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Lauren Frances Turek. *To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2020. ISBN: 9781501748912 (hardcover, \$47.95).

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 INTRODUCTION BY PHILIP JENKINS, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY

However strange such a concept might have appeared to earlier generations, the influence of religion on US diplomacy and foreign policy is now widely acknowledged, and indeed forms the subject of an impressive volume of scholarship.¹ Lauren Turek's *To Bring the Good News to All Nations* studies the role of evangelical Christians in these matters from the mid-1970s through the end of the twentieth century, with a particular focus on human rights. As Turek herself notes in her thoughtful response to the reviews, her work "reflects on the intersections of domestic politics, religious non-state actors, and U.S. foreign policymaking."

Of course, such religious interest and enthusiasm was anything but new in that era. American Christians of all shades had long expressed concern about instances of anti-Christian violence and persecution, whether by Muslim or Communist regimes. Repeatedly, such foreign debates had led to conflicts between Protestant and Catholic interest groups – notably over policies towards leftist and anti-clerical Mexico in the 1920s and 1930s - but the Cold War brought a new sense of inter-church harmony against a common Communist foe.²

The 1970s brought many new developments, not least in the emergence of a much more active and self-confident evangelical conservative Right, which ultimately found its champion in President Ronald Reagan. Although chiefly motivated by domestic issues of gender, family, and sexuality, the movement was deeply committed to international causes, above all in galvanizing resistance to the Soviet Union and international Communism. From the late 1970s, the Cold War confrontation revived in deeply perilous form, with resurgent threats of imminent nuclear warfare. End Times and apocalyptic beliefs became increasingly widespread within many religious denominations, but especially among evangelicals and Pentecostals.³

No less vital for evangelical thinkers was the vigorous globalization that was redrawing the map of worldwide Christianity in those same years, and which found a focus in the great 1974 Lausanne gathering, the First International Congress on World Evangelization. Such encounters made U.S. evangelicals suddenly more attentive to the voices of their Global South counterparts, and to their special cares and concerns.⁴

¹ Dianne Kirby, ed., *Religion and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Anchor, 2012).

² Matthew A. Redinger, *American Catholics and the Mexican Revolution, 1924-1936* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005); William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

³ William Martin, *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America* (New York: Broadway Books, 1996); Philip Jenkins, *Decade of Nightmares: The End of the 1960s and the Making of Eighties America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); Daniel Williams, *God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, three volumes (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), vol. iii; Seth Dowland, *Family Values and the Rise of the Christian Right*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Neil J. Young, *We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Darren Dochuk, *Anointed With Oil: How Christianity and Crude Made Modern America* (New York: Basic, 2019).

⁴ Brian Stanley, *Christianity in the Twentieth Century: A World History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2018); David King, *God's Internationalists: World Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); David C. Kirkpatrick, *A Gospel for the Poor: Global Social Christianity and the Latin American Evangelical Left* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); David Swartz, *Facing West: American Evangelicals in an Age of World Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

Practically, what could U.S. evangelicals contribute to supporting and defending these Global South brethren, during such a time of deeply impressive expansion? During the 1970s, the language of human rights gained great significance in international affairs, especially during the East-West negotiations that culminated in the Helsinki Accords of 1975. Human Rights were much in the news, usually in the context of Western denunciations of the Soviet bloc. American evangelicals exalted two such rights in particular, namely the right to hold and practice one's own religion, and also to be free to evangelize or spread one's ideas. Enforcing such rights would remove obstacles to the diffusion of the gospel and the implementation of Jesus's Great Commission to his followers, in what might after all be the End Times. (Turek properly stresses these apocalyptic undertones: 22, 42). Evangelical groups became very active in lobbying U.S. governments to promote these causes.⁵ As Turek remarks in her response, "The conservative human rights language that evangelicals helped develop proved to be very useful to the Reagan administration as it worked to align U.S. human rights policies with a conservative foreign policy agenda."

Turek's book is richly informative on the evangelical use of mass media in promoting global evangelism, which included not just the familiar use of radio, but also of more innovative devices such as cassette tapes. Preventing repressive governments from limiting or suppressing such weapons of mass instruction thus became a fundamental contribution to encouraging global Christian expansion.

To Bring the Good News to All Nations traces the emergence and development of this activism. The author draws impressively on archival research, including collections in Guatemala and South Africa, as well as the obvious sources in North America. Only a trained academic historian will appreciate just how extensive and how expert Turek's research has been, building a rock-solid foundation for her statements and conclusions.

Almost half the book consists of three substantial and closely-observed case-studies of evangelical human rights activism, respectively behind the Iron Curtain (mainly the Soviet Union); in Guatemala; and in apartheid-era South Africa. Each posed very different political and moral dilemmas, and two of the examples set evangelicals against a broad range of centrist and liberal opinion, religious as well as secular. Guatemala was in the midst of an extremely bloody civil war, which claimed hundreds of thousands of lives. From 1982, the regime was dominated by the repressive military commander, Efraín Ríos Montt, who nevertheless identified as a faithful *evangélico*. U.S. evangelicals struggled to maintain the Reagan administration's support for his regime.⁶

Scarcely less controversial were attitudes to white-ruled South Africa, which during the 1980s faced overwhelming international pressure and condemnation, and which was also confronting an ever-enlarging domestic campaign of popular resistance. As in Guatemala, American evangelical activists were chiefly concerned about the possible spread of Communist influence and dominations, and resisted efforts to bring the U.S. into conformity with the international sanctions system. As Turek notes, "the evangelistic mission, rather than the pursuit of social justice, defined U.S. evangelical engagement with

⁵ Rosemary Foot, "The Cold War and Human Rights," in Leffler and Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. iii: 445-465; Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014); Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); Sarah B. Snyder, *From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U. S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Sarah Shortall and Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, eds., *Christianity and Human Rights Reconsidered* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

⁶ Virginia Garrard-Burnett, *Terror in the Land of the Holy Spirit Guatemala under General Efraín Ríos Montt 1982-1983* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); John Coatsworth, "The Cold War in Central America, 1975-1991," in Leffler and Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. iii: 201-221.

South Africa between 1970 and 1994” (180). Whatever their religious motivations or their human rights rhetoric, evangelical lobbying groups were effectively aligning with the most implacable forces of the domestic U.S. hard Right.⁷

Evangelical attitudes in these areas stand out all the more forcefully because U.S. foreign policy debates in the 1980s especially were so profoundly shaped by other and very different religious agendas, above all those of the Roman Catholic Church. This was especially true in Central America. Appalled by state violence and Rightist militias in El Salvador, Guatemala, and other states, the U.S. Catholic leadership became fiercely critical of Reagan policies in the region, and vigorously supported limitations on any possible US military interventions in Nicaragua or elsewhere. This was still the era before the clergy abuse scandals so undermined the church’s moral and political influence, and Catholic activism did much to establish and sustain a political and media consensus against administration policy. Turek briefly mentions the situations in El Salvador and Nicaragua (125, 142) but that larger picture does demand more emphasis in putting the evangelical contributions in a broader context. For centrists as well as liberals, U.S. misdeeds in the region – including Guatemala - gravely undermined Western claims to any monopoly of virtue in global human rights debates.⁸

Nor does Turek mention the critical Catholic role in the intense anti-nuclear campaigns of these precise years, which so profoundly shaped attitudes to the Cold War, and more generally to policies toward the Soviet Union, and to real or alleged Communist threats. That passionate militancy culminated in a 1982 New York City demonstration that still remains the largest political demonstration ever recorded in the United States. Against this background, anti-Communist evangelicals looked ever more isolated and extreme in their single-minded concerns about Communist menaces, and especially when conservative Christian leaders defended the buildup of nuclear arsenals. For the administration, it was a relief and a delight to have at least a few explicitly religious voices of support in these foreign and military matters, in contrast to the widely-reported mass of Catholics, mainline Protestants, and Jews who opposed them. That contrast certainly opened the door to evangelical lobbyists. Readers who are less familiar with the era would profit from a little more background context, in order to situate those evangelical activities on the larger religious spectrum.⁹

Turek’s book offers much to admire, and her close descriptions of those various policy debates are exemplary. She leaves no doubt that religion is an essential component in the making of foreign policy, and that any attempt to elucidate those connections must be founded on a thoughtful and deeply informed view of faith, as well as of policy making. Turek makes a powerful and indeed essential contribution to current scholarship on both foreign policy, and the politics of religion. Her writing throughout is lucid and accessible.

All four reviewers applaud Turek’s excellent archival research, and the ambitious scope of her project. All praise her achievement in drawing together different kinds of evidence, going far beyond the merely diplomatic. In different ways, each of the reviewers underlines the importance of religion for understanding the making of foreign policy. All, likewise, emphasize the contribution that her book makes to our understanding of the emerging concepts and rhetoric of human rights.

⁷ Chris Saunders, “The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976–1990,” in Leffler and Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, vol. iii: 222-243.

