Total Cold War Roundtable Review

Reviewed Work:

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Introduction by Scott Lucas, University of Birmingham

I would like to begin by thanking Professor Osgood and all the discussants for a stimulating exchange that I am certain will not only further debate on the concept of “psychological operations” but also lead to re-interpretation of U.S. foreign policy in the early Cold War.

Ten years ago “information services”, if they received any recognition, were an adjunct to areas of historical concern. There were some good, if dated, studies such as Wilson Dizard’s insider history of the United States Information Agency and excellent but often overlooked surveys of Radio Free Europe by Robert Holt and Sig Mickelson. These stood apart, however, from opening approaches to the cultural prosecution of the Cold War, namely Frank Ninkovich’s *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, or ideological constructions of the conflict, for example, the overview offered by Michael Hunt. Re-conception of U.S. foreign policy was still dominated by, some might argue hostage to, “national security” and its ongoing contest with the foe of “economic hegemony”.

It was then, possibly because of openings offered by the supposed end of the Cold War, possibly in response to the prevailing discourses of “what we now knew”, possibly by happenstance, that a number of studies began to place “information” in broader analytic contexts. In the United States, Walter Hixson published *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-1961* and there were studies of specific initiatives from Penny Van Eschen on the promotion of jazz to Michael Krenn on the framing of American art. In Europe, Reinhold Wagnleitner’s *Coca-Colonization and the Cold War* and Frances Stonor Saunders’ provocative narrative on the C.I.A. and the cultural Cold War intersected with a series of articles and monographs on the “State-private network” from Hugh Wilford’s readings of the non-Communist left and the Agency to Giles Scott-Smith’s critique of the Congress for Cultural Freedom to Anthony Carew’s work on covert operations and US labour. At an immediate level, such scholarship offered an essential presentation of the


dynamic between the Government and “private” groups in the construction and projection of US foreign policy and the cold war. Beyond this, it opened up the prospect of a reconsideration of strategy, policymaking, and operations in relation not only to security, economics, and geopolitics but also ideology and culture in both domestic and international environments.

I first met Professor Osgood when he was developing his initial articles on psychological strategy and the Eisenhower Administration. There had been some attention to the topic, namely H.W. Brands’ chapter on C.D. Jackson, Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for psychological operations, or an examination of special cases such as Walt Rostow’s critique of the response to Stalin’s death, but this tended to be a narrative limited to the President and his inner circle of advisors.5 Professor Osgood’s work offered a significant advance through his consideration of psychological warfare within the Eisenhower Administration’s strategic approach towards the Soviet enemy. For the first time, information operations, structural changes such as the creation of the U.S.I.A., and initiatives such as Eisenhower’s Chance for Peace and Atoms for Peace speeches were situated within the “New Look”.

To state what may now be obvious, Professor Osgood was bringing in and interrogating the dimension now labelled as “soft power”, often overlooked or marginalized because of the focus on the New Look’s “hard power” attention to atomic weapons. Articles such as “Form before Substance: Eisenhower’s Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy” and “The Perils of Coexistence: Peace and Propaganda in Eisenhower’s Foreign Policy” led to and complemented the book highlighted in this roundtable.6

I heartily endorse the comments made by Professors Corke and Wilford and Dr Tudda and welcome the discussion furthered by Professor Osgood’s response. From my vantage point, I would like to set a further challenge.

This dynamic of psychological warfare, policymaking, and operations still rests on a fundamental assumption of strategic coherence. Professor Osgood usefully critiques the deliberations that led to high-profile initiatives and sets out the attendant bureaucratic re-

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organization, but the “New Look” itself remains largely untouched. The standard narrative remains that NSC 162/2 offered a reconciliation of means and ends, following the extrication from Korea, through atomic weaponry, alliance politics, and economic measures. That presumption is reinforced and extended with the inclusion of psychological operations, both in Professor Osgood’s presentation of “the Eisenhower Administration’s evolving Cold War strategy” (p. 75) and by Professor Corke’s assertion of “the development of a unified and integrated Cold War strategy”.

I am not so sure of this. The Eisenhower Administration had entered office behind the allegation of its predecessor’s incoherence and the “negative, futile, and immoral” policy of containment, but the fundamental issue— to liberate or not to liberate? — would hover, unresolved, throughout Eisenhower’s first term. The hesitant and confused response to Stalin’s death and the East German demonstrations of June 1953 highlighted the problem, and all of the discussion of Project Solarium and the deliberations over NSC 162/2 came no closer to resolution.

My suggestion is that any success of psychological operations under Eisenhower was not that they fulfilled a global strategy that encompassed both American positions of strength such as Western Europe and disputed areas in Europe, Asia, and beyond but that they covered up the tensions and contradictions that were present in the strategic approach throughout the 1950s. C.D. Jackson’s resignation and lingering bitterness, the futile efforts of Nelson Rockefeller as Eisenhower’s Special Assistant in 1955/6, the moment of hope offered by Khruschev’s Secret Speech followed by the disaster in Hungary: all pointed to indecision within the Administration about the fundamentals towards which a psychological strategy should be directed. And, far from seeing US policy and operations moving systematically from the “core” towards regions such as Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa, one might reconfigure the Eisenhower approach — complete with psychological operations — as a necessary shift to evade and even obscure the issues raised across the European divide.

