gilman observes, *Global Development* is mainly an intellectual history of development because it emphasizes ideas more than projects or numbers. Throughout the book, the reader encounters personalities who were crucial to the intellectual history of development, be they politicians or social scientists. Some are more center stage than others, and I attempted, when possible, not to focus on the familiar stories. Invariably, signal personalities typically identified as the architects of development need to appear in my account, such as President Harry Truman, who introduced development into US foreign policy, or economist and political scientist Walt Whitman Rostow who insisted on making it key as a foreign policy tool, or Raúl Prebisch, the Argentinian economist heading the Economic Commission for Latin America. However, readers will find additional less-known characters such as Barbara Ward, the advocate of the ‘environmental turn’ in development, Werner Lamberz, the brains behind a new East German Afrikapolitik, Dzermen Gvishiani, the Soviet hero of systems analysis, or Claude Cheysson, the designer of the ‘Third Worldist turn’ in European Community foreign and development policy.

There is no doubt that *Global Development* is a history that is mainly told from the viewpoint of the donors in the Global North. Voices from the Global South are there; Prebisch is one of them,—as are, for example, important African leaders such as Sékou Touré, Léopold Senghor and Julius Nyerere, or economists such as Arthur Lewis, Mahbub ul Haq and Jahangir Amuzegar. Even so politicians and economists from the Global South are admittedly not often the agency of this story. I am entirely sympathetic to the concerns of Christy Thornton, Alden Young, and Corinna Unger that the book may, at times, overlook the interests, perspectives, and ideas of the developing South, because it does not have as its main focus the thoughts of the Afro-Asian leaders. And I also concede that in my story Africa has a more prominent place than other areas of the Global South - bigger than Asia or Latin America. However, fundamental turning points are dealt with detailed attention in order to balance the multiple views of many actors, as a concise synthesis allows. Thornton argues that the 1955 Bandung Conference does not receive many pages, but Bandung is a crucial moment of my story and stands out as such. It is
mainly (not exclusively) described through the words of Richard Wright, the Afro-American writer who was undoubtedly supportive of the plans of the Afro-Asian group. Different temporalities, Young argues, should be able to rip us out of ancient chronologies. Events like the launch of the New International Economic Order (NIEO) should mark a turning point and receive more space than other symbolic moments, such as the 1971 financial crisis and the connected disruption of the Bretton Woods system. This is precisely what happens in my book. It is true, though, that it is not the programmatic goal of this book to reverse the existing narratives on the history of development by giving a distinctive voice to personalities from the Global South. Instead, I am interested in unveiling the many contradictions tearing up the supposed unity of both the Global North and the Global South.

Nathan Citino asks whether development should be described as a Cold War story, and Gilman asks whether the Cold War is the best way to think about the global project of development as a totality. Recent narratives are often dismissive of the Cold War dynamics in telling the history of development. Continuities of development practice existed over time in terms of similarities in people and projects that extend from late colonial times into the Cold War years. Similarly, plans and ideas outlived the Cold War. Can we conclude that, given the continuities, the Cold War is not as relevant to the history of development? I believe not. I argue that development assistance (that is, foreign aid used to finance development) became a critical foreign policy tool and increased its institutional structures with the Cold War and in fact because of the Cold War. Development existed before the Cold War as a domestic policy for empires. With decolonization, however, it changed its nature and turned into foreign policy. In the book, I deal extensively with the thorny issue of reinventing development; that is how post-imperial actors managed to find a new, emancipatory meaning for policies that were born to serve colonial empires.

My synthesis could not escape the often-told story of Cold War modernization theories and policies, and of development turning into the elusive Cold War tool and having its failures exposed very early on. However, as Stephen Macekura, Corinna Unger and Nathan Citino stress, my approach is not as conventional when recounting this story. I argue that modernization in its American fashion did not immediately become the policy for the West as a whole. It remained controversial within the DAC, the Development Assistance Committee in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). In the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), where the Soviet Union hoped to rally the hopes for a Socialist alternative, economic relations with the newly independent countries were likewise problematic. On the whole, development exacerbated international political conflicts and caused fractures within the respective blocs, as Macekura fittingly summarizes.

Many of the reviewers (Gilman, Macekura, Unger, and Young) ask why I did not choose a bottom-up approach to tell this story. Sticking to projects on the ground, they argue, would allow an understanding of the different interests in place and enables one to consider interactions with the local communities. I confess that it was in my original plan for this book to do what the commentators feel is missing. Having worked with a project-based approach for an earlier book on Germany’s Cold War in Africa, I know well the advantages and disadvantages of a project-based approach. The explicatory power of development projects is indeed majestic and allows us to follow more clearly the dynamics of aid relations on the ground. While writing the book, though, I felt that the projects selected did not reflect enough of the long-term dynamics that I wanted to understand. After pondering whether to adopt microhistory as a methodology, I eventually chose to distill the ideas behind the projects. I believe that the loss in terms of the analytical dimension is counterbalanced here by the width.

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31 Sara Lorenzini, Due Germanie in Africa: la cooperazione allo sviluppo e la competizione per i mercati di materie prime e tecnologia (Firenze: Polistampa, 2003).
achieved with a less project-based approach, especially in the chapters on the 1970s. Yet, an analysis of the ground-level experience of the single projects is something that I am very likely to incorporate in my next work.

A critical aspect of my book is its devoting much more attention to the 1970s, compared to existing histories of development, which classically still focus on the 1950s and 1960s. I am pleased that both Young and Citino generously highlight this aspect of it. Young correctly notes that chapters 5-9 are the more compelling and innovative part of the book, with the multiple and contradictory development offers on the Socialist side (including the NIEO alternative), and the efforts of the West, especially the G7, to split up Third World unity. In my account of the 1970s, I chose not to focus on the militarization of North-South relations during that decade. O.A. Westad has done this masterfully in *The Global Cold War*. Instead, I address the ideas of development and how they interacted with broader changes: the emergence of global environmentalism and the resurgence of human rights. In my book, one can read how pollution and the conservation of resources came to be a topic of East-West cooperation, following the story of specialized international organizations, such as the Vienna-based International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). Or one can learn about the paradoxical Third-Worldist turn of the Club of Rome, which had originally been conceived as neo-Malthusian think-tank that was concerned with the predicaments of growth, and which was led by Aurelio Peccei. This revolution in priorities is telling of the growing capacity of developing countries to make their voice heard on the environment-development nexus. Still, there is no doubt, as Unger suggests, that more in-depth analysis is much needed in order for us to better understand how the North-South tensions around the environment progressed.

Further research on topics that are still understudied will shed new light on aspects that are not yet at the forefront of this global history. Among them, the reviewers rightly mention the weight of debt, the role of multinationals, and the tensions surrounding the ecology of development. It may well be that, as Gilman prophesizes, the rise of China will lead to a dramatic rethinking of the global history of development as a whole, with different ways to measure success and failure. Of the many contradictory elements that populate the history of development, the belief that development helps contain threats, be they Communism during the Cold War, or nowadays radical Islam, does not necessarily hold. I believe that this is one of the lessons from the history of development that we have to keep in mind.

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