In Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave, Mark S. Bell offers an elegant and compelling theory that explains the foreign policy of states that have acquired nuclear weapons. His argument has rightly earned him the acclaim of scholars like Charles Glaser and Scott Sagan[1]. Bell terms his theory as “nuclear opportunism.” He argues countries use nuclear weapons “to improve their position in international politics and that the circumstances in which a state finds itself determine the way in which it will use its nuclear weapons to do so” (10). As Bell notes in his response to the reviewers, his book “emphasizes the way in which nuclear weapons are incorporated into, rather than transform, the practice of great power politics.”
H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum
Roundtable Review 15-8
Mark S. Bell. Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear Armed States Behave. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2021. ISBN: 9781501754166 (paperback, $19.95)
13 October 2023 |PDF: https://issforum.org/to/jrt15-8 | Website: rjissf.org
Editor: Diane Labrosse
Commissioning Editor: Jennifer Erickson
Production Editor: Christopher Ball
Copy Editor: Bethany Keenan
Contents
Introduction by Jasen J. Castillo, Texas A&M University. 2
Review by Debak Das, University of Denver 5
Review by Rebecca Davis Gibbons, University of Southern Maine. 8
Review by Or Rabinowitz, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem.. 11
Response by Mark S. Bell, University of Minnesota. 14
Introduction by Jasen J. Castillo, Texas A&M University
In Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave, Mark S. Bell offers an elegant and compelling theory that explains the foreign policy of states that have acquired nuclear weapons. His argument has rightly earned him the acclaim of scholars like Charles Glaser and Scott Sagan[1]. Bell terms his theory as “nuclear opportunism.” He argues countries use nuclear weapons “to improve their position in international politics and that the circumstances in which a state finds itself determine the way in which it will use its nuclear weapons to do so” (10). As Bell notes in his response to the reviewers, his book “emphasizes the way in which nuclear weapons are incorporated into, rather than transform, the practice of great power politics.”
Throughout the book, Bell focuses on six foreign-policy behaviors of states that nuclear weapons influence: independence, aggression, bolstering, expansion, steadfastness, and compromise (9). Bell also describes three key variables which impact the normative behaviors of nuclear states. First, if a state faces a territorial threat or is engaged in a war, it is likely to be aggressive and steadfast towards that threat (21-23). Second, if a state possesses a senior ally, it is likely to use nuclear weapons to seek independence from that ally (23-24). Third, if a state is a rising power it is likely to use nuclear weapons as a means to expansion, bolstering of weaker allies, and steadfastness (24-26).
To test his theory of nuclear opportunism, Bell uses three case studies: Great Britain, South Africa, and the United States (33-34). Bell examines the foreign policies of each of these states right before and after nuclear weapons are acquired (31). His reason for choosing these historical case studies is that each possesses what he terms “countervailing conditions” (33). He does an excellent job of applying nuclear opportunism to each case, explaining how nuclear weapons influenced the foreign policy behaviors of each state. The case for Bell’s theory would have been made stronger if he had used only great powers as his cases. For instance, rather than South Africa or Great Britain, China or the Soviet Union could have been used as cases. To his credit, Bell does mention China and its nuclear weapons. Yet, he claims that China’s leaders viewed nuclear weapons narrowly, seeing them as tools to be used only for “resisting nuclear coercion and deterring nuclear attack” (160). As such, Bell believes that Chinese leaders view nuclear weapons through the lens of the Nuclear Revolution, a theory which holds that nuclear weapons, are a force peace in international politics, especially under the condition of MAD, or mutual assured destruction.[2] This should make China a case that is inapplicable to nuclear opportunism (160). It seems that this case is consistent with the theory of nuclear opportunism, however, as China has historically viewed nuclear weapons as a way to achieve independence and potentially as a way to be aggressive, such as against the Soviet Union.
The reviewers in this roundtable provide positive feedback. Debak Das points out that Bell’s book makes an important contribution explaining how military capabilities impact non-military ends, and suggests that Bell’s theory expands on the Nuclear Revolution—high praise indeed. Rebecca Davis Gibbons applauds Bell for his “fascinating archival evidence.” Or Rabinowitz labels Bell’s book as “an important addition to the current new wave of literature on nuclear proliferation.”
They also offer several critiques to this book. Das believes there was more room to expand on the implications of “compromise” in Bell’s theory. As Das also mentions, Bell does not explain whether having a nuclear or non-nuclear rival impacts a newly nuclearized country’s behavior. Das also questions if various nuclear capabilities have differing effects on the behavior of states in accordance with Bell’s theory. Gibbons recommends that Bell create more clearly defined terms. She points out that “steadfastness” and “aggression” tend to overlap in meaning. Gibbons questions why more countries have not obtained nuclear weapons if they help countries achieve their pre-existing political goals, and questions the empirical evidence of a country’s behaviors after it acquires nuclear weapons. For her part, Rabinowitz suggests that Bell could have delved into the influence of nuclear weapons on Israel’s decision to compromise in the Israeli-Arab conflict.