To be provocative while paying tribute both to this book and the responses it has brought, the easy framing in these times is to hold up the Eisenhower Administration’s development of psychological operations as a wise approach that has not been ignored but betrayed by its 21st-century descendants. The harder task is to acknowledge that maybe we have it the wrong way around: the issue of psychological operations and its “soft power” incarnation has always been secondary to the global strategy that these operations/soft power are supposed to serve. In Professor Corke’s response, the ends are still coherent and the problems is the “images that were impossible to maintain in the face of perceived strategic interests”; an alternative is that the present Bush Administration’s distinction has been to offer a comprehensive strategic vision — the pursuit of a “preponderance of power” against any rival or group of rivals — that Eisenhower failed to establish in the 1950s. From that “success” has come the failures, highlighted by the discussants, that both reinforce and take us beyond the historical analysis offered by Professor Osgood.
Where for art thou strategy?

Over the last four years the international community has watched with dismay as the Bush administration struggled and failed to develop a coherent strategy for its policy in Iraq. Plagued by ideological and bureaucratic divisions within the administration, American strategy has vacillated between at least two “strategic visions.”

On the one hand the State Department has consistently pushed for operations designed to rebuild Iraq’s society; on the other the Pentagon, under the leadership of Donald Rumsfeld, eschewed “nation-building” and instead pressed for operations designed primarily to secure the country and rout the enemy. With Rumsfeld’s departure in November 2006, however, the American people were promised a new strategy for combating the civil war in Iraq. That has yet to occur.

Nevertheless on January 10, 2007 President Bush announced the decision to send 20,000 additional troops to Iraq. The men and women deployed are to be dispersed in around Baghdad and Anwar province, apparently an “insurgent” stronghold. The deployment represents a 15% increase in U.S. troops, bringing the total number of soldiers to approximately the same number that were in Iraq in 2003. As John Stewart made clear in the week following the President’s address, this new deployment was “not a surge. It’s a tip. And not a very good one at that!”

Humor aside and irrespective of the questions surrounding the decision to increase the troops levels, in his address to the nation the President outlined a subtle yet important tactical shift away from the Rumsfeldian emphasis on security. While still conceding that the “most urgent priority” for the troops was in fact “security”, the President also conceded that the American commanders should have “greater flexibility to spend funds for economic assistance”, and he stated that he will “double the number of provincial reconstruction teams” in order to help stabilize the country.

All this will be for naught, however, if it is not accompanied by a well-coordinated strategy that includes a psychological warfare campaign designed both to bolster Iraqi perceptions of the United States and to build allied support for the American cause. Coordinating military campaigns with psychological warfare operations is not easy, however, and only a

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few presidents have been successful in unifying the two. It is clear from reading *Total War* that Dwight Eisenhower was more successful than most.

In his masterful new book, Osgood chronicles the Eisenhower Administration’s development of an integrated and unified psychological strategy for waging the contest against the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War. The book is a must-read for anyone interested in the relationship between policy, strategy and operations, and it should be at the top of the list for those charting a new course in Iraq.

According to Osgood, during the 1950s psychological warfare touched all areas of life, both in the United States and abroad. As he points out, “The principle of total war—that wars were no longer fought just by armies in the field, but by the entire nation—erased distinctions between the front line and the home front, and made the mobilization of the masses an indispensable feature of modern conflict.” Not surprisingly, he concludes, “Virtually every aspect of American life—from political organizations and philosophical ideals, to cultural products and scientific achievements, to economic practices and social relationships—was exposed to scrutiny in this total contest for the hearts and minds of the world’s peoples.” Not much has changed since the 1950s. Like the Cold War, the American war in Iraq must be fought on all fronts if it is to have any chance of success.

In making his argument, Osgood addresses five central themes. First and perhaps most importantly, he places the story of American psychological warfare into its proper context, which he identifies as “the changing nature of international relations as a result of the communications revolution and the age of mass politics and total war”. Second, he explores the variety of ways psychological warfare became part of American Cold War policy. Third, he opens up the process by which, policy is translated into operations; a question the author concedes is “sometimes overlooked by diplomatic historians.” Fourth, picking up a theme first introduced by Scott Lucas, Osgood examines how propaganda developed by the “state-private” nexus influenced the “domestic-international” context and vice-versa. Finally, the book contributes to the growing historiography on Dwight Eisenhower. On the one hand Osgood’s argument supports the revisionist and post-revisionist claim that Eisenhower was an active president “who left his mark on American national security policy”. On the other, however, his work simultaneously and persuasively refutes the claims made by revisionist and post-revisionist scholars that Eisenhower’s foreign policy was developed in order to pursue a “détente” with the Soviet Union. Instead

5 Kenneth Osgood, *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006), 1.


Osgood argues that Eisenhower attached “far greater value to waging and to winning the Cold War than to ending it through negotiations.”

The book demonstrates scholarship of the highest quality, supported by an excellent array of evidence from primary and secondary sources. Osgood has a firm grasp of the subtleties and nuances of psychological warfare, and he builds into his argument the assumption that the ability to wage total war rests on strategic clarity. Yet policy and strategy are notoriously difficult to narrow down to the type of simplistic slogans necessary to wage an effective propaganda campaign. Today the available evidence suggests that neither Roosevelt nor Truman were able to achieve the type of strategic coherence that Eisenhower did.

According to Osgood, Eisenhower was successful because he capitalized on the groundwork provided by his successors. Throughout the book he traces the linear progression of American psychological strategy, starting with the Creel Committee through the public relations campaigns of Edward Bernays and into World War Two. He also offers a brief examination of American psychological exploits during the Truman Administration, thereby setting up the historical context for Ike’s ultimate triumph. Through the structure of this narrative, however, Osgood implies that there was an element of progress in the development of these operations. I want to suggest, however, that the efforts were not uniform as he proposes. For example, it was not until the final days of the Second World War that a weekly propaganda directive was developed and implemented. Moreover, after World War Two ended, there was no consensus among senior policymakers that these types of activities should be conducted in the post-war world. Between 1948 and 1952 psychological warriors were consistently on the defensive, playing catch-up in a hostile bureaucratic environment. Furthermore there was never an agreement over what American Cold War strategy should be. Instead between 1948 and 1952 there were a number of “strategic visions” in play. And it is here that I wished Osgood had provided more linguistic precision.