⁸ Kenneth A. Briggs, *Holy Siege: The Year That Shook Catholic America* (San Francisco: Harper 1992); Penny Lernoux, *People of God: The Struggle For World Catholicism* (New York: Viking 1989); Timothy A. Byrnes, *Reverse Mission: Transnational Religious Communities and the Making of US Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011).

⁹ William A. Au, *The Cross, The Flag, And The Bomb: American Catholics Debate War And Peace, 1960-1983* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985); Sharon Nepstad, *Catholic Social Activism : Progressive Movements In The United States* (New York: New York University Press, 2019)

John D. Wilsey praises Turek's integration of religious and diplomatic history, all the more so because of her thorough understanding of religious ideologies and world-views involved. Although terms such as "evangelical" are often used loosely and inaccurately, Turek treats her topic thoughtfully and knowledgeably. He writes, "To put it colloquially, Turek 'gets' evangelicals." This awareness helps her navigate some of the paradoxes inherent in her work. In an American evangelicalism that often presented itself as quintessentially American, larger transnational trends "were also expanding their understanding, outreach, and influence on the international scene." The more American those evangelicals seemed, the more global they actually became, almost despite themselves. Wilsey observes a "delicious irony."

Wilsey notes several main dynamics at work in her story. Respectively, these involved the creation of international networks pledged to fulfil the Great Commission, from the 1970s onward; the expanded awareness by U.S. evangelicals of the existence of those vast communities overseas, and their concerns; and how the religious freedom emphasis contributed directly to the growing U.S. emphasis on religious freedom. That process culminated in 1998 when President Bill Clinton signed the still remarkable International Religious Freedom Act, which made religious liberty a core goal in the making and implementation of US foreign policy.¹⁰

Mark Edwards also lauds Turek's work for its contributions to understanding the role of religion in foreign policy. He remarks, memorably and expansively, "Religion is always present at the creation of every diplomatic adventure, and so historians need to take it more seriously."

But Edwards emphasizes other important implications of Turek's work. He underlines the book's contributions for understanding the U.S. religious Right, which must always be seen as a global, and globally oriented, phenomenon. He also highlights the role of individualism in evangelical belief and rhetoric. "Specifically, is it possible to establish human rights concerns on a foundation of individualism?" In South Africa especially, a focus on the rights of individual believers was well and good, but the need for larger collective action and reform was unanswerable. In practice, the individualist approach could not fail to be reactionary in its policy consequences, and at worst, to provide a thin veil for the worst oppression. As Edwards asks, provocatively, "Should religious freedom be considered a human right, at least in the self-serving way imagined by American evangelicals?"

While praising the quality of Turek's research, David A Hollinger makes a number of criticisms and suggestions. He expresses disappointment that Turek does not more explicitly state the important conclusions that would naturally arise from her work. In particular, Hollinger writes, "Turek has shown how episodic and relatively limited evangelical pressure was in South Africa, how temporary and counter-democratic it was in Guatemala, and how minor a role it played in the eventual demise of the Soviet Union." These findings are "highly valuable," so, he wonders why are they not stated more clearly and forthrightly? In practice, he suggests, those findings tend to be lost in Turek's conclusion. Nor, suggests Hollinger, does Turek present the evangelical attitudes and concerns that she portrays in their larger context. As an instance, he observes how the more liberal and outward looking insights heard at Lausanne had been familiar for decades among liberal and mainline Protestants. As he says, "Too often, Turek depicts American evangelicalism in a religious and political vacuum, and invites readers to accept uncritically the evangelicals' own sense of their foreign involvements as a straightforward effort to act on the Great Commission."

Hollinger notes that the themes of Turek's work were also reflected in several other books that appeared around the same time, so that (through no fault of her own) she was unable to engage with them. The most important of these absences is

¹⁰ Thomas F. Farr, *World Of Faith And Freedom: Why International Religious Liberty Is Vital To American National Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Anna Su, *Exporting Freedom: Religious Liberty and American Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); Tisa Joy Wenger, *Religious Freedom: The Contested History of an American Ideal* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017).

Melani McAlister's *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders*, which is also cited by Mark Edwards.¹¹ In her own "Response," Turek offers generous praise of McAlister's book, and its many contributions to the subjects at hand. McAlister deals with many of the same issues as Turek, and touches on some related case-studies, but she develops important concepts that should usefully be more widely employed. McAlister is more critical of evangelical uses of the rhetoric of religious freedom and persecution, noting how on occasion they have used such examples to mobilize Rightist and intolerant sentiment within the US. As Mark Edwards puts it, they "have used violence against Christians abroad to fuel their persecution-industrial complex at home."¹² (Edwards makes no claim to be the source of that arresting phrase).

Daniel G. Hummel stresses the central significance of the 1974 Lausanne Congress in the history of modern evangelicalism, so that Turek's work fits perfectly into this trend. But where other scholars trace the inheritance of Lausanne in left-leaning social justice movements, Turek follows the conservative legacy. Like Edwards, Hummel stresses the book's implications for understanding the American religious Right, which is too often portrayed solely in terms of domestic concerns. In a striking inversion of conventional assumptions, Hummel argues that emerging global concerns were not only marginal for the religious Right but were actually pivotal. That rightist tradition, after all, had a declared mission to defend a Christian (or Judeo-Christian) America, to serve as a beacon to the world. As he writes "a case could be made that the *primary* self-understanding of the Christian right was as a foreign relations movement, with the domestic issues of abortion, feminism, and so forth understood as rearguard actions to maintain America's 'Christian' identity so that it could perform its divine mandates abroad." He stresses that this is his view, rather than Turek's.

It is a sign of a book's value, and its contribution to scholarship, that expert readers are so inspired to pursue its lessons into so many diverse areas.

Participants:

Lauren Frances Turek is an assistant professor of History, the director of Museum Studies, and the Director of the Mellon Initiative for Undergraduate Research in the Arts and Humanities at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. Turek's articles on religion in American politics and foreign policy have appeared in *Diplomatic History*, the *Journal of American Studies*, and *Religions*, and she has contributed chapters to several edited volumes. Her first book, *To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations*, was published with Cornell University Press in 2020 and is part of the United States in the World Series.

Philip Jenkins is Distinguished Professor of History at Baylor University, where he serves in the Institute for Studies of Religion. He studies global Christianity, new and emerging religious movements and recent US history. His most recent books are *Fertility and Faith: The Demographic Revolution That Is Transforming All the World's Religions* (Baylor University Press, 2020), and *Climate, Catastrophe, and Faith: How Changes in Climate Drive Religious Upheaval* (Oxford University Press, 2021).

¹¹ Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

¹² Among the wave of other closely relevant books published very recently, see Heather Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians: American Evangelicals and Global Aid* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018); David King, *God's Internationalists: World Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); David Swartz, *Facing West: American Evangelicals in an Age of World Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

Mark Edwards is Professor of U.S. history and politics at Spring Arbor University in Michigan. He has published articles in *Religion and American Culture*, *Diplomatic History*, *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, *Religions*, and the *Journal of Religious History*. His first book, *The Right of the Protestant Left: God's Totalitarianism* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012) offered a new view of Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism, and the geopolitics of the World Council of Churches. His most recent publication, *Faith and Foreign Affairs in the American Century* (Lexington, 2019), offers a religious history of the Council on Foreign Relations and the idea of "Protestant secularism." Mark also edited the *Religions* essay series and subsequent collection, *Christian Nationalism in the United States* (2017). In the spring of 2018, he served as Fulbright Senior Scholar to Hankuk University of Foreign Studies in Seoul, Korea, where he taught American diplomatic history. He is currently working on a religious biography of Walter Lippmann.

David A. Hollinger is Preston Hotchkis Professor Emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley. His recent books include *Protestants Abroad: How Missionaries Tried to Change the World but Changed America* (Princeton University Press, 2017) and *After Cloven Tongues of Fire: Protestant Liberalism and Modern American History* (Princeton University Press, 2013). He also contributed a "Learning the Scholar's Craft Essay" for H-Diplo in February 2020; <https://issforum.org/essays/PDF/E189.pdf>.

Daniel G. Hummel is on staff at Upper House, a Christian study center on the campus of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and an Honorary Research Fellow at UW-Madison. He earned his Ph.D. in History from UW-Madison and held postdoctoral fellowships at the Harvard Kennedy School and the Institute for Research in the Humanities. He is the author of *Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U.S.-Israeli Relations* (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).

John D. Wilsey is Associate Professor of Church History and Philosophy at The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary. He is the author of *American Exceptionalism and Civil Religion: Reassessing the History of an Idea* (IVP Academic, 2015) and *God's Cold Warrior: The Life and Faith of John Foster Dulles*, part of the Eerdmans Library of Religious Biography Series, forthcoming in February 2021.