In his response to these reviewers, Bell notes that countries with nuclear weapons will compromise, yet the likelihood of nuclear weapons facilitating this process is small. He also explains that it was difficult to create clear terms, with meanings disentangled from one another. Bell also acknowledges that while there are political benefits to nuclear proliferation, there are heavy costs to acquiring nuclear weapons as well. Moreover, none of these criticisms undermine Bell’s theory or the core claims of the book. The contents of this roundtable demonstrates the ongoing debates over the limitations of both the theory of the Nuclear Revolution and other theories which might better explain the interaction of nuclear weapons and international politics.[3]
Contributors:
Mark S. Bell is an Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota. His research examines issues relating to nuclear weapons and proliferation, international relations theory, and US and British foreign policy. His book, Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave, was published by Cornell University Press (2021), and other work has been published in journals including International Organization, International Security, International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and Texas National Security Review. He holds a PhD in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, an MA in Public Policy from Harvard Kennedy School and a BA in Politics, Philosophy, and Economics from St. Anne’s College, Oxford University.
Jasen J. Castillo is an Associate Professor and the Evelyn and Ed F. Kruse ‘49 Faculty Fellow in the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University. He is the Co-Director of the Albritton Center for Grand Strategy.
Debak Das is an Assistant Professor in Peace and Security at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. His research lies at the intersection of international security, nuclear proliferation, crises, and international history. His current book manuscript explores how states develop and acquire the means of nuclear delivery. He is also an affiliate at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) at Stanford University and the Centre de Recherche Internationales (CERI) at Sciences Po, Paris.
Rebecca Davis Gibbons is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Southern Maine. She previously served as a fellow and associate of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Her book The Hegemon’s Tool Kit: US Leadership and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime was published by Cornell University Press in 2022.
Or (Ori) Rabinowitz, a Chevening Scholar, is an Associate Professor at the International Relations Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. In 2022-2023, she is also a visiting associate professor at Stanford University, where she is an Israel Studies Fellow. Her research interests include nuclear proliferation, intelligence studies, and Israeli-American relations. Her book, Bargaining on Nuclear Tests, was published in 2014 by Oxford University Press. Rabinowitz has been awarded two personal research grants by the Israeli Science Foundation and in 2020 was named as a member of the Young Academic Forum of the Israeli Academy for Sciences and Humanities. She holds a PhD from the War Studies Department of King’s College London, as well as an MA in Security Studies and an LLB in Law, both from Tel-Aviv University.
Review by Debak Das, University of Denver
What effect does the acquisition of nuclear weapons have on a state’s foreign policy? We assume that states are “emboldened” (13) by nuclear weapons. But what does that mean? Mark Bell’s excellent new book, Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave, explains the divergent ways in which states use nuclear weapons to achieve their foreign policy goals. Bell’s book—an important contribution to the field—provides us with a new conceptual toolkit to understand an issue that we often take for granted: how a state’s foreign policy behavior changes after nuclear weapons acquisition.
Nuclear Reactions breaks down what “emboldenment” might mean, but also adds other categories of behavior that states engage in post-nuclearization. Bell’s theory of “nuclear opportunism” (5) posits six categories: aggression (the pursuit of foreign policy goals in a belligerent manner); expansion (the widening of goals and objectives in international politics); independence (gaining autonomy from the will or influence of powerful allies); bolstering (taking action to increase the strength of an alliance or friendly state); steadfastness (displaying greater resolve during disputes or crises to maintain status quo); and compromise (displaying less aggressive behavior and restraint during disputes). The book uses case studies of the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States’ nuclear acquisition, along with smaller discussions of all the other nuclear states, to test the theory.
Bell’s book makes a number of important contributions. First, it explains that the acquisition of critical military capabilities like nuclear weapons may have important and lasting non-military effects. Under the nuclear threshold, there are a range of behaviors that nuclear weapons facilitate. The presence of nuclear weapons thus does not necessarily have to lead to overt nuclear threats. Indeed, as the book demonstrates, apart from aggressive behavior, there are other more subtle ways in which nuclear weapons can impact a state’s foreign policy and propensity to either expand the scope of its foreign policy actions or show greater resolve in a crisis or war.
Second, the book adds nuance to our understanding of the theory of the nuclear revolution,[4] particularly the assumption that nuclear weapons make war obsolete and induce greater restraint in nuclear states, leading to an easier maintenance of the status quo.[5] Bell’s nuclear opportunism theory does not invalidate the theory about the nuclear revolution, but shows how limited the latter is in explaining the behavior of nuclear-armed states. Behaviors like aggression, expansion, independence, and bolstering are outcomes that the nuclear revolution would not predict. Indeed, an important takeaway from Bell’s book is that that the nuclear revolution does not have to be a myth with all bets on nuclear restraint and strategic stability off as soon as states increase their nuclear capabilities quantitatively and qualitatively. A state’s increase in nuclear capacity could just be intended to gain greater political leverage and range of action in its foreign policy.