For instance, as I have argued elsewhere, “liberation” and “rollback” were not identical strategies. “Rollback” had a very brief life span. It was first used in 1949 in a NSC paper

8 Osgood, 4-7.
10 Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War.
11 Sarah-Jane Corke, “History, Historian and the Naming of Foreign Policy: A Postmodern Reflection on American Strategic Thinking during the Truman Administration, Intelligence and National Security, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Autumn 2001), pp. 146-163.
on the Far East, and it was subsequently employed in NSC 68. Yet the term was all but abandoned, by even the most die-hard interventionists, after Chinese forces successfully pushed U.S. troops back across the 38th parallel in the Korean War. Thereafter the preferred linguistic artifice became “liberation.” Seized upon by John Foster Dulles and other Republican “interventionists” during the run-up to the 1952 election campaign, “liberation” also had a short existence, all but disappearing from the historical record in 1954.

In this context, I would also have liked to see a more careful delineation between “psychological warfare,” “political warfare,” “propaganda” and “psychological strategy,” terms which Osgood argues were used “more or less interchangeably.” Here again I disagree, but not for traditional reasons. During the Truman Administration each word was used at a particular point of time, not to delineate changes in strategy, but rather to serve as a political weapon in the burgeoning bureaucratic battles and turf wars that came to characterize the government. For example, in his determination to have all covert operations placed under his direction George Kennan purposely substituted the term “political warfare” for “psychological warfare” in “The Inauguration of Political Warfare.” Yet, in all of his replies to the Policy Planning Staff director, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, DCI at the time, continued to use the term “psychological warfare.” The language wars belied a larger bureaucratic conflict and the personal animosity between the two men.

Language again became important after the Psychological Strategy Board was set up, in 1951. The State Department, determined to limit the PSB’s activities, consistently substituted the word “information activities” for “psychological warfare” in all of their memo’s to the PSB. For their part, both the military and the CIA preferred “psychological warfare” because it provided a more expansive definition of the types of operations that could be conducted. In both of these cases the subtle nuances are crucial to understanding the power struggles that took place within the Truman Administration. We have to be able to interrogate the changes in language more forcefully.

I would also have liked to see a bit more discussion on the PSB’s role in narrowing the strategic options open to Eisenhower. While Osgood is correct when he suggests that the PSB failed to provide a coherent effort in developing American Cold War strategy, I believe that the board did play an important role in narrowing the gap between policy and operations in the early fifties. By the time the PSB was shut down, “rollback” and “liberation” had all but disappeared and the American people had for the first time a coherent strategy for waging the Cold War.

13 Osgood, 8.

These minor points aside, Osgood is correct when he points out Eisenhower played the critical role in his administration’s success in this area. During his first year in office he undertook three activities designed to clarify American Cold War Policy. He set up the President’s Committee on Governmental Organization, the so-called “Jackson Committee.” He also participated in the Solarium Exercise, which narrowed the gap between policy and operations by effectively reconciled the competing and contradictory “strategic visions” that plagued the Truman administration. Finally he appointed CD Jackson as Special Policy Advisor to the President on all Cold War matters. All of these decisions were crucial to the development of a unified and integrated Cold War strategy.

Eisenhower’s decision to abolish the Psychological Strategy Board and set up the Operations Coordination Board in its place also had an impact because the bureaucratic ideology of these two organizations was strikingly different. Under Truman, the State Department insisted that psychological operations should be kept separate from strategic considerations. However, on the recommendation of the Jackson Committee, the OCB was established on the premise that psychological operations and Cold War strategy were intimately related. As Osgood points out, “From the highest levels of the national security establishment to the remotest diplomatic outposts abroad, political warfare became *the* organizing concept for American foreign policy.”

Beginning with Eisenhower’s “Chance for Peace” address in the aftermath of Stalin’s death, which Osgood characterizes as “a dress rehearsal” for the administration’s Cold War strategy, the White House made it clear that it intended to insure strategic clarity. This trend continued after the creation of the United States Information Agency (U.S.IA), which was established on August 1, 1953. The U.S.IA saw themselves as “the ideological shock troops on the front lines of the Cold War”. However, in contrast to the Truman Administration, where propaganda often contradicted and sometimes undermined U.S. foreign policy, the U.S.IA was able to construct a clear message in a number of different areas in the world. In Iceland, for example, American efforts were designed to combat neutralism. In Asia, U.S.IA was committed to developing programs to challenge communism. In Africa and the Middle East, American operations walked the “delicate line” between Arab nationalism and French and British colonialism. While in this arena they were perhaps the least successful, as U.S. propaganda leaned more toward European colonialism and therefore alienated many Arabs, the message was at least, consistent. The Eisenhower Administration’s strategic triumph was also evident when there were issues dividing the government. As Osgood makes clear with topics such as nuclear testing and

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15 Osgood, 76 (emphasis in the original text).

16 Osgood, 67.

17 Osgood, 104.

18 Osgood, 125 and 131.
the project Militant Liberty, these initiatives, although fraught with bureaucratic tensions, presented a coherent message to the world.\textsuperscript{19}

The administration’s most successful campaign, however, was the creation of “the friendly atom”, a symbol that still has resonance today. This propaganda campaign converted “the dreaded atom [into] a force for peace, a source of life.”\textsuperscript{20} To publicize this message, U.S.IA dispatched fourteen news stories a week. East story targeted a different audience with a different message.\textsuperscript{21} More amazing, however, was the degree to which “legitimate” news stories mirrored the propaganda messages created by the government. “Total War” encompassed every area of American life from economic trade fairs to garden clubs, pet culture and chewing gum. The degree of strategic coherence was complete.