REVIEW BY MARK EDWARDS, SPRING ARBOR UNIVERSITY

For a long time in the study of American foreign relations, religion was seen but not heard. Obligatory references to pastors Josiah Strong and Reinhold Niebuhr substituted for thorough interrogation of the political influence of religious persons and ideas. Thanks to the pioneering work of Diane Kirby, William Inboden, Andrew Preston, and others, the question for diplomatic historians is no longer if but rather how religion matters.¹³ Lauren Frances Turek's new work, *To Bring the Good News to All Nations* (2020), is certain to advance our appreciation of religion's role in worldmaking. Her book makes at least three important, overlapping historiographical interventions.

First, Turek offers a fresh perspective on post-World War II evangelical conservatism in America. Both short-view and long-view studies of the Christian right have tended to frame their scholarship around their actors' America First theology.¹⁴ Yet evangelical conservatism was forged and reforged in a global context of war, depression, and terrorism. It always transcended national borders. More recent studies, including Darren Dochuk's *Anointed with Oil* (2019) and Kristin Kobes Du Mez's *Jesus and John Wayne* (2020), have begun to overcome the historiographical restraints of Christian nationalism. Though based firmly in American experience, Du Mez's and Dochuk's people impact and are impacted by world developments.¹⁵ Future surveys of the religious right will need to continue this work of interrogating the often-artificial barrier between the foreign and the domestic.

Indeed, the religious right looms large in the flurry of studies on evangelical internationalism, a new subfield that Turek significantly occupies. Missionaries have long been a topic of concern for historians of American foreign relations, and more recent works by Emily Conroy-Krutz and Heather Curtis continue that tradition.¹⁶ Still, the question re-mains: Are American missionaries and their home-front communities perpetrators or problematizers of the Western imperial project? Melani McAlister answers "both" in her narrative, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders* (2018).¹⁷ She finds that since the 1970s, evangelicals have looked to export their 'family values' conservatism and have used violence against Christians abroad to fuel their persecution-industrial complex at home, culminating in the 2016 election of Donald Trump as president. Yet evangelicals have also been transformed by their international engagements in ways that elide any simple culture wars binary. David King's *God's Internationalists* (2019) and David Swartz's *Facing West* (2020) conclude that evangelical internationalism drove theologically conservative American Protestants to the left—or at least led conservatives

¹³ Dianne Kirby, ed., *Religion and the Cold War* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); William Inboden, *Religion and American Foreign Policy, 1945-1960: The Soul of Containment* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Anchor, 2012). For an overview, see Lauren Frances Turek, "An Outpouring of Spirit: A Historiography of Recent Works on Religion and U. S. Foreign Relations," *Passport* 48 (September 2017): 25-31.

¹⁴ See, for instance, William Martin, *With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America* (New York: Broadway Books, 1996); and Frances Fitzgerald, *The Evangelicals: The Struggle to Shape America* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2018).

¹⁵ Darren Dochuk, *How Christianity and Crude Made Modern America* (New York: Basic, 2019); Kristen Kobes Du Mez, *Jesus and John Wayne: How White Evangelicals Corrupted a Faith and Fractured a Nation* (New York: Liverlight, 2020).

¹⁶ Emily Conroy-Krutz, *Christian Imperialism: Converting the World in the Early American Republic* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015); Heather Curtis, *Holy Humanitarians: American Evangelicals and Global Aid* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018).

¹⁷ Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019).

to appropriate more liberal positions on race and other issues.¹⁸ Daniel Hummel's *Covenant Brothers* (2019), however, traces the long evangelical investment in Christian Zionism and how that concern was co-opted for political purposes by a global religious right.¹⁹ So, is it even possible to talk about a singular politics of evangelical internationalism?

On that problem Turek adds to a third conversation, the debate over religion and human rights. The starting point here remains Samuel Moyn's *Christian Human Rights* (2015), which argues that, following World War II, conservative Catholics and Protestants used human rights to anchor a new European religious right.²⁰ Moyn's claims don't travel quite as well across the Atlantic, where scholars such as David Hollinger, Gene Zubovich, and others have noted the rise of a left-liberal human rights regime rooted in ecumenical American Protestantism.²¹ Recent scholarship by Anna Su, Tisa Wenger, and others, which understands religious freedom as a human rights issue, would appear to confirm Moyn's portrait of global Christian conservative triumph.²²

But the question lingers: Where do American evangelicals fit into these stories of Christian human rights? Centrally, Turek has discovered. "Pursuing global evangelism under the banner of human rights," she observes, "enabled U. S. evangelical groups to exercise influence on U. S. foreign relations, including decisions on trade, aid, and military assistance, diplomatic exchanges, and bilateral negotiations with allies and adversaries alike" (7). Turek's delineation of what she calls "conservative Christian human rights" (6) represents a much-needed rethinking of the religious right and one more advance in understanding the existence, nature, and impact of evangelical internationalism. Turek argues that Christian right founding fathers Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson fought "secular humanism" abroad as well as at home during the 1980s in the name of spreading the old-time religion. Turek joins with McAlister and others in retelling how President Ronald Reagan's evangelicals saw themselves as anchors of a global gospel network bound by overcoming persecution in all its perceived forms. Much like Matthew Avery Sutton's *Double Crossed* (2019), *To Bring the Good News to All Nations* reminds us that there is nothing like a deep dive into the archives to demonstrate religious influence on statecraft.²³

The first half of Turek's book offers a compelling account of a world-wide evangelical Christian coalition that was in formation between the 1950s and 1980s. Like most of what Billy Graham's legions did during these years, global evangelical networking was intended to counter the supposedly 'godless Communist' power of the World Council of Churches

¹⁸ David King, *God's Internationalists: World Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); David Swartz, *Facing West: American Evangelicals in an Age of World Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

¹⁹ Daniel G. Hummel, *Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U. S.-Israeli Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019).

²⁰ Samuel Moyn, *Christian Human Rights* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).

²¹ David Hollinger, *Protestants Abroad: How Missionaries Tried to change the World but Changed America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017); Gene Zubovich, "For Human Rights Abroad, against Jim Crow at Home: The Political Mobilization of American Ecumenical Protestants in the Era of World War II," *Journal of American History* 105 (September 2018): 267-90.

²² Anna Su, *Exporting Freedom: Religious Liberty and American Power* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016); Tisa Joy Wenger, *Religious Freedom: The Contested History of an American Ideal* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2017). See also Winnifred Fallers Sullivan, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Saba Mahmood, and Peter G. Danchin, eds., *Politics of Religious Freedom* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015); and Sarah Shortall and Daniel Steinmetz-Jenkins, eds., *Christianity and Human Rights Reconsidered* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2020).

²³ Matthew Avery Sutton, *Double-Crossed: The Missionaries Who Spied for the United States during the Second World War* (New York: Basic Books, 2019).

(WCC) and its ecumenical American wing, including their promotion of human rights. The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) and *Christianity Today* first supported ‘human rights’ themselves during the early Cold War in the domestic terms of the Civil Rights Movement. Graham and the NAE then internationalized themselves as part of the ‘Lausanne Movement’ that was launched in 1974 at the International Congress on World Evangelization (ICOWE). Lausanne Movement transactions allowed nonwestern evangelicals opportunities to critique the cultural imperialism of the United States. Nevertheless, the expansion of missions during these years was driven in large part by anti-Communist anxieties over faltering American leadership of the free world. Turek documents how a “global evangelical network” (46) took shape through denominational insurgencies (notably Baptists and Pentecostals) and new activism like the Fellowship Foundation world prayer group. Evangelicals had always been mass media savvy, so their innovations in radio, television, tape, and Bible-smuggling ministries that were intended to grow transnational Christian community should not be surprising.

Yet then why have scholars of evangelical conservatism missed the fact that the religious right was arising in the very years in which American evangelicals were embracing one conservative Protestant worldism? As Turek convincingly argues, global evangelical interconnectivity encouraged American evangelicals to lobby Washington for policies intended to make the world safe for ‘born again’ Christianity. Christian Republican congressmen lent their support to evangelical efforts to rollback persecution abroad as well as at home. In other words, the religious right was always a global phenomenon. Evangelicals looked to Reagan not only to stop abortion and the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) but also to end détente and ‘punish’ nations that hurt Christian evangelists. For Turek, conservative Christian human rights was an amalgam of a vague personalism, libertarian anti-statism, and a power play conducted through concerns for religious freedom.

Turek defines evangelical human rights in action through cases studies that are centered in the Soviet Union, Central America, and South Africa. Unlike the ‘evangelical humanitarianism’ described by King and Swartz, Turek’s subjects were closer to Hummel’s in wanting to harness the power of the U.S. warfare state to advance their particular religious brand. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, American missionaries continued to build solidarity with like-minded Christians behind the Iron Curtain. They found an eager ally in the Reagan administration, which employed human rights rhetoric against Communist states rather than authoritarian regimes more generally. Reagan’s eventual choice for human rights director, Elliot Abrams, was in basic agreement with the NAE, whose director Robert P. Dugan, Jr., boasted before Congress that conservative Christianity was the world’s greatest hope because it emphasized the most important freedom, spiritual freedom. The religious right championed an aggressive posture toward the Soviet Union as well as military aid for anti-Communist ‘Christian’ dictatorships in Central America. Falwell, Robertson, and their followers campaigned enthusiastically for Guatemala’s junta government as gospel partners even as the regime killed and ‘disappeared’ thousands. Evidently, white evangelical support for strongmen began abroad as well as at home. Finally, the Christian American right shared Reagan’s fears of Communist advances in South Africa, which they believed would hurt evangelistic efforts on the continent. They resisted all attempts at boycotts, sanctions, and divestment, including the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act (1986) that Congress passed over Reagan’s objections. South African evangelicals quickly made their peace with the new government and the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, yet the episode helped to consolidate white evangelicals and the Republican Party in the United States.