One of the behaviors predicted by the theory of nuclear opportunism is that a state might use its nuclear capability not simply to deter or coerce its adversary, but to gain independence from its own allies. Bell’s empirical chapter on the United Kingdom is extremely illuminating on this front. Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Britain is entirely dependent on the United States and has been a compliant junior partner in the ‘special relationship,’ Bell’s theory and evidence demonstrates that the possession of nuclear capability allowed the British to break with the United States’ preferences repeatedly. The examples of the United Kingdom’s behavior during the Suez crisis, greater engagements in the Middle East after the acquisition of nuclear delivery capability in 1955, and the deployment of nuclear weapons during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war are compelling pieces of evidence for the independence mechanism of Bell’s theory.
Would we have observed a tamer response from the United Kingdom to its loss of power and influence in the Middle-East in the 1950s without British nuclear weapons? The case study of the United Kingdom in the book suggests that the answer is yes. This is an important observation for our understanding of decolonization and the attempts of the UK as a declining great power to retain power in an international system stacked against it.
Nuclear Reactions provokes some important questions on how we should think about nuclear weapons acquisition. First, “compromise,” which is one of the predicted state behaviors, while theorized is not as emphasized as the other categories. Given the role of the presence of nuclear weapons leading to caution, restraint, and the dedication of less offensively postured conventional forces in crises like the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (by the United States) and the Kargil War in 1999 (by India), future work will have to examine the compromise category in greater detail.[6]
Another question that is sparked by the discussion of the different foreign policy behaviors is whether it matters if a nuclear state’s immediate competitor is a nuclear one or not. Could we expect different types of outcomes for the categories of aggression, expansion, bolstering, and steadfastness depending on whether the states’ adversary a nuclear one or a non-nuclear one?
An important question that requires further investigation is what the difference in the level of operational capacity to deliver nuclear weapons makes for the theory of nuclear opportunism. Once a state has developed a nuclear weapon and developed ‘existential deterrence,’ what effect might that have on a state’s foreign policy? The book states that the first test of a nuclear device might not necessarily influence a state’s foreign policy and that it is the state’s nuclear posture that determines the technological threshold at which a state’s foreign policy will be affected (171). Indeed, the case of South Africa and its greater aggression after 1979 in its Border War suggests that possession of merely a testable nuclear device without any serious delivery capacity might be enough. The British case, meanwhile, shows that changes in foreign policy took effect not after 1952 (when the U.K. tested the bomb), but after 1955, once the V-bomber force provided nuclear delivery capability.
Future work will have to determine how other stages of nuclearization could affect a state’s foreign policy. In other words, to what extent might proximity to attaining a nuclear capability affect a state’s foreign policy? For example, do we expect a state with a ‘peaceful nuclear explosive’ (India in 1974) to have similar changes in behavior as a state that has conducted a full-blown nuclear weapons test? Do “hard-hedging” states who are threshold nuclear states that “stand on the precipice of nuclear weapons acquisition but restrain themselves from going over the brink” have changes to their foreign policy in similar ways to new nuclear state?[7] Relatedly, what about states with the nuclear weapons of other states housed on their territory, like Italy, Spain, Belgium, Germany, or Turkey (among others)? Does the assurance of survival in the international system owing to the presence of nuclear weapons on their soil lead to any significant changes in the foreign policies of these states?
Finally, does the possession of certain delivery capabilities embolden or enable states to behave in certain ways over others? Would a considerable qualitative improvement to the range, delivery, and survivability of a state’s nuclear forces lead to certain types of foreign policy outcomes over others? This is particularly important given China’s rapid modernization and potential expansion of its nuclear forces.[8]
Reassuringly, Bell’s predictions for the behavior of potential future proliferators like Iran, South Korea, and Japan are (on balance) not too alarming. The theory of nuclear opportunism predicts that a potentially nuclear Iran would be “steadfast” and demonstrate greater resolve, but would be unlikely to be aggressive (162). Meanwhile, a nuclear-armed Japan would behave more like the United Kingdom and try to gain more independence from its senior ally, the United States. However, Bell’s theory is most concerning when it comes to South Korea. Despite recent calls for South Korean nuclearization, the theory of nuclear opportunism shows that such an event would likely facilitate more aggression and steadfastness from South Korea against North Korea.[9] This is an outcome that policy makers might seek to avoid.
Ultimately, Mark Bell’s Nuclear Reactions sparks a number of questions that flow from the strong intellectual foundations of the book. While some of the questions highlighted in this review maybe outside of the scope of the theoretical framework of the book (by definition it has to be parsimonious, after all) they are nevertheless inspired by the novel approach to the study of nuclear weapons that Bell has put forward. Importantly, they signal the robust research agenda that Nuclear Reactions will generate in the study of nuclear weapons and foreign policy.