Yet, according to Osgood, while Ike strived to make “psychological strategy an integral part of the policy-process...psychological considerations did not always exert a decisive influence in foreign policy decision-making”.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, in one of his most provocative arguments, he points out that the American empire was not built “by invitation” as Geir Lundestad has suggested.\textsuperscript{23} Rather it was a “covert empire built on subtle manipulation”, resting on “informal modes of dominance camouflaged to reduce the apparent size of intervention”.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite my earlier quibbles over language, this is an excellent book. Unlike many histories, it presents tangible lessons for today’s world. In this sense, it offers is a cautionary note for psychological warriors in Iraq. Propaganda and psychological warfare operations are rarely enough. As the Jackson Committee pointed out in 1953, “Mere words [can] only accomplish so much; they need to be harmonized with deeds....[What the U.S. does] will continue to be vastly more important than what [they] say.”\textsuperscript{25} So while Eisenhower Administration successfully executed a coherent propaganda campaign, “where every man became an ambassador”, American deeds did not always live up to the rhetoric. Indeed, I believe that the success of Ike’s psychological campaign probably contributed, in part, to the disillusionment with American foreign policy that occurred in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate.

\textsuperscript{19} Osgood, 221.

\textsuperscript{20} Osgood, 161.

\textsuperscript{21} Osgood, 170.

\textsuperscript{22} Osgood, 102.

\textsuperscript{23} Geir Lundestad, \textit{The United States and Western Europe Since 1945} (London: Oxford University Press, 2003).

\textsuperscript{24} Osgood, 150.

\textsuperscript{25} Osgood, 80.
In the Cold War world, American actions never lived up to the ideals that it advertised. Thus in no small measure the Eisenhower Administration’s propaganda can be understood, in part, as the architect of “America’s” demise. It sold the American people and the international community an image, which included—“protecting the rights of the individual, limiting the power of the state, extending the benefits of capitalist production to all, and advancing the principals of freedom and democracy”—images that were impossible to maintain in the face of perceived strategic interests. Then and now, it is important that the U.S. government not promise more than it can deliver.

Sarah-Jane Corke is Assistant Professor at Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Her first book, U.S. Covert Operations and Cold War Strategy: Truman, Secret Warfare and the C.I.A., will be published this summer by Routledge. Dr. Corke has also published articles in Intelligence and National Security, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and the Journal of Conflict Studies. She is presently working on her second book on the Psychological Strategy Board.

26 Osgood, 287.
Kenneth Osgood has written an excellent account of how the Eisenhower administration used psychological warfare in the form of public diplomacy, propaganda, and other informational campaigns in order to sway American and international audiences against the Soviet Union during the 1950s. He has also made an important contribution to the recent emphasis on the uses of public information programs, ideology, and rhetoric in the historiography of Eisenhower administration diplomacy. Marked by the exhaustive use of primary and secondary sources and a creative use of case studies, *Total Cold War* deepens our understanding of the successes and failures, both anticipated and unanticipated, of Eisenhower’s public diplomacy.

Osgood convincingly argues that President Eisenhower and his national security team considered the struggle with the Soviet “a different kind of war,” given the destructive nature of atomic weapons. Osgood contends that the new war had to be actively “waged by other means”, such as the competition of ideas, culture, and science, all on a global scale (p. 2). Thus propaganda, which he defines as “any technique or action that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, or behavior of a group, usually to serve the interests of the sponsor”, became as important as the more “traditional” forms of policy such as diplomacy, military force, and political pressure. (4, 7)

After a brief but comprehensive history of the U.S. government’s public information programs from World Wars One and Two, Osgood, like a number of historians, notes that the Eisenhower administration took its psychological warfare cues from the Truman administration. Truman created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which covertly

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supported the establishment of the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE) and its programs such as Radio Free Europe (RFE), Radio Liberty (RL), and domestic campaigns including the Crusade for Freedom. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was heavily involved in both the Crusade for Freedom and the NCFE in the late 1940s.

Domestic and international audiences could have been forgiven for not realizing Eisenhower’s close involvement with Truman’s informational programs, since by 1952, Republican presidential candidate Eisenhower and his foreign policy advisor, John Foster Dulles, repeatedly excoriated Truman for his failure to adopt an aggressive psychological warfare program. Eisenhower and Dulles criticized Truman’s static and weak “containment” policy and promised a new “dynamic” policy centered on the “liberation” of the “captive peoples” caught behind the Iron Curtain. Osgood argues that Eisenhower and Dulles offered a “notably coherent and sophisticated understanding of psychological warfare” aimed at winning over domestic and international audiences (p. 48).

Osgood supports his argument by examining the administration’s efforts to establish a global informational program. Eisenhower’s close confidante C.D. Jackson, formerly of Life magazine and now the head of the National Security Council’s (NSC) Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), scrambled to adapt the administration’s program of anti-communism to fit different countries. On one hand, for NATO members, the administration pushed the solidarity of the collective security alliance and the prevention of any drift toward “neutralism”. On the other hand, when trying to convince pro-U.S. authoritarian dictatorships, they emphasized the fight against communist or leftist insurgencies and the perils of destabilization. In left-leaning countries, the administration employed covert information programs to destabilize those nations.