To Bring the Good News to All Nations has much to commend it. The book is at its strongest when describing the tireless efforts to build an anti-Communist global evangelicalism. It is an important reminder that the Cold War was an opportunity as well as an impediment to the forging of transnational identities and movements. Reagan’s courting of evangelicals is well known, but Turek has uncovered the foreign-policy dimensions of that special relationship in a clear and captivating way. Religion is always present at the creation of every diplomatic adventure, and so historians need to take it more seriously.

Turek’s work also raises some important questions. Specifically, is it possible to establish human rights concerns on a foundation of individualism? The personal-conversion-coveting evangelicals have for ages given life to American self-government, entrepreneurship, and cowboy conservatism. That does not mean, however, that their offering of Christian inter-racialism to South Africans as an alternative to ending apartheid should be recognized as being adequate in any way.

There is reason to question the efficacy and perhaps the validity of the notion of ‘conservative Christian human rights’ when compared to its more comprehensive competitors on the liberal-left. That relates to a second dilemma: Should religious freedom be considered a human right, at least in the self-serving way imagined by American evangelicals? On this issue, Turek is much kinder to her subjects than previous scholars have been. She more or less takes their claims to interest in the general global welfare at face value. At the same time, Turek offers a think description of the remarkably insular nature of the American evangelical pursuit of human rights. Admirably, she leaves it to readers to decide what to make of her story. What will we conclude? Should a world movement for religious freedom that was and is so ambivalent toward Muslim and, to a lesser extent, Jewish discrimination be understood as anything other than a crusade?

One thing that is beyond question, though, is that Turek’s evangelicals have won the inter-Protestant American fight to define human rights. To be sure, as Sarah Snyder has indicated, ecumenical Protestant renderings of human rights continue to undergird numerous internationalist endeavors.²⁴ Yet such adaptations also appear to be divorced from the present American state. Some saw the central role of evangelicals in drafting and supporting the International Religious Freedom Act (1998) as an indication that Billy Graham’s children were now ready to play nice with other human rights advocates. Since at least 2008, foreign and domestic religious freedom promotion has become a central part of the Christian nationalism project carried forward by evangelicals and their Catholic allies who purport to be resisting persecution. The prominence of outspoken Christian culture warriors like Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (evangelical) and Attorney General William Barr (Catholic) on behalf of religious liberty is something that Jerry Falwell, Sr., would have idolized. What Turek shows is that the transfiguration of Barr, Pompeo, and even Trump was in the works for a long time.

²⁴ Sarah B. Snyder, *From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018).

REVIEW BY DAVID A. HOLLINGER, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

What makes this book valuable is the detail with which Lauren Frances Turek documents three late-twentieth century episodes in the American evangelical effort to influence the foreign policy of the United States. Turek proves that the singular priority of converting foreign peoples to Christianity drove these efforts in the Soviet Union, in Guatemala, and in South Africa. While they formally adopted the language of universal human rights, the evangelicals devoted themselves only to the one right they took to be central and indispensable: the right to practice one's religion freely, including the liberty to proselytize. The evangelical lobbyists were concerned with threats to this right as exercised by Christians. The rights of other religions were not a matter of prominent concern for Turek's cast of characters.

Turek's research resoundingly confirms the widespread view that evangelical campaigns to defend religious liberty often entailed support for authoritarian regimes. This is the most important take-away from *To Bring the Good News to All Nations*. Turek also provides a convincing and highly illuminating account of the development and deployment of media technology by internationally engaged evangelicals. This book is traditional, archive-intense diplomatic history, in which the author's analysis stays very close to the documents.

About the Soviet Union in its last dozen years, Turek traces the interaction of religious lobbies with government officials, especially in the administration of President Ronald Reagan. She concludes that evangelicals were glad to cooperate with the Reagan administration's efforts to bring down a communist regime, but were primarily determined to diminish the mistreatment of Christians no matter what the character of the offending government (121, 123). There are few surprises here, but Turek tells the story well.

In her chapters on Guatemala and South Africa, Turek develops more pointed arguments. Entranced by the pro-religious rhetoric of the Guatemalan dictator Efraim Rios Montt, American evangelicals encouraged the Reagan administration's support of Montt's aggressive actions against guerilla opponents. The American evangelicals accepted Montt's promise that "pacifying the countryside and removing the communist threat would bring justice, peace, and human dignity to poor villagers." Thinking only about guaranteeing the opportunity to proselytize, the American dupes—which is exactly what Turek shows them to have been, although she does not call them that—failed to take account of the testimony of the "Mayan and Catholic refugees who fled across the border into Mexico to escape army violence." Instead, the American evangelicals and the Reagan administration whose support they had won actually aided and abetted "genocidal state violence" (150).

About South Africa's apartheid regime evangelicals were divided, Turek explains. But she correctly reminds us that during much of the debate over apartheid during the 1970s and 1980s, major figures like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson strongly opposed the sanctions and divestment advocated by many progressives in the United States. Falwell even "rejected the legitimacy of anti-apartheid leaders Desmond Tutu, Allan Boesak, and Nelson Mandela (174)." Attracted to the idea that the hearts of white South Africans would soften if they understood the gospel more deeply, most American evangelicals were very slow to appreciate the need for stronger measures. "Evangelicals who hailed from politically and ecclesiastically conservative churches with predominantly white memberships tended to support apartheid, citing as justification for their views the scriptural command in Romans 13 that Christians should submit to governing authorities," she writes (155). Turek finds that when American evangelicals talked about human rights in South Africa, it was the right of Christians to flourish and carry out their missionary activities that most mattered to them; "the evangelistic mission, rather than the pursuit of social justice, defined U.S. evangelical engagement with South Africa between 1970 and 1994" (180).

A frustrating feature of *To Bring the Good News to All Nations* is that the book tends to hide its best arguments. In Turek's concluding reflection on the South African case, for example, she pulls back to observe, sympathetically, that even if the American evangelicals "may not have swayed congressional opinion on sanctions and divestment," they had "played a role in the unfolding drama as they worked to build the kingdom (180)." Turek thus buries the most interesting finding of her research, the persistent narrowness of evangelical perspectives on South Africa. This occurs several other times. She

concludes the book by observing that her cast of characters offered “believers from all corners of the earth... common spiritual meaning amid tremendous cultural differences” (188). This assertion is not only quite distant from the book’s specific findings, but begs the question of just how effective the evangelical witness might have been in creating a genuinely global fraternity, saturated as it obviously was—as Turek acknowledges—with American culture.

More striking yet is the final passage in *To Bring the Good News to All Nations*, which calls attention to the power of faith: “Their faith inspired their political activism and grassroots organizing amid the shifting social and political sands of the late twentieth century. Their impact on U.S. foreign relations is a testament to the power of religiously inspired individuals, united in common cause, to shape national politics as well as the international order” (188). This statement is not so much wrong as irrelevant to what are the great strengths of her book. Turek has shown how episodic and relatively limited evangelical pressure was in South Africa, how temporary and counter-democratic it was in Guatemala, and how minor a role it played in the eventual demise of the Soviet Union. Rather than using her concluding chapter to pull these cases together and to assess the actual measure of evangelical influence, she simply invokes that influence in the abstract and assures us of the power of faith to affect policy. I, for one, would have appreciated a more forthright statement of the book’s highly valuable findings.