Review by Rebecca Davis Gibbons, University of Southern Maine
In Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear Armed States Behave, Mark S. Bell asks an important and timely question: how does the acquisition of nuclear weapons affect states’ foreign policy? Bell offers the theory of “nuclear opportunism,” arguing that the possession of nuclear weapons facilitates several different foreign policy behaviors, including aggression, expansion, independence, bolstering, and steadfastness.[10] Previously, according to Bell (13), scholars conflated many of these post-acquisition behaviors under the umbrella term “emboldenment.” In offering this typology of behaviors and illustrating them with rich and detailed case studies, Bell makes a novel and useful contribution to the study of nuclear weapons and their effects on international politics.
According to the theory of nuclear opportunism, the behaviors a state pursues after its nuclear acquisition stem from its particular strategic environment (21-26). Bell’s theory simplifies these circumstances into three factors in descending order of importance: whether the nuclear-armed state is facing a serious territorial threat or an on-going war, whether the state has a senior ally or not, and whether the state is rising in power or not. In the case studies, Bell explores two alternative explanations: the nuclear revolution, most associated with Robert Jervis,[11] and S. Paul Kapur’s argument that conventional aggression will result when conventionally weak, revisionist states acquire nuclear weapons.[12]
To test his own theory against these alternatives, Bell employs case studies of the United Kingdom, South Africa, and the United States. He examines the foreign policies of these states before the weapons were acquired, how elites in the country speculated on how nuclear weapons could improve their foreign policy goals, and then how their foreign policy behavior changed after their states possessed a deliverable nuclear weapon.
Each of the case studies provides an important contribution to the field, especially in terms of tying elite ideas to behavioral outcomes. Bell provides fascinating archival evidence on the ways in which elites in each country thought about how nuclear weapons would help them achieve their goals internationally. While the theory of nuclear opportunism does not apply perfectly across all cases, as Bell acknowledges, it sheds light on how the acquisition of nuclear weapons alters the way states pursue their foreign policy goals. In each case, Bell provides persuasive evidence that states behave differently in their foreign policy behavior before and after acquiring the bomb.
Bell’s three intervening variables create a theoretical decision tree that results in a mix of expected state behaviors. For example, a state facing a serious territorial threat or an ongoing war is theorized to engage in aggression and steadfastness toward the threat after it acquires nuclear weapons. In the decision tree, it is notable that every possible outcome includes steadfastness in the list of expected behaviors. Steadfastness is defined as “reduced inclination to back down in disputes or in response to coercion, and an increased willingness to fight to defend the status quo” (18). An increased willingness to defend the status quo suggests a greater comfort with escalation in conflict. And it is evident in the case studies that newly nuclear-armed states, whether Great Britain, South Africa, or the United States, became willing to take escalatory actions that were previously rejected or not seriously considered before possessing nuclear weapons. For example, following the UK’s nuclear acquisition, the British military ousted the Saudis from Buraimi in 1955, planned to send troops to seize the Suez canal in 1956, and intervened militarily in Oman in 1957 and in Jordan in 1958 (pp. 64-69). In the book, these examples are primarily used to illustrate British independence from the United States, yet they also appear to be forms of aggression and steadfastness. Similarly, in South Africa after acquisition, the military went deeper into Angolan territory with greater numbers of personnel and more devastating weapons (100). Finally, after World War I, Bell tells us that escalation with the Soviet Union “was a key feature of US foreign policy” (135).
These examples illustrate just how difficult it can be to precisely parse out the five predicted behaviors in practice. While all states are theorized to engage in steadfastness after nuclear acquisition, only states facing territorial threats or an ongoing war are theorized to engage in aggression, which Bell defines as “more belligerent pursuit of goals in preexisting disputes or in pursuit of previously defined interests” (13). This latter half of this definition appears to overlap with the definition of steadfastness: “increased willingness to fight to defend the status quo.” Based on the examples in the three case studies it is hard to argue that these three states did not engage in aggressive behaviors after acquiring deliverable nuclear weapons. After all, aggressive behaviors include “a greater tolerance for escalation and risk-taking behaviors in existing disputes” (14). If that is the case, then perhaps most new nuclear-weapon states engage in both steadfastness and aggression, a very important potential finding. If these definitions are not supposed to overlap, then clearer definitions to illustrate the contrast between aggression and steadfastness would be useful.
Definitional challenges aside, Bell’s thought-provoking book left me with several questions for future research.
First, in his case studies, Bell examines the few years before and after nuclear weapons acquisition in detail, but argues that there is continuity in these foreign policy behaviors long after acquisition. In future work, I would be curious to see this claim illustrated with more empirical evidence, especially as other scholars have argued that these effects fade over time.[13] If Bell and other scholars can draw a clear line between initial behavior following acquisition, particularly when the elites who held strong ideas about the near-term benefits of acquisition are still in government, and behaviors decades later, this could be a notable contribution to our understanding of the effects of nuclear weapons.