Osgood demonstrates that the Eisenhower administration viewed with disdain any resistance from targeted countries, in particular those third world countries that questioned the United States’ devotion to democracy and anti-colonialism. In response, such countries pointed out that the U.S. practiced racial discrimination at home and repeatedly sided with its NATO partners during disputes with their colonies. (pp. 106-10, 125-27). Ultimately the administration enacted a program that Osgood characterizes as a “form of secret empire building that used covert forms of coercion and manipulation to draw countries into the American orbit” (p. 107). Such intervention became “standard operating procedure”, in particular when the administration helped overthrow governments in Iran and Guatemala in 1953 and 1954 and tried to overthrow the Indonesian government in the late 1950s (p. 150). This interventionism led to resentment towards the U.S. in the developing world and ran contrary to the administration’s democratic rhetoric.

Cogent examinations of Eisenhower’s arms control initiatives, in particular the “Chance for Peace” and “Atoms for Peace” speeches and his “Open Skies” proposal from the 1955 Geneva Conference, highlight Total Cold War and expand on Osgood’s earlier articles. Characterizing Atoms for Peace as “a political warfare tactic” designed to “discredit Soviet peace overtures” that occurred in the wake of Stalin’s death in 1953, Osgood contends that, even as Eisenhower claimed the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, his administration adopted massive retaliation as a strategic military doctrine (p. 155). Osgood also deftly describes the subsequent United States Information Agency (U.S.IA) campaign that sent Atoms for Peace exhibits throughout the world to promote the “friendly uses” of the atom. These exhibits proved to be hugely popular, especially in Eastern Europe.

Osgood also perceptively critiques the Geneva Conference, noting that Open Skies was only a “secondary objective of U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union. Far higher on the list of priorities was the use of negotiations to influence the attitudes and perceptions of domestic and international audiences.” (p. 183) Osgood also provides an excellent examination of U.S.IA’s “People to People” program. People to People successfully used trade fairs, dance, music (in particular jazz), movies, and athletic events to “sell” the advantages of the U.S. to international audiences (p. 220).

The weakest part of Osgood’s analysis is his examination of the Eisenhower administration’s psychological warfare program, which Shawn Parry-Giles first explored in two articles.3 Eisenhower, Osgood argues, believed that “audiences would be more receptive to the American message if they were kept from identifying it as propaganda” (p. 77). The President’s solution to this dilemma, as Parry-Giles contends, was to “camouflage” the government propaganda program by having U.S.IA work closely with private sector groups, such as media organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and presenting propaganda as a public “information” program. This blurred the lines between the federal government and the private sector, and, more importantly, those between overt and covert programs (pp. 78-80).

To his credit, Osgood admits that it is very difficult to discern where the government program left off and private programs began. Indeed, given the fact that the Soviet Union had already thrown down the gauntlet and challenged democratic capitalism, it would seem logical that the U.S. government, corporations, and individuals would work together to highlight the differences between democratic capitalism and totalitarian communism. Regarding the arms race and peaceful uses of the atom initiative, Osgood also concedes that Eisenhower “had tapped into a psychological need to find something redeeming and worthwhile in this technological marvel threatening the very existence of mankind” (p. 180). Osgood is on much safer ground when, as noted above, he describes the gap between the administration’s rhetoric and its actual policies.

Whatever its minor shortcomings, Osgood’s book clearly demonstrates that because the Cold War was such a new and different conflict, marked by the possibility of nuclear annihilation, the Eisenhower administration needed to establish an innovative strategy that deployed the nation’s intellectual rather than military resources against the Soviet Union and communism. Osgood concludes that the administration decided to use propaganda, public information programs, and other forms of psychological warfare to convince its domestic and international audiences of the advantages of democracy and the dangers of communism. A significant contribution to our understanding of how psychological warfare can fit into national security strategy, Total Cold War should be read by all historians of U.S. foreign relations.

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The last several years have witnessed a surge of scholarly interest in the ideological, cultural, and even rhetorical dimensions of U.S. involvement in the Cold War. In addition to analyzing the superpower conflict’s vast and complicated impact on domestic political culture, historians have paid increasing attention to the ways in which psychological factors actually shaped the American Cold War effort. Some have focused on how unstated assumptions about race, class, gender, and sexuality affected the decisions of foreign policy-makers, while others have concentrated on the ways in which politicians and diplomats deliberately employed “psychological warfare” (propaganda designed to undermine enemy morale and strengthen that of allies) as a means of winning the Cold War struggle for “hearts and minds.”

Kenneth Osgood’s excellent new book belongs more to the latter than the former tendency in this new kind of Cold War scholarship. It takes as its subject U.S. psychological warfare in the so-called “Free World” (as opposed to propaganda measures designed to penetrate the communist bloc itself, the subject of a number of earlier works) during the presidency of Dwight D. Eisenhower, who emerges from Osgood’s account as a tireless advocate of “psy-war” methods in the fight against communism. Part one of the book establishes the broad historical context of the Eisenhower administration’s propaganda campaigns. After a first chapter tracing the historical roots of the psychological concepts and techniques employed by propagandists during the early years of the Cold War, the book goes on in this section to explain the president’s personal enthusiasm for propaganda; examine changes in the nature of the Soviet-American confrontation in the early 1950s, such as de-Stalinization, and the rise of the post-colonial “Third World,” which appeared to necessitate a greater focus on ideational and symbolic considerations; identify the individuals and agencies involved in the planning and prosecution of psy-war strategy (chiefly C. D. Jackson and Nelson Rockefeller in the first category, and the Operations Coordinating Board and U.S. Information Agency in the second); and, finally, note the main geographical and chronological variations in the U.S. propaganda effort during Eisenhower’s two terms in the White House.