I also wish that the book had addressed more extensively the debates over just what the Christian faith implied about human rights. The ecumenical churches of the United States, though the National Council of Churches and the World Council of Churches advanced a much more capacious vision of human rights, including a substantial quantity of respect for non-Christian cultures. Turek alludes occasionally to the political activities of these mainline Protestants, but her analysis of evangelicals could have been enriched by more attention to what was being said on the other side of the ecumenical-evangelical divide. Turek does not discuss the extensive human rights activities of ecumenical Protestants during the 1940s, despite the important book of fifteen years ago by John S. Nurser, *For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights* (2005). More recently, Gene Zubovich has contributed importantly to our understanding of this history in his “For Human Rights Abroad, against Jim Crow at Home: The Political Mobilization of American Ecumenical Protestants in the World War II Era.”²⁵

Turek allows that by the end of the 1960s, Billy Graham and other evangelical leaders became worried that “liberal Protestant critiques of missionary work as imperialism threatened the evangelistic mission of the global Christian church” (182), but she does not take this opportunity to explore the mentality within which imperialism itself was of apparently little or no concern. Liberal use of the charge of imperialism was an issue, but the charge itself was not? Evangelical intellectuals developed an extensive argument for missionary activities, which was formulated as a point-by-point refutation of the outlook on missions and human rights voiced by the liberal Protestants. Turek mentions Harold Lindsell once, but does not quote his writings, which over several decades in twenty books revealed a host of evangelical ideas about foreign peoples and the meaning of conversion.²⁶

Turek attends carefully to policy-specific exchanges between evangelical lobbyists and government officials, but says little about the theoretical foundation for evangelical actions. She does provide a brief account of the debates at the Lausanne Conference of 1974 and of the resulting Lausanne Covenant, through which the Graham-led evangelicals finally accepted social justice as a valid supplement to proselytizing (26-32). But a remarkable fact about the liberalizing voices at Lausanne was their copying of ideas that had been standard since the 1930s for the much-excoriated liberal Protestant leadership. The ecumenical-evangelical dialectic was a major context for everything that Turek discusses, but the book attends to that

²⁵ John S. Nurser, *For All Peoples and All Nations: The Ecumenical Church and Human Rights* (Geneva: World Council of Churches, 2005); Gene Zubovich, “For Human Rights Abroad, against Jim Crow at Home: The Political Mobilization of American Ecumenical Protestants in the World War II Era,” *Journal of American History* 105:2 (September 2018): 267-290.

²⁶ Two of Lindsell’s most important books were *A Christian Philosophy of Missions* (Wheaton IL, 1949), and *The Battle for the Bible* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976). He was also a long-time editor *Christianity Today*.

dialectic only episodically. Too often, Turek depicts American evangelicalism in a religious and political vacuum, and invites readers to accept uncritically the evangelicals' own sense of their foreign involvements as a straightforward effort to act on the Great Commission (Matthew 28:19) "to make disciples of all nations." Turek's subjects were not simply reading the New Testament. They were more deeply embedded in their American time and place than she suggests.

The timing of publication clearly prevented Turek from engaging several other books in the same domain. These include David R. Swartz, *Facing West: American Evangelicals in an Age of World Christianity* (New York, 2020), David P. King, *Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia, 2019), and David C. Kirkpatrick, *A Gospel for the Poor: Global Social Christianity and the Latin American Evangelical Left* (Philadelphia, 2019). This is an historiographically rich era, and had Turek been able to engage these three contemporary works her perspective on her subjects might have become more critical.

But Turek misses an opportunity that timing of publication did allow. She does not engage Melani McAlister's *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders* (New York, 2018)²⁷, which offers an analysis of the lenses through which American evangelicals have looked at the globe. Like an effective pair of glasses dealing with the different needs of two eyes, McAlister argues, "enchanted internationalism" and "victim identification" work together well. Turek's description of the romantic views that evangelicals developed in Guatemala can be seen as an example of the "enchantment" Americans felt when confronted with more or less "primitive" indigenous peoples. The book's narrow focus on what one lobbyist said to what government official ignores the larger context of domestic politics in which evangelicals increasingly saw themselves as victims of persecution by liberals. But Turek does not integrate her analysis with the lively professional conversation already going on in the proximity of her topic.

Moreover, McAlister's own case studies remind us of the limited is the range of Turek's inquiry. McAlister shows how differently American evangelicals reacted to human rights abuses in the Iraq war than they did to those that took place behind the Iron Curtain. In 2004 the Vatican and mainline Protestant churches immediately spoke eloquently and angrily about the tortures at Abu Ghraib prison, while evangelicals, who had objected vociferously to reports of persecution of Christians in the Soviet Bloc, were more inclined to describe the tortures in Iraq as just another sign of the fallen state of humankind. McAlister also deals at length with the case of American evangelical involvement in Sudan, a highly publicized episode about which Turek mentions only with an allusion to the Sudan Peace Pact of 2002.

Yet, the most surprising absence from Turek's pages is any treatment of evangelical priorities in the realm of sex and gender, especially their efforts to limit women's reproductive health care. The notorious "Gag Rule," first implemented by Reagan in 1984, has prevented the use of American foreign aid monies to support abortion counseling. The policy was reversed by President Bill Clinton, but then re-instated by President George W. Bush. Neither the Gag Rule nor "The Mexico City Policy," as this feature of American foreign policy is also known, appear in the index. Recently addressed by Yana van der Meulen Rodgers in *The Global Gag Rule and Women's Reproductive Health: Rhetoric versus Reality* (New York, 2018),²⁸ the Gag Rule has been a constant topic of conversation regarding the "evangelical influence on human rights and U.S. foreign relations" for more than thirty-five years. Was it not relevant to the Soviet Union, Guatemala, and South Africa between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s? Perhaps but by using only those particular cases to address the huge domain of the book's subtitle, we are left to wish for more.

²⁷ Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

²⁸ Yana van der Meulen Rodgers, *The Global Gag Rule and Women's Reproductive Health: Rhetoric versus Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

REVIEW BY DANIEL G. HUMMEL, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON

It has become clear over the last five years that historians of evangelicalism have found a new historical inflection point: the First International Congress on World Evangelization, or the Lausanne Congress, of July 1974. The conference committee was headed by Billy Graham, then in his third decade as *de facto* leader of American evangelicalism, but the conference itself signaled something of a changing of the guard. More than two thousand evangelicals converged on Lausanne from 150 different countries. Though still dominated by Western leadership, evangelicalism, it was clear from the diversity of attendees as well as the pressures on the committee to address issues of concern for the Global South, was going global. Recent work by Andrew Preston, Steven Miller, Melani McAlister, David King, and David Swartz all cite the Lausanne Congress as a major event.²⁹ In his new book, *Facing West*, Swartz argues that the Congress signaled “the chastening of America...from many quarters of the Majority World.” In labeling Lausanne “the most important evangelical gathering of the postwar era,” his book typifies—with excellence—the emphasis in new scholarship on these globally “reflexive” forces on American evangelicals that defined the late twentieth century.³⁰

Lauren Turek’s excellent new book also pivots on the Lausanne Congress, but her story clears new ground by breaking with the developing historiographical literature in interesting ways. She agrees with the new emphasis on Lausanne, describing the covenant signed by its organizers as “perhaps the most influential evangelical statement of the modern era” (34). With such importance foregrounded, it is no surprise that Turek’s book spans the history of evangelicalism and the history of U.S. foreign relations. *To Bring the Good News* provides welcome new perspectives and arguments to both of these fields, and raises questions about the relationship between evangelicalism, foreign relations, and political conservatism.

First, where Swartz and others have found roots of a more diverse, social justice-oriented global evangelicalism at Lausanne, Turek reconstructs what might be described as the conservative legacy of the same moment. Where others have emphasized the challenge to American evangelical leadership in the 1970s, Turek documents the same leadership’s galvanized response to Lausanne; how a “new internationalist outlook and activist sensibility” took hold even amid the challenges of post-colonialism and theological division (18). American evangelical leaders, starting with Graham but also crucially extending to Western missionaries, evangelical and Pentecostal media producers, and Christian NGOs, left Lausanne with “a renewed sense of missionary urgency and millennial expectation” (20). Even as evangelical demographics were internationalizing, American evangelicals embraced a robust internationalism. For the next two decades, and continuing in various forms today, these evangelicals would prioritize their own version of human rights and the maintenance of American power abroad for the sake of expanding missionary access around the globe.

The ramifications of this international energy were felt in the renewed evangelical focus on missions, especially the broadcasting of the gospel message through radio and television and lobbying the U.S. Congress for religious freedom protections to practice evangelism in the “closed” countries behind the Iron Curtain. Unlike the progressive wing of the Lausanne Congress, these evangelicals saw Communism and liberation theology as equal threats to their gospel, which assumed American-style values and standards of religious freedom. It might be obvious that the institutional and theological locus of this evangelical internationalism was in the independent fundamentalist and Pentecostal ministries of figures like Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, both of whom supported President Ronald Reagan’s new Cold War measures in the early 1980s and helped to define the Republican Party’s positions on most every political issue after the mid-1970s. But just as important were the organized structures of evangelicalism: the National Religious Broadcasters, the National Association of

²⁹ Andrew Preston, *Sword of the Spirit, Shield of Faith: Religion in American War and Diplomacy* (New York: Knopf, 2012); Steven P. Miller, *The Age of Evangelicalism: America’s Born-Again Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); David P. King, *God’s Internationalists: World Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); David R. Swartz, *Facing West: American Evangelicals in an Age of World Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020).

³⁰ Swartz, *Facing West*, 87.