Second, Bell chronicles how elites in each of the cases perceived the value of nuclear weapons to their government’s foreign policy goals. While beyond the scope of the book, it would be interesting to study where these ideas originate and how they might change over time. Related to the previous point, it seems at least plausible that elite ideas about the utility of nuclear weapons could have changed over the course of the nuclear age. The elites in the case studies in the book contemplated nuclear weapons relatively early in the nuclear age. Perhaps ideas have changed over time as nuclear weapons continue not to be used in warfare and evidence accrues that nuclear weapons are not particularly useful for compellence[14] and do not protect nuclear-armed states from attacks by non-nuclear weapons states.[15]
Finally, Bell writes that “nuclear weapons, therefore, allow states to pursue their pre-existing political goals with greater freedom.” Bell is clear that this is not a theory explaining nuclear proliferation (28). Nonetheless, based on this argument, one wonders why more states have not proliferated given these perceived benefits, particularly if these benefits may remain long after acquisition. Though states seeking to proliferate face many challenges, Nuclear Reactions illustrates that the benefit side of the cost-benefit equation may appear considerable to elites.
In sum, Nuclear Reactions provides an important theoretical contribution by disaggregating the many behaviors states engage in once they acquire nuclear weapons. States in different security circumstances will use their weapons differently. The empirical evidence, especially related to how elites thought about nuclear weapons before they possessed them, will aid scholars who study motivations for proliferation as well as how ideas about the value of these weapons may change over time. Bell’s book also makes an important contribution to the growing scholarship that illustrates empirically that the expectations of the nuclear revolution did not pan out.[16]
Review by Or Rabinowitz, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
Mark Bell’s new book, Nuclear Reactions, is an important addition to the current new wave of literature on nuclear proliferation.[17] The book’s main argument is that states which possess nuclear weapons may use them to achieve a variety of foreign policy goals. Significantly, this takes place in addition to the traditional role nuclear weapons play in boosting a state’s deterrence posture. According to Bell’s theory, which is titled nuclear opportunism, states which end up successfully pursuing and developing nuclear weapons also end up modifying their foreign policy as a result of this acquisition. However, the interesting innovation in Bell’s theory, and, perhaps contrary to the common intuition, is that this modification varies according to the geo-strategic and political condition the new possessor finds itself in, and it does not have the same effect on all actors. In other words, rather than seeing a similar effect among all nuclear possessors, nuclear opportunism suggests that different effects are at play for different actors. Bell’s work is commendable for his excellent research overall, using documents from several archives around the world and multiple sources. One point of criticism, which I expand on below, involves the absence of a more in-depth analysis of the strategy of compromise in developing the empirical analysis.
The book, which holds 234 pages including notes and index, contains five chapters, in addition to its introduction and conclusion. The first chapter presents the theory of nuclear opportunism, and the following three chapters discuss the cases of Britain, apartheid South Africa, and the United States. There, the first part of this chapter examines US experience during World War II, and the second part broadly analyses US foreign policy after the war ended. Bell demonstrates the utility of his theory of nuclear opportunism by juxtaposing its predictions in each case to those produced by the relatively well-known theory of “the nuclear revolution” developed by Robert Jervis[18] and other advocates, and S. Paul Kapur’s theory of “strategic pessimism.”[19] A fifth chapter discusses past and potential future proliferators using the format of ‘mini-cases;’ these include the cases of Pakistan, India, France, Israel, and China, and some predictive notes on the possible behavior of Iran, Japan, and South Korea, following a putative nuclear acquisition.
Bell’s theory of nuclear opportunism, which is presented in the first chapter, is a detailed, well-developed theory which is put forward in clear, easily accessible, and jargon-free language. Simply put, Bell argues that “states use nuclear weapons in an opportunistic way to improve their position in international politics and to help them achieve political goals that the state cares about” (6). According to Bell, since states exist in “different strategic circumstances” they have “different political priorities” (20), and these political priorities lead them to use nuclear weapons acquisition in different ways. According to the theory of nuclear opportunism, several factors are at play when states shape their foreign policy following nuclear weapons acquisition. These include “three binary variables” (166): the existence of a serious threat or an on-going war, the existence of a senior ally, and whether the state is a rising power. Put together, these conditions shape the expected effect that nuclear weapons acquisition would have on the behavior of a state. The outcomes oscillate following different mechanisms between aggression, steadfastness towards the threat, independence from a senior ally, expansion, and bolstering of junior allies (6). The theory does not incorporate some other factors which have been the focus of other studies, such as the role of individual leaders,[20] domestic politics,[21] normative factors,[22] or strategic interaction (166).[23] Another important point which Bell makes is that while nuclear weapons serve pre-existing policy goals, they do not create new ones: they “do not transform state preferences or international politics,” but, rather, “they are incorporated into the practice of international politics” (7).