Having clarified the background, strategy, and apparatus of Ike’s Cold War psy-war effort, Osgood goes on in the book’s second part to examine the unfolding of specific propaganda campaigns during the Eisenhower era. Hence there are chapters on such disarmament initiatives as Atoms for Peace and Open Skies; the involvement of private groups of U.S. citizens in “grass-roots diplomacy” in the Third World; the favorable representation by the U.S.IA of daily life in America, especially the everyday experiences of traditionally disadvantaged or oppressed groups such as African Americans and women; secret efforts to win the ideological allegiance of the Free World’s intellectuals by such means as the

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1 See, for example, Walter L. Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture, and the Cold War, 1945-1961 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1997).
covert official sponsorship of book publishing; and the psychological aspects of the early U.S. space program.

In the course of these case studies, certain overarching themes are developed and arguments expounded. The main one of these is the centrality of the psychological dimension to understanding U.S. Cold War foreign policy during the Eisenhower years: not only did Ike’s advisers and the president himself see propaganda as one of the most valuable weapons in their Cold War arsenal, they constantly took into account the likely psychological repercussions of U.S. political, economic, and military actions overseas, making psychology a major conscious determinant of American foreign policy during the 1950s. Indeed, in a related line of argument, Osgood also claims that the various disarmament initiatives of the Eisenhower years, which some “revisionist” scholars have interpreted as signifying a strong desire for world peace, were in fact conceived primarily with their likely Cold War propaganda impact in mind. Détente was desirable, of course, but uppermost in Ike’s thinking was the kudos the U.S. would earn in the Free World from putting out peace feelers, and the embarrassment that would result for the Soviets from turning them down. Third, Osgood argues throughout that Eisenhower and his psychological warriors were also constantly mindful of the domestic reception of their foreign policies, displaying a concern about preserving American public morale that could be traced back to the conditions of total mobilization experienced during World War II. Linked to this factor, Ike attached great importance to involving non-government organizations and individuals in U.S. diplomacy, not only because American overtures to foreign populations tended to be more successful when made by private citizens rather than government officials, but also because “people-to-people”-style programs increased ordinary Americans’ psychological investment in the Cold War. The effect of these tactics was to blur the boundaries between the domestic and international, as well as between state and private, that had already been greatly eroded during the War years.

These are all powerful arguments, and Osgood makes them persuasively, supported by an extremely impressive array of primary materials derived from thorough and enterprising research in a great variety of official record collections. Besides these strengths of argumentation and evidence, the book has many other laudable qualities. The structure is sensible and sound, the writing highly polished, and the volume itself handsomely produced, with a particularly good range of illustrations.

From a personal viewpoint, this reviewer especially appreciated two aspects of the book not mentioned so far. One of these was the light it throws on the influence of public relations theory and, in particular, the writings of PR founding father – and nephew of Sigmund Freud – Edward Bernays, on U.S. Cold War psychological warfare. It has long been known that Madison Avenue played a part in the making of government policy (and, more specifically, that Bernays acted as a consultant to the United Fruit Company in the run-up to the CIA-engineered coup in Guatemala in 1954), but few other studies have explained so well how long established public relations principles and practices shaped American Cold War propaganda tactics, such as the covert official use of anti-communist “front”
organizations. I was also extremely grateful for the clarity of Osgood’s explanation of the somewhat bewildering welter of committees instituted throughout Eisenhower’s spell in the White House to review overseas U.S. informational activities, as well as for the fullness of his discussion of the inter-departmental psy-war planning unit, the Operations Coordinating Board. As an organizational history of early Cold War U.S. propaganda, this book is peerless. (Researchers more interested in the cultural history of Eisenhower-era diplomacy are advised to consult Christina Klein’s superb Cold War Orientalism which, while primarily concerned with the analysis of “middlebrow” literary and cinematic texts of the 1950s, makes many similar points to Total Cold War, including the importance of the role of private citizens and the emphasis laid by the Eisenhower administration on the psychological “integration” of the Free World through bonds of personal sympathy or “sentiment.”)²

For all its many strengths, there are several aspects of the subject which the book does not fully address. One of these is the actual impact of psychological warfare on its target populations. There is the occasional nod in this direction, based on local press coverage of U.S.IA exhibits, but the author sidesteps the broader issue of the effectiveness of these measures, stating in the book’s introduction that the patchiness of evidence on this score would make any speculation misleading. Hence, one will have to look elsewhere for answers to such questions as: was Eisenhower’s psychological warfare program worth the expense? Did the American tax-payer get value for money? How did target audiences react to Ike’s propaganda blandishments? Was the response one of acceptance, resistance, or appropriation? Do country and regional variations make it impossible to generalize at all? Of course, these questions are vast ones, answers to which could fill several volumes, so it is understandable that Osgood should have chosen not to address them in any thoroughgoing, systematic way. There are, however, encouraging signs that other scholars, especially in Europe, are beginning to undertake more pinpointed studies of the impact of U.S. psychological warfare on overseas societies.³

Second, the book is much more expansive on the subject of overt than covert psychological measures, particularly political warfare operations carried out by the CIA and its numerous front organizations (although it does have some good passages on lesser known secret programs, such as the distinctly harebrained invention of Colonel John C. Broger, Militant Liberty). Again, this reflects the paucity of available sources, and, in any case, the enduring romance of the clandestine has meant that the importance of covertly conducted psychologically warfare, as opposed to the publicly sponsored initiatives of such agencies as U.S.IA, has tended to be exaggerated in previous writing. Nonetheless, the evidence is there, for those who care to look, concerning CIA front group organizations, scattered


among private archival collections (the Agency ran organizations representing each of the “minority” citizen groups covered in Osgood’s chapter about U.S.IA representations of everyday American life, including women and African Americans). As with the issue of foreign reception, there is still much work to be done on the involvement of U.S. citizens in the “state-private network,” both overt and covert – something which Osgood himself acknowledges.