Evangelicals, and the Southern Baptist Convention, the largest Protestant denomination in the country. Turek's interest in political lobbying tilts her analysis toward the latter group—a welcome choice that adds to our understanding of the deep institutional history of the Christian right.³¹

It is on this issue of “evangelical influence on human rights” that Turek seeks to make another contribution to the existing historiography. The locus of historical research on human rights so far has been organizations like the United Nations, non-governmental organizations, and the arena of international law. Turek instead unearths another tradition of human rights advocacy by evangelicals that, while invoking the same term, referred to a generally different strand of discourse and activism. Evangelical human rights were understood to be granted by God, were rooted in the interpretation of some key biblical texts, and amounted almost exclusively to freedom of religion and the freedom to practice evangelization. Turek helpfully clarifies this last point by insisting that evangelization be regarded as a religious practice rather than a mere issue of belief. Indeed, in countries ranging from the Soviet Union to Saudi Arabia to Israel, the act of evangelization was seen as a direct threat to social stability by the local authorities, far more a problem than the mere existence of Western Christians in their midst.

In Israel, the case study I know best, officials attempted to limit ‘missionizing’ and ‘proselytizing’ which were seen by Israeli officials as predatory, opportunistic, and disruptive—while also not banishing the hundreds of foreign Protestant missionaries, many of whom were helpful contacts when carrying out diplomacy with Western governments. Eventually many of the missionaries in Israel themselves reimagined what it meant to share the gospel, developing theological language of ‘witnessing’ the gospel to Israelis (both Jews and Arabs) through offering social services and supporting the Israeli government. They became part of the “new breed of evangelical missionary, eager to dispense material aid as well as the gospel” in Andrew Preston’s words, albeit for reasons that were less directly tied to the Cold War than the particular stresses of living in Israeli society.³² This theological shift, notably, took much longer to filter back into American evangelical thinking—and often never did—because those same local pressures of living in foreign societies were not felt by American evangelicals.

Still, the language of human rights could be found in the writings of these evangelical missionaries in Israel, as Turek has shown throughout 1970s American evangelical thought. What is less clear to me after finishing *To Bring the Good News* is the relationship of this evangelical tradition of human rights to the dominant human rights tradition that encompasses the research of scholars such as Sarah Snyder and Barbara Keys.³³ Turek references Keys’s distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ human rights strands, with evangelicals occupying space in the conservative strand, but those conservatives include numerous parties, many of whom would find evangelical human rights insufficient or unpalatable. Neoconservative policymakers, Soviet dissidents, and American Jewish activists may have agreed on the God-given dignity of every human, but none of these groups would have found anything inspiring in the millenarian hopes of evangelicals to evangelize the world as a presage to the Second Coming, which Turek positions as the *raison d’être* of evangelical human rights. How, then,

³¹ Some recent work on the Christian right in this vein includes K. Healan Gaston, *Imagining Judeo-Christian America: Religion, Secularism, and the Redefinition of Democracy*, First edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2019); Neil J. Young, *We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016); Seth Dowland, *Family Values and the Rise of the Christian Right*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015); and Daniel Williams, *God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

³² Preston, *Sword of the Spirit*, 481.

³³ Sarah B. Snyder, *From Selma to Moscow: How Human Rights Activists Transformed U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018); Barbara J. Keys, *Reclaiming American Virtue: The Human Rights Revolution of the 1970s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).

did the evangelical conception of human rights work within, exist within, and position itself in relation to the broader human rights discourse?

Turek's book raises this interesting question—one we can only begin to grapple with once we acknowledge how far *To Bring the Good News* has advanced the conversation. One angle I continue to think about is how the coalition of the Christian right—the groups mentioned above as well as Mormons and other religious conservatives—has often been explained through the concept of “co-belligerence,” a concept that was popularized by evangelical activist and thinker Francis Schaeffer in his 1970 book, *The Church at the End of the 20th Century*. This has been especially true in terms of the pro-life movement. A co-belligerent, in Schaeffer's words, “will seem to be saying exactly the same thing as those without a Christian base are saying” on issues of shared concern. But, Schaeffer warns, “we [Christians] must not align ourselves as though we are in any camp built on a non-Christian base.”³⁴ This language is indebted to Schaeffer's Reformed theology, but it has become the animating way in which many Christians, as well as historians, conceptualize the relationship between evangelicals and politics—whether it is the domestic politics of abortion or the foreign policy advocacy of human rights.

Turek's research raises the question of how “co-belligerency” functioned in foreign policy—how evangelical human rights related to conservative human rights. In some examples, evangelicals contributed their own perspective to human rights. Turek is surely right that for Southern Baptists, *The Baptist Faith & Message* statement of 1963 was a pivotal reference text for later Southern Baptist activism. The 1963 statement declared that “every man possesses dignity and is worthy of respect and Christian love” for the reasons, crucially, “that God created man in his own image, and in that Christ died for man” (90). The first quotation could gain the assent of many Americans, while the second quotation has a more limited Christian appeal. In other examples, however, evangelicals adopted conservative movement frameworks that shaped their understanding of human rights. Even as it is doubtful that a policymaker like Jeane Kirkpatrick ever set her eyes on *The Baptist Faith & Message*, her distinction between accommodating authoritarian regimes (so long as they were anti-Communist) and resisting totalitarian regimes was easily internalized, to great tragedy, by evangelicals in the 1980s, as Turek clearly shows. To summarize: the fact that ‘evangelical human rights’ became a subset of ‘conservative human rights’ is a big deal, in my opinion, and deserves more attention. It may shed light not only on the lines of influence outside evangelicalism that shape evangelical human rights, but also on how the evangelical priority of religious freedom came to dominate conservative human rights.

Turek's work is a helpful reminder that for many evangelicals, ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ were often blurred categories. Jerry Falwell's insistence on preserving a ‘Christian’ or ‘Judeo-Christian’ America was deeply connected to his advocacy for freedom of religion abroad. In an oft-cited statement about his Christian Zionism, in 1981 Falwell told *Christianity Today* that “God has raised up America in these last days” for two reasons. One was “for the protection of his people, the Jews.” The other, less commented upon (but listed first), was “world evangelization.” Falwell concluded, “I don't think America has any other right or reason for existence than those two purposes.”³⁵ Turek argues forcefully that foreign relations has been missing in accounts of the Christian right—not just as another dimension to its agenda, but as a core part of its purpose and legacy. It might be said, given Falwell's quotation, that a case could be made that the *primary* self-understanding of the Christian right was as a foreign relations movement, with the domestic issues of abortion, feminism, and so forth understood as rearguard actions to maintain America's ‘Christian’ identity so that it could perform its divine mandates abroad. To be clear, Turek does not make this argument. However, with her excellent work that illustrates the importance of foreign relations to postwar evangelicalism, the next interested historian will have an easier time of doing so. In addition to all the other praise Turek's book deserves, opening up exciting new avenues of research and argumentation should also join the list.

³⁴ Francis A. Schaeffer, *The Church at the End of the 20th Century* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1970), 38.

³⁵ “An Interview with the Lone Ranger of American Fundamentalism,” *Christianity Today* (4 September 1981): 25.

 REVIEW BY JOHN D. WILSEY, THE SOUTHERN BAPTIST THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY

From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, American evangelicals were devouring books and pamphlets arguing that the United States was founded as a Christian nation. Starting with the 1977 publication of *The Light and the Glory* by Peter Marshall and David Manuel, which argued that the United States was the new Israel of God, several evangelical authors followed suit with their own titles that advanced the Christian America thesis. Figures such as Tim LaHaye, Jerry Falwell, John Eidsmoe, D. James Kennedy, Benjamin Hart, David Barton,³⁶ and many others spilled gallons of ink making their case that America was a Christian nation, that it was suffering decline because it had strayed from its holy calling, and that Americans must recover their Christian heritage before God poured forth his righteous judgment, a certain destruction that was sure to come if they failed in their task. The Christian America thesis was so compelling to American evangelicals at the close of the twentieth century that three of the most respected historians of American religion, Mark Noll, George Marsden, and Nathan Hatch, were compelled to write a historical rebuttal in their 1989 book, *The Search for Christian America*. No matter. The Christian America thesis has proven resilient to this day, despite the fact that it has been discredited by historians, religionists, and social scientists again and again, especially over the past ten years.

And yet there was a delicious irony at work. At the same time that evangelicals in America were taking an inward, simplistic, ahistorical, and provincial view of their own national identity during the 1970s to the 1990s, they were also expanding their understanding, outreach, and influence on the international scene through a dedicated and sophisticated effort in evangelistic missions that was paired with a new interest in human rights, especially the rights of free speech and freedom of conscience in authoritarian countries (3). They also found themselves making their mark on U.S. foreign policy as they sought to advance their overall goal of international religious freedom within the administrations led by Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton.