The empirical chapters are quite varied in style and content. The second chapter, which deals with the British nuclear experience, contains several examples of British behavior around the time of Britain’s nuclear acquisition in the 1950s, the most engaging of which is the section dealing with the 1956 Suez Crisis. Bell manages to analyze this well-trodden historical episode with great care and attention to detail, demonstrating how nuclear acquisition facilitated Britain’s drive to increase its independence from the US. In his words, Britain exhibited “greater independence” and “far less concern regarding US policy preferences and a greater willingness to stand firmly” (69), noting the fact that strategically, this attempt ultimately failed. Since this chapter deals with the 1950s, it is also useful in underscoring how the conceptualization of nuclear weapons has changed over time, and in exploring the emergence of the stigma on nuclear weapons.[24] It demonstrates how in the first decade of the nuclear age, nuclear weapons were largely seen as “important tools of statecraft” (72), which, in the case of Britain, its leaders thought they were compelled to develop in order to maintain the United Kingdom’s self-perceived rightful place on the world stage.
The South African chapter is perhaps the most convincing one. Here Bell tests whether apartheid South Africa used its nuclear weapons to facilitate aggression and steadfastness, finding that while the weapons did lead to South African increased aggression in its border war in Angola during the 1980s, they did not facilitate steadfastness or other possible behaviors. Bell uses a variety of primary documents from South African archives and interviews he personally conducted with former South African officials and army generals to underscore his findings. The quality of the research demonstrates the importance of these methods to current nuclear proliferation studies. To those interested in a brief history of apartheid era south Africa with an emphasis on the 1980s, this chapter makes for an excellent stand-alone reading.[25]
The chapter which deals with US foreign policy during and after World War II gives a broad description of US strategic decision-making during the war, and foreign policy trends following its conclusion.[26] While the analysis in the first section is relatively straightforward, the second section is presented in a manner which is more open to interpretation and is consequently less compelling. Bell acknowledges that while the theory correctly anticipates that US behavior would lean towards bolstering, expansion, and steadfastness, it fails to predict that the US would also use nuclear weapons “to engage in behaviors that could be reasonably characterized as aggression” (142). This intellectual integrity is commendable, as Bell points to one of the theory’s shortcomings: failure to anticipate situations where nuclear weapons facilitate belligerence, which is the exact quality that makes nuclear weapons possession so worrisome to start with.
In a similar vein, when discussing the mini-cases in the fifth chapter, Bell goes on to note that although the theory of nuclear opportunism preforms relatively well in most cases, it does not perform well in all cases. To his credit, as in the US case, Bell does not shy away from pointing to the cases which do not accommodate the theory and trying to explain them. While the Pakistani, Indian, and French cases are all explained relatively well by theory, it falls short of explaining the cases of China and Israel. In the Chinese case, Bell notes that “Chinese leaders do not appear to have viewed nuclear weapons as a broadly useful political tool” (160), thus adopting views that are not consistent with the theory. In the Israeli case, the theory predicts that Israel “would use nuclear weapons to facilitate both aggression and steadfastness” following the state’s nuclear acquisition (142). Yet according to Bell, the historical record shows that the state was in fact more inclined to adopt a restraining behavior, thus compelling US assistance (158).
From a more critical standpoint, one point that is missing from Bell’s analysis of the Israeli case is the discussion of compromise as a possible strategy following nuclear acquisition. In the Israeli context this is known as the ‘insurance policy’ dimension of Israel’s nuclear weapons possession, which could potentially enable Israel to opt for territorial withdrawal within the context of the Israeli-Arab conflict. This possibility within the typology is briefly mentioned in the first chapter, where Bell explains that the theory predicts that “states will not use nuclear weapons to facilitate compromise” (30).[27] Yet Israel’s nuclear history shows that this is not necessarily the case. One pertinent question is what role Israel’s nuclear possession played in Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s decision to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula in the 1979 Camp David Peace Accords? According to some accounts (which are certainly not conclusive, given the lack of primary documents on the subject), during the Camp David peace talks, President Jimmy Carter made a direct threat to the fate of the US-Israel bilateral nuclear understanding if Begin refused to remove the settlements; according to this telling, following this conversation Begin agreed to remove all Israeli settlements from the Sinai Peninsula.[28] Another case which should be explored more deeply is the role that Israel’s nuclear possession played in the decision made by Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1992-1993 to pursue and promote the peace talk with both the Palestinians and the Syrians. In both these channels Rabin had agreed in principle to territorial withdrawals. In the Palestinian track, this willingness culminated in the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority. In the Syrian track, Rabin’s willingness to reach a peace settlement which included an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan heights was not accomplished before his assassination on 4 November 1995.
To conclude, Nuclear Reactions is a valuable contribution to the recent wave of literature on nuclear proliferation issues, enhancing our capacity to grasp why different actors react different to nuclear weapons acquisition in the international field. It sheds light on how nuclear weapons embody different things for different actors. And since nuclear weapons are still viewed by many actors as useful for pursuing political goals, Bell is right in remarking that they are “likely here to stay” (173).