Finally, it is difficult not to wish that Osgood had been tempted in the book’s conclusion to relate his study of Eisenhower-era propaganda to the present day and the Bush administration’s “War on Terror.” There clearly are valuable lessons to be learned from this painstaking and meticulous examination of an earlier U.S. campaign to win hearts and minds, but one suspects they need to be made more explicitly in order to have any influence on the current generation of politicians in Washington.

As I reflect on the many important works that have been debated on other H-Diplo roundtables, I consider it a special honor to have my book reviewed in this forum. I am grateful to George Fujii, H-Diplo, and the roundtable participants for making this discussion of *Total Cold War* possible. It has been rewarding to read that the reviewers, whose scholarship has so greatly influenced my own, all agree that *Total Cold War* has enriched their understanding of American propaganda during the early Cold War. It is even more gratifying to read that all the reviewers find my arguments persuasive and, in Hugh Wilford’s words, “well supported by an extremely impressive array of primary materials.” I was humbled by Sarah-Jane Corke’s conclusion that the book is “masterful,” and by Chris Tudda’s generous judgment that “*Total Cold War* should be read by all historians of U.S. foreign relations.” In light of the reviewers’ positive appraisals of *Total Cold War*, I hope readers will take the following remarks more as a friendly dialogue, than as a needlessly defensive rebuttal.

I would like to begin with a few words of caution. Both Wilford and Corke (as well as reviewers elsewhere) see connections between my historical analysis of the Cold War era and the foreign policy dilemmas facing us today. I do, too, especially since I was putting the finishing touches on the manuscript while bombs were falling on Baghdad. Yet I would urge readers not to rush to conclusions about the lessons to be learned from Eisenhower’s psychological strategy. To be sure, there is something to admire about Eisenhower's approach to foreign relations. On this score I have come to sympathize with the Eisenhower revisionists whose arguments on other matters I challenge in the book. Just as those historians found much to appreciate about Eisenhower in the wake of Vietnam, so too is it easier to respect Eisenhower's sense of global and moral leadership when juxtaposed against the dismissive attitude to world public opinion exhibited by George W. Bush and his administration at many points in the run-up to the war in Iraq. On more than one occasion in 2003, I found myself thinking that maybe “I like Ike” after all. I share Eisenhower’s judgment that world opinion matters, and that the U.S. ability to achieve its objectives will continue to depend on its ability to mobilize meaningful international support. I also suspect we would not be in the mess we are in now had Ike been in the White House in 2003.

That being said, I did not conclude the book with a commentary on contemporary affairs, as Hugh Wilford recommends, in large measure because as a historian I think my primary mission is to engage the past on its own terms, and for its own sake. I write to understand,

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not to advocate. I also view with some trepidation the possibility that Eisenhower’s tactics could be viewed as a sort of magic blueprint for psychological strategy today. I say this not just because I doubt psychological warfare can solve the problems the United States faces in Iraq. I also think my research findings raise troubling questions about the role of propaganda in a democracy. As Jeff Broadwater so aptly put it, *Total Cold War* provokes the question: “to what extent did the propaganda war stifle public debate and corrupt the very democratic process it was ostensibly designed to protect?”

Eisenhower employed a range of techniques that contravene the principles of democratic government that he espoused. There is much to criticize in Eisenhower’s approach to public opinion: He played up the hope for peace to facilitate a staggering build-up in weapons of mass destruction; he meddled repeatedly and occasionally egregiously in the internal affairs of other governments; and he found ingenious ways to manipulate the free press at home and abroad. On issues such as civil rights, Eisenhower put more thought into putting a positive spin on Jim Crow than into changing the hardened minds of segregationists. It could even be argued that he broke the law in allowing the U.S. Information Agency (U.S.IA) to conduct propaganda, even if restrained, at home. Thus, while we can admire Eisenhower’s efforts to reach out to people abroad, we also can be concerned about the cynical manipulation of perceptions and politics that his approach to total Cold War engendered.

Hugh Wilford inadvertently points to another reason why *Total Cold War* should not be read as a prescriptive tract for solving today’s international problems. Because my study does not methodically address the “impact of psychological warfare on its target populations”, we should avoid jumping to the conclusion that Ike’s propaganda campaigns worked as well as he and some of his advisors seemed to think. I explain in the book’s introduction why I did not engage more fully the intractable question of effectiveness (pgs. 9-10), and Wilford finds my argument “understandable”. Still, since it is an important issue I will briefly elaborate on my thinking here.

As I point out in the book, I did not attempt to assess systematically the effectiveness of Ike’s psychological operations because the global and chronological sweep of the book would have made such an effort nearly impossible. Any arguments I might have made to that end would have stretched the available evidence beyond credulity. In addition there were also intrinsic problems with some of the sources that were available. The U.S.IA’s records, for example, are filled with documents titled “Evidence of Effectiveness”, but these were compiled for the express purpose of selling the information program to Congress. They were anything but proof of effectiveness. I also have my concerns about studies by historians and communication specialists which have made bold claims about the impact of U.S. propaganda and cultural diplomacy based on exceedingly thin and speculative types of evidence.

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2 Jeff Broadwater, review of *Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad* by Kenneth Osgood, *Journal of American History* 93:3 (December 2006).
To analyze effectiveness properly, one would need to have a focused case study on a narrowly defined issue, amply supported by a wide range of sources that convey the pulse of public opinion in the “target area”. Since propaganda by a foreign government is only one of a range of inputs that affect public attitudes and perceptions, an effective case study would also need to examine the broader context of the propaganda campaign in question. An analysis of the impact of Atoms for Peace, for example, would have to look at the impact of the *Lucky Dragon* incident, a U.S. thermonuclear test that inadvertently sprayed a Japanese fishing boat with radioactive ash just a few months after Eisenhower’s speech before the UN. This event, probably more than the propaganda about atomic power, affected Japanese and world perceptions of the splitting of the atom.