Lauren Frances Turek tells the story of how evangelicals deepened their influence on American foreign policy and expanded their engagement worldwide in her new book, *To Bring the Good News to All Nations*. Turek writes that foreign missions have long been a concern of American evangelicals. Since the formation of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions in 1810, evangelicals have been venturing forth from the United States to points around the world, attempting to fulfill Christ's command to preach the gospel to all nations (Matt. 28:18-20). She argues that from the mid-1970s, American evangelicals sharpened their focus on evangelism and religious liberty, established complex international networks with indigenous evangelicals, creatively utilized technology and mass media, and increased their political power in Washington to the extent that they were able to wield unprecedented influence over U.S. foreign policy at the end of the

³⁶ A sampling of statements from these Christian nationalist figures includes: "In the virgin wilderness of America, God was making His most significant attempt since ancient Israel to create a new Israel of people living in obedience to the laws of God, through faith in Jesus Christ," Peter Marshall and David Manuel, *The Light and the Glory* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1977), 22–23; "Lest you think that's an oversimplification of the issues, let me point out that for 150 years this nation was built on Biblical principles that assured freedom, community decency, and domestic tranquility," Tim LaHaye, *Faith of our Fathers: A Comprehensive Study of America's Christian Foundations* (Green Forest: Master Books, 1999); "Any diligent student of American history finds that our great nation was founded by godly men upon godly principles to be a Christian nation" and the founders "developed a nation predicated on Holy Writ," Jerry Falwell, *Listen, America!* (New York: Doubleday, 1980), 29; "If by the term Christian nation one means a nation that was founded on biblical values that were brought to the nation by mostly professing Christians, then in that sense the United States may truly be called a Christian nation," John Eidsmoe, "Operation Josiah: Rediscovering the Biblical Roots," in *The Christian and American Law: Christianity's Impact on America's Founding Documents and Future Direction*, ed. H. Wayne House (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1998), 103; "[Via John Calvin], the virtual founder of this nation was Jesus Christ and His teachings," D. James Kennedy and Jerry Newcombe, *What If Jesus Had Never Been Born? The Positive Impact of Christianity in History* (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1994), 59; "The U.S. Constitution has worked because there has been a sacred aura surrounding the document; it has been something more than a legal contract; it was a covenant, an oath before God," Benjamin Hart, *Faith and Freedom: The Christian Roots of American Liberty* (San Bernardino: Here's Life Publishers, 1988), 77; "Did you realize that 52 of the 55 Founding Fathers who worked on the Constitution were members of orthodox Christian churches and many were evangelical Christians?" David Barton, *America's Godly Heritage* (Aledo: WallBuilder Press, 1993), 3.

Cold War and the beginning of the multi-polar world order of the 1990s (7). For evangelicals, one of the greatest threats to humanity at large was the totalitarian repression of religious thought and expression, which curtailed the freedom of Christians to evangelize their neighbors. Turek differentiates mainline Protestants from evangelicals, especially since mainliners were emphasizing economic and social justice in their overseas outreach, while evangelicals began championing religious freedom in the 1970s. Turek shows that evangelicals believed that with the expansion of the free exercise of religion, the gospel could be speeded to the ends of the earth and bring about the Second Coming of Christ (42). Furthermore, as mainline Protestants began retreating from the mission field in the 1960s and 1970s, evangelicals spread out over the globe, filling the vacuum they left behind.

Turek begins her narrative with the First International Congress on World Evangelization (ICOWE), which took place in Lausanne, Switzerland in 1974. Not only did the ICOWE serve as the impetus for international evangelical unity in the 1970s, it was the first step in a growing evangelical influence in American foreign policy that culminated during the Reagan administration (20). Evangelicals were able to smooth over lingering differences over the issues of increasing the role of indigenous missionaries as well as the place of social justice in world evangelization. The Lausanne Covenant, which laid the basis for evangelical unity in world missions after 1974, emphasized the primacy of conversionism, but still left a place for social action, thanks to the advocacy of anti-imperialist figures such as Ecuadorian C. Rene Padilla, the associate general secretary for Latin America of the International Fellowship of Evangelical Students. The ICOWE “created a new cooperative consciousness among evangelicals” (34) and resulted in the emergence of a multi-layered global evangelical network “that transcended national and cultural boundaries” (42).

But this “new cooperative consciousness” was much more than an abstraction. Turek devotes much attention to how the leaders in the ICOWE set out to use new technologies in communication in order to scatter the seeds of the gospel across the entire globe (44–71). Radio broadcasting and mass production of taped preaching through cassette ministries penetrated the Iron Curtain, but use of communication technology and mass media also had the effect of tightening the developing international evangelical networks. American evangelicals grew deeper in their understanding and appreciation of indigenous cultures, and as their political power increased stateside, their broadening outlook gave them a new frame of reference on world evangelism and cooperation.

In the decades spanning the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations, evangelicals used their political power to advance an anti-Communist and pro-religious freedom agenda through American foreign policy. Turek skillfully narrates how evangelicals blended the Great Commission, Jesus’s final command to his disciples to spread the gospel to the world (Matt. 28:18–20), with human rights, especially the individual right to the free exercise of religion and the rights of religious people to persuade non-Christians to change their beliefs and become Christians. Evangelicals used disappointment with détente in the 1970s to advocate for a values-based foreign policy. They learned important lessons from the success of the Jackson-Vanik amendment (1974) and the Helsinki Accords (1975), which resulted in focused efforts to assist evangelicals in the Communist bloc. Finally, evangelicals were able to capitalize on the Reagan administration’s departure from détente and the old notions of containment and turn toward the rollback of Communism.

These dynamics, coupled with “quiet diplomacy,” (107) slowly but surely undermined Communist efforts at suppressing evangelicals—as exemplified in the story of the Vashchenko and Chmykhalov families. These families were known popularly during the 1980s as the “Siberian Seven” and the “Embassy Pentecostals,” because they had taken refuge in the American embassy in Moscow after the Soviet state denied them permission to emigrate out of the U.S.S.R (102). Turek notes that Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev credited evangelical lobbying and international network building with encouraging the introduction of glasnost and perestroika in the late 1980s. Evangelicals were encouraged by the opening of Russia as a new mission field after 1991, but their overzealousness resulted in new restrictions on religious freedom under the leadership of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. Turek points to evangelical advocacy for international religious freedom in Communist Europe as a mix of success and failure (123). But the successes inspired further efforts in authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Africa that came to more complicated and tragic results.

Turek demonstrates how evangelical networks influenced American policy in Latin America during the 1980s, especially in the context of the Rios Montt regime in Guatemala. After the 1976 earthquake, evangelical missions in Guatemala increased exponentially. American evangelicals got behind Montt because he utilized religious freedom and anti-Communist language to bait Americans into throwing their support behind him. The Montt regime was brutal in its suppression of dissent, but since it used the right language, evangelicals in the United States rallied to his support.

Turek observes that the apartheid regime in South Africa was more complicated for evangelicals (153). Most white evangelicals in America deplored the racism inherent in apartheid, but wanted to support the South African government because it was anti-Communist. What would happen if the forces friendly to the African National Congress were to overturn apartheid and set up a new government? Would not that new government be Marxist, and inclined toward Communism? She argues that between 1970 and 1994, American evangelical engagement with South Africa was defined not by social justice concerns, but evangelism, and was driven by an emphasis on reconciliation between South African whites and blacks, but not reparations (180).

Turek concludes her study by reiterating four dynamics that were key to the development and efficacy of evangelical engagement with foreign policy during the 1970s through the 1990s (182). First was the establishment of international networks that had as their common purpose the fulfillment of the Great Commission. Second, a broadening awareness and appreciation for the experience and culture of Christians outside the West opened American evangelicals' minds and gave them a more sophisticated perspective as they lobbied for a values-based foreign policy. Third, evangelical emphasis on religious freedom directly resulted in a foreign policy that committed the United States to advocate for international religious freedom through the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act. And fourth, evangelicals adopted a new perspective on human rights, emphasizing the unique facet of human rights specifically in the language of religious freedom.

To Bring the Good News to All Nations is deeply researched and carefully considered. Its thesis is ambitious; weaving together a narrative such as this one requires a historian to be conversant not only in the diplomatic aspects of the times, but also the diverse religious culture that played such a key role in the development of the diplomatic history. Evangelicalism is an unwieldy term, but Turek defines her understanding of evangelicalism as it manifested itself in the late twentieth century with clarity, accuracy, and with enough specificity to give the reader a focused way to identify the movement, but also broadly enough to include groups like Pentecostals from Southern Baptists. This is one of the strongest points of her work. To put it colloquially, Turek 'gets' evangelicals. She makes interpreting a particular aspect of the movement—the emphasis on global evangelism and international religious freedom—look easy, when in fact, it is fraught with ambiguities, complexities, and loaded language and concepts.

Turek is also adept at blending diplomatic and religious history throughout her narrative. Rather than isolating and compartmentalizing the diplomatic from the religious, or neglecting the one in favor of the other, Turek shows that the story of evangelical engagement with foreign policy is a complex interchange between biblically informed practices, theologies, and denominational traditions with ideas on war, society, economics, statecraft, and ideology. In this regard, Turek's book is well situated with Neil Young's *We Gather Together: The Religious Right and the Problem of Interfaith Politics*, which serves as an analysis of how evangelicals, Roman Catholics, and Mormons attempted to join forces in advocating for conservative domestic policies. Turek's book also complements Daniel K. Williams' *God's Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right*, but her work is unique in its focus on foreign policy. The books of Williams, Young, and Turek make for a comprehensive consideration of how evangelical voices contributed to a departure from the Eisenhower-Dulles-Nixon-Kissinger conception of American engagement with the world and with itself.