Response by Mark S. Bell, University of Minnesota
I thank H-Diplo|RJISSF for publishing this roundtable, Jennifer Erickson and Diane Labrosse for shepherding it through the publication process, Jasen Castillo for writing the introduction, and especially Or Rabinowitz, Debak Das, and Rebecca Gibbons for their contributions. I am delighted that such accomplished scholars of nuclear weapons issues were willing to engage so thoughtfully and constructively with my work. I am especially pleased that all three argue that my book makes an important contribution to scholarship on the ways in which nuclear weapons affect international politics. Of course, it is not perfect, and the contributors raise perceptive questions and concerns about various aspects of the book. In this response, I will first lay out some of the goals I had in writing the book before turning to some of the contributors’ critiques and questions.
My aim in writing Nuclear Reactions was to better understand the way in which nuclear weapons affect the foreign policy calculations of the states that acquire them. In other words, how do nuclear weapons change what states can get—and get away with—in international politics? In answering this question, I hoped to push scholarly debates forward in three main ways. First, I wanted to disaggregate the overly vague concept of “emboldenment” that often gets deployed when thinking about how nuclear weapons affect the calculations of the states that acquire them. The book therefore offers a typology of six distinct foreign policy behaviors (aggression, expansion, steadfastness, bolstering, independence, and compromise) that states can use nuclear weapons to facilitate. Second, I wanted to shed light on why some states used nuclear weapons to facilitate certain combinations of these behaviors, while other states used nuclear weapons to facilitate other combinations. My theory of “nuclear opportunism” makes predictions on this front based on a relatively parsimonious analysis of a state’s geopolitical circumstances and the political goals that flow from those circumstances. It thus offers a theoretical foundation for explaining the heterogeneity of the nuclear era, and the varied nuclear experiences of different countries. Third, I hoped to contribute to broader theoretical debates about nuclear weapons and the extent to which they transform international politics. Notably, my theory aligns with recent critics of the “theory of the nuclear revolution.”[29] The theory of the nuclear revolution emphasizes the transformative effects that nuclear weapons have on the international system because they constrain the ways in which nuclear-armed powers can interact with each other, thus improving their security and cutting off a key taproot of international conflict.[30] My argument, by contrast, suggests that acquiring nuclear weapons does not cause states to worry less about their security or power position, does not reduce states’ competitive inclinations, and does not tamp down states’ international ambitions. Rather, states have political goals beyond security, and use nuclear weapons to try to achieve those goals. In this way, my book emphasizes the way in which nuclear weapons are incorporated into, rather than transform, the practice of great power politics.
I now turn to addressing some of the points raised by the contributors.
Das asks an important set of questions relating to the threshold at which nuclear weapons begin to have political effects. For reasons of both research design and theoretical parsimony, I assume that nuclear weapons are a binary capability that begin to have political effects at a specific point in time. Further, I argue that exactly what technological threshold states must reach varies depending on how states plan to use nuclear weapons. For example, in the British case, because British nuclear strategy hinged on delivering nuclear weapons to the Soviet Union, it is only when Britain acquired those delivery capabilities that we should expect to see nuclear weapons having political effects (37-38). These are simplifying assumptions that allows me to make a clear before-and-after comparison in each case. I think this assumption is defensible. And, in fact, making this assumption makes it less likely that I would find the effects of nuclear weapons that I do (i.e., this assumption biases against me finding the effects I observe): if nuclear capabilities begin to have effects prior to the threshold I identify, or if the effects I identify emerge gradually as states build up their nuclear capabilities, it would be less likely that we would observe a step-change in a state’s foreign policy behaviors at the point of nuclear acquisition. Nonetheless, future research could profitably assess whether weakening that assumption might have merit. For example, it is perfectly possible that more marginal nuclear capabilities might result in versions of the effects I identify. Das suggests, for example, that a state standing on the nuclear threshold or a state that has another state’s nuclear weapons housed on its territory might also be able to use those capabilities to shift their foreign policies. These are plausible hypotheses that would be interesting to evaluate.
Both Rabinowitz and Das raise questions relating to the concept of “compromise.” This is a behavior which I argue nuclear weapons can facilitate, but which my theory anticipates that states will generally not choose to use nuclear weapons to facilitate. Both Das and Rabinowitz raise some examples in which they suggest that nuclear weapons may in fact have facilitated compromise: Das suggests US behavior in the Cuban Missile Crisis or Indian behavior in the Kargil War, while Rabinowitz suggests Israel’s withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula after the Camp David Accords, its pursuit of peace talks with the Palestinians in the early 1990s. In responding to this, it is worth clarifying exactly what my argument implies. My argument is not that states (including nuclear-armed states) never compromise—they often do so, for a range of reasons. As I argue, “While states may be coerced into compromise or make compromises voluntarily for a range of reasons, the theory of nuclear opportunism suggests that states are unlikely to deliberately use nuclear weapons to facilitate this behavior.” This is because my theory suggests that “states seek to use nuclear weapons to better their position in international politics, and use nuclear weapons as a tool with which to do so” (30). In short, I expect that states will use nuclear weapons to achieve and acquire things they want. I do not expect that states will expend considerable resources to acquire nuclear weapons only to use them to give up territory (or anything else) they previously valued. Thus, to the extent that states do use nuclear weapons to facilitate compromise, this would be important evidence against my theory (and evidence in support of the theory of the nuclear revolution, the logic of which does suggest that states should use nuclear weapons to facilitate compromise).