Generally speaking, an assessment of effectiveness should probe the issue on at least four different levels. First, did the sponsor of the propaganda disseminate its message effectively? Since modern propaganda typically works through the mass media, an assessment of effectiveness would need to analyze pertinent media resources to determine if the intended message circulated widely. Public opinion polls also can provide clues on this issue. A month after Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace speech, for example, the U.S.IA conducted a flash poll in six countries to ascertain international reactions to the president’s proposal. In no country had a majority even heard of Atoms for Peace. The administration attempted to redress this problem through a sustained propaganda campaign, and it would be interesting to find additional polling data to indicate whether it worked in raising public awareness of Atoms for Peace. Evidence in the book suggests it probably did, but more systematic research at the local level would help answer this question more conclusively.

The second question one should ask is this: did the propaganda campaigns have a perceptible impact on media coverage? Did the sponsor manage to “change the story”, so to speak? The research in *Total Cold War* seems to suggest that on this level the Eisenhower administration encountered mixed success. On issues such as Atoms for Peace and Open Skies, for example, Eisenhower was able to shift the debate on nuclear weapons, even if only temporarily. On other issues, such as civil rights, he was decidedly less successful; stories about the persistence of Jim Crow greatly outnumbered those of racial progress.

The third aspect to consider when approaching the effectiveness issue concerns reception. As specialists in film cultural studies suggest, audiences often interpret a given media

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product in ways unintended by the creator. Thus a study of effectiveness would need to go beyond mere analysis of a given piece of propaganda to evaluate how audiences responded to it. Walter Hixson and Michael Krenn, for example, used the U.S.IA’s “exit surveys” and other sources to gauge how people responded to the international exhibitions in Moscow and Brussels at the end of the 1950s. Such an approach, their work reveals, can lead to exciting and unexpected discoveries.5

The fourth (but perhaps not the last) way to approach effectiveness is to ask if minds were changed. Did the propaganda change or reinforce existing attitudes and perceptions? This is a most wily issue. It is also the one that both practitioners and scholars of propaganda would most like to see answered. A good argument could be made, however, that this question is impossible to answer conclusively – something even the most hardened spin doctor would concede.

On other issues raised by the reviewers, Wilford laments the fact that my book devotes more treatment to overt propaganda techniques than covert ones. While Total Cold War does discuss some of the most pertinent clandestine campaigns – including those in Iran, Guatemala, and Indonesia – Wilford properly observes that the book devotes less attention to the CIA than other “overt” organizations. I did so in part because there already exist many excellent works which analyze the agency’s operations in detail (Wilford’s work included). Moreover, I wanted to draw attention to the extraordinary range of clandestine techniques employed by groups and organizations other than the CIA, including: the U.S. Information Agency, which more often than not acted like the CIA in its propaganda activities; U.S. embassy personnel overseas, whose “low key” efforts to influence local perceptions and attitudes generally fell below the radar screen; and high-level administration officials, including the President, who worked tirelessly to camouflage their efforts to manipulate foreign and domestic opinion.

I also wanted to reorient the debate about U.S. propaganda away from the “romance of the clandestine” (in Wilford’s fine phrasing). I wanted to draw attention to the wide range of other types of psychological warfare initiatives that so profoundly shaped American diplomacy. One of my most important goals was to explore the intersection between propaganda, policy, and diplomacy. In part because of the communications revolution and in part because of the ideological nature of the Cold War, distinctions between propaganda, policy, and diplomacy became blurred. The imperative of manipulating or influencing public opinion at home and abroad exerted a profound influence on the ways in which policies were formulated, implemented, and presented. Moreover, as I argue in chapter four’s survey of psychological operations around the world, overt and covert operations to manipulate perceptions and politics became routine: “Intervention in foreign internal affairs was standard operating procedure.” (pg. 150)

Sarah-Jane Corke’s review raises interesting questions about the terminology employed by psychological warfare advocates and their bureaucratic opponents. Her perceptive critique in this regard follows from her fine scholarship on national security discourse, which I have found persuasive on many levels. Still, I only partially agree with her analysis here. Terminology may have been a component of the turf war between the psy-warriors and the diplomats, but I think it remains true that even the most ardent propaganda enthusiasts like C. D. Jackson used such terms as “propaganda,” “psychological warfare,” and “information” interchangeably. At least during the Eisenhower years, officials devoted less attention to linguistic precision than Corke suggests. Occasionally their discourse revealed a lack of clarity in their thinking. To the extent that propaganda specialists gave attention to terminology, it was less a matter of their concern for waging bureaucratic warfare than for managing public perceptions of their trade. They became increasingly unnerved by the term psychological warfare itself. It seemed too antagonistic, too manipulative. They lurched for euphemistic ways to describe their craft before settling on the now fashionable “public diplomacy”, a term which masterfully obscures the manipulative elements of propaganda practices.

Also, to reply briefly to Corke’s observation that the Psychological Strategy Board “played an important role in narrowing the gap between policy and operations in the early fifties”: I heartily agree. Total Cold War acknowledges repeatedly the impact of the PSB – as well as its bureaucratic and intellectual predecessors, including those in the public relations industry.

Finally, in response to Hugh Wilford’s comment that “the volume itself [is] handsomely produced, with a particularly good range of illustrations”, I must give credit where it is due by concluding with a special word of thanks to the University Press of Kansas, who graciously accommodated my desire to use visual images to reinforce the main arguments of the book and did so much more to make my vision for the book come alive.