To Bring the Good News to All Nations is a critical addition to the historiography of late twentieth century American history, and a welcome contribution to an expanding conversation on the influence of religion on American diplomacy.

RESPONSE BY LAUREN F. TUREK, TRINITY UNIVERSITY

First, I would like to express my gratitude to the roundtable participants for engaging so carefully and thoroughly with my book. Reviewers Mark Edwards, David Hollinger, Daniel Hummel, and John Wilsey, along with author of the introduction, Philip Jenkins, all have deep expertise in the history of Christianity in the United States and of the varied and significant relationships that U.S. Christians have forged abroad as missionaries, activists, or public intellectuals, particularly in the twentieth century. I hold all of the reviewers in great esteem, and am very humbled by their praise and thankful that they have sought to situate the arguments that I make within the extensive literature of U.S. religious history while also posing important questions about the aspects of that larger story that do not feature greatly or explicitly in my book. By way of response to their comments, I will provide some thoughts on the core objectives of the book that will hopefully address the questions they have posed in a holistic manner.

As I have noted in other venues, I had several overlapping goals in mind while researching and writing *To Bring the Good News to All Nations*.³⁷ This book reflects on the intersections of domestic politics, religious non-state actors, and U.S. foreign policymaking. Since I see myself primarily as a historian of U.S. foreign relations, who was trained as a diplomatic historian, I framed the book and my guiding historical questions through that particular disciplinary lens. I aimed to illuminate the nature of evangelical Christian foreign-policy engagement, to make the case that evangelical groups exerted an influence on U.S. relations abroad, and to explore the extent of that influence both at home and in the foreign countries where they operated. Foreign policy decisions are almost never monocausal, and interest-group activism and amorphous cultural forces such as religion are rarely the sole determinative factor in policymaking, as my book makes clear. Still, evangelical interest groups did matter; their domestic activism and foreign missionary presence affected U.S. relations with other countries in both large and small ways, shaped how other countries perceived of the United States, and contributed to domestic public discourse about foreign affairs.

Examining that discourse and its political power was another central goal of the book. The conservative human rights language that evangelicals helped develop proved to be very useful to the Reagan administration as it worked to align U.S. human rights policies with a conservative foreign policy agenda. This conservative reorientation was significant and has been an enduring (though not uncontested) feature of U.S. human rights policy since. Explaining the role that U.S. evangelicals played in this process is an important additive to the large and growing literature on the international human rights movement. As might be clear from the previous points, another ambition of mine was to look beyond historical accounts of evangelicals that focus on domestic culture-war issues or Christian Zionism. Important though those topics are, evangelicalism is neither monolithic nor static in its political priorities, and there is ample room to consider how the evangelicals of the 1970s and 1980s drew on their faith to target issues beyond abortion and prophecies about Israel.

These particular objectives and my scholarly orientation meant, of course, that I had to make choices about which political, cultural, and strategic factors, which regions, and which groups and individuals I would cover and how I would cover them. Religious historians and religious studies scholars might have made different choices, but this is one of the reasons that the recent efflorescence of work on religion and U.S. foreign relations has been so genuinely exciting.³⁸ Because the scholars

³⁷ Lauren F. Turek, "Author's Response to A Roundtable on Lauren Turek, *To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations*," *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* 51:3 (January 2021): 32-33, <https://www.shaft.org/system/files/passport-01-2021-turek.pdf>.

³⁸ A small sampling of this work includes Ronit Y. Stahl, *Enlisting Faith: How the Military Chaplaincy Shaped Religion and State in Modern America* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017); Matthew Avery Sutton, *Double Crossed: The Missionaries Who Spied for the United States During the Second World War* (New York: Basic Books, 2019); Mark Thomas Edwards, *Faith and Foreign Affairs in the American Century* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019); Cara Lea Burnidge, *A Peaceful Conquest: Woodrow Wilson, Religion, and the New World Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016); John D. Wilsey, *God's Cold Warrior: The Life and Faith of John Foster Dulles* (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2021). For a more expansive historiographical review of

producing work in this field hail from such a range of different disciplinary lenses, we readers are treated to fresh and provocative arguments, new stories or ways of reading well-told stories, understudied historical actors and phenomena, and sometimes surprising confluences—like the remarkable number of scholars who have included analyses of the 1974 International Congress on World Evangelization in their recent books, as Hummel notes in his review. Although I wish the latest work in this area had come out sooner so that I could have engaged with it before submitting my final manuscript to my editor, I am pleased that the reviewers recognized the ways in which *To Bring the Good News to All Nations* complements the wonderful books of David Kirkpatrick, David Swartz, David King, Dan Hummel, Melani McAlister, and others.³⁹

Writing as an outsider to evangelicalism also informed my approach to the book. Evangelical culture, beliefs, and activism have exerted a strong pull on American politics and I was eager to try to understand the movement in all of its diversity and complexity even though I am not myself a Christian. For this reason, Wilsey’s commendation that I “get” evangelicals” was tremendously gratifying to read. Beyond just understanding though, it was important for me to treat my historical subjects fairly, such that they would recognize themselves in my portrayal. I did not want to write a polemic or take political pot shots to signal my own personal beliefs. As Edwards notes, I wanted to let “readers decide what to make of [the] story” I tell. Paying careful attention to the words and ideas that evangelicals consistently used was a way to facilitate that. That said, I think the book does offer critical appraisal of the serious limits and self-serving nature of the human rights vision that evangelicals promoted. I also agree with Edwards when he raises questions about whether or not a human rights vision built “on a foundation of individualism” is possible.

In a similar vein, I very much agree with Hollinger that Melani McAlister’s concepts of “enchanted internationalism” and “victim identification” are incredibly useful for understanding the evangelical ethos of the recent past, in terms of both current evangelical domestic political engagement and their foreign policy orientation.⁴⁰ Kristin Kobes Du Mez likewise captures these concepts well when she notes that “for conservative white evangelicals, a militant faith required an ever-present sense of threat.”⁴¹ These are profound and valuable insights. McAlister’s work remains unparalleled and has been tremendously influential to my own.⁴² In terms of the critique about the attention I pay to diplomatic exchanges, the book has a policy-oriented focus and these exchanges are rich and revealing on those terms. Additionally, as the book centers on

the work of the past decade or so, see Lauren F. Turek, “An Outpouring of the Spirit: A Historiography of Recent works on Religion and U.S. Foreign Relations,” *Passport: The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations Review* 48:2 (September 2017): 25-31.

³⁹ David C. Kirkpatrick, *A Gospel for the Poor: Global Social Christianity and the Latin American Evangelical Left* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); David Swartz, *Facing West: American Evangelicals in an Age of World Christianity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020); David P. King, *God’s Internationalists: World Vision and the Age of Evangelical Humanitarianism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); Daniel G. Hummel, *Covenant Brothers: Evangelicals, Jews, and U.S.-Israeli Relations* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019); Melani McAlister, *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders: A Global History of American Evangelicals* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

⁴⁰ Though, to quibble with Hollinger’s quibble, the timing of McAlister’s book release and of my publication schedule did not allow for extensive engagement with her excellent ideas, much to my regret, though the book does incorporate several references to *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders*.

⁴¹ Kristin Kobes Du Mez, *Jesus and John Wayne: How White Evangelicals Corrupted a Faith and Fractured a Nation* (New York: Liveright Publishing Corporation, 2020), 13.

⁴² In particular, I cite and draw from the following key works throughout the book: Melani McAlister, “The Persecuted Body: Evangelical Internationalism, Islam, and the Politics of Fear,” in *Facing Fear: The History of an Emotion In Global Perspective*, edited by Michael Francis Laffan and Max Weiss, 133-61 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012); Melani McAlister, “What is Your Heart For? Affect and Internationalism in the Evangelical Public Sphere,” *American Literary History* 20:4 (September 2008): 870-895; Melani McAlister, *Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East, 1945-2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).

the 1970s and 1980s, it covers a different time span than does McAlister's *The Kingdom of God Has No Borders*. Because my narrative ends, essentially, with the end of apartheid in 1994, I do not provide an extensive explanation of how evangelical conceptions of human rights or religious freedom evolved in the late 1990s through the 2010s, or of the extensive focus on reproductive healthcare that we see with the Global Gag Rule. I allude to these developments in the epilogue, but they are outside of the stated scope of the book. There is much excellent work that does cover this more contemporary era, including but not limited to McAlister's book and Allen Hertzke's *Freeing God's Children: The Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights*.⁴³

Again, I extend my great thanks to all of the reviewers for their insightful and incisive engagement with my book, and my appreciation to Frank Gerits and H-Diplo for organizing the roundtable.

⁴³ Allen D. Hertzke, *Freeing God's Children: the Unlikely Alliance for Global Human Rights* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).