However, while some of the cases Rabinowitz and Das suggest may be examples of nuclear-armed states engaging in compromise, I am skeptical that any of these are examples of nuclear-armed states using their nuclear weapons to facilitate compromise. For example, I agree that India was in certain ways cautious in the Kargil War, but that was because of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and nuclear posture, rather than because its own nuclear weapons facilitated that restraint.[31] Similarly, the US took very considerable risks during the Cuban Missile Crisis in order to achieve its political goal of removing Soviet missiles from Cuba—risks that were enabled by the United States’ own nuclear weapons.[32] And while scholars have certainly made arguments that Israel should use its nuclear weapons to facilitate significant territorial compromise, the sum of Israeli behavior over the decades since nuclear acquisition does not indicate much sustained interest in doing so.[33] Overall, I think the historical record offers very limited evidence of states using their nuclear weapons to facilitate compromise, an observation that is consistent with my theoretical argument and inconsistent with the theory of the nuclear revolution.
Gibbons questions whether some of the behaviors I identify can be easily distinguished from each other in empirical cases. There are two issues here. The first issue is that distinguishing between conceptual categories in complex and ambiguous historical cases is a common problem in empirical International Relations research. For example, the distinction between compellence and deterrence may be conceptually clean, but applying that distinction in practice is often challenging given actors frequently disagree about the nature of the status quo and who is seeking to challenge it. My book is certainly not immune from this issue, and I try to be transparent about its implications, flagging instances in the cases where these challenges are particularly significant. For example, in the US case I point out that in the fast-changing international system in the immediate aftermath of World War II, distinguishing between several of the behaviors in the typology is particularly difficult (113), and I therefore modify the empirical goals in that case. Overall, I think my coding decisions in the cases are the most reasonable ones given the evidence, and I do not shy away from coding decisions that go against my theory—as in the Israeli or Chinese cases (although I certainly appreciate Castillo’s suggestion that my theory may in fact explain the Chinese case). Nonetheless, I encourage readers to assess the evidence I present and draw their own conclusions. Second, as Gibbons points out, in my lists of what I look for empirically when identifying different behaviors, I note some actions that could be indicative of more than one behavior. I think this is reasonable, in much the same way that it would be reasonable for a wildlife guide to point out that bushy tails are indicators of both squirrels and foxes. Indeed, this emerges from my desire to be as clear as possible about what is guiding my coding decisions and interpretations within the cases, and to be as comprehensive as possible in describing what I look for to identify the different behaviors.
Finally, Gibbons raises the question of why so few states have ultimately acquired nuclear weapons, given that my book’s argument highlights the significant political benefits that nuclear weapons offer to states. I think Gibbons’s own (excellent) work on US nonproliferation policy offers a big part of the answer to this.[34] While the political benefits that nuclear weapons offer to states are significant, the costs of acquiring nuclear weapons are also significant, in large part because the United States has gone to considerable lengths to make it politically and economically costly for states to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, if nuclear weapons did not offer such political benefits to states, the United States would not need to go to such lengths to prevent proliferation, nor would the United States be as motivated to do so. It is for this reason that I argue (169-170) that my work offers a theoretical explanation for why the United States has historically focused on the goal of nonproliferation.
Once again, I would like to thank all the participants in this forum for their thoughtful reviews and engagement with my work.
[1] https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501754180/nuclear-reactions/#bookTabs=1.
[2] Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
[3] Critics of the Nuclear Revolution include Brendan Rittenhouse Green, The Revolution that Failed: Nuclear Competition, Arms Control, and the Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020); and Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).
[4] Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, Cornell Studies in Security Affairs (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).
[5] Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, 45.
[6] Martin J. Sherwin, Gambling with Armageddon: Nuclear Roulette from Hiroshima to the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1945-1962, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2020); Debak Das, “‘The Courtroom of World Opinion’: Bringing the International Audience into Nuclear Crises,” Global Studies Quarterly 1:4 (December 1, 2021): https://doi.org/10.1093/isagsq/ksab028.
[7] Vipin Narang, “Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation: How States Pursue the Bomb,” International Security 41, no. 3 (January 2017): 118.
[8] Hans M. Kristensen and Matt Korda, “China’s Nuclear Missile Silo Expansion: From Minimum Deterrence to Medium Deterrence,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 1 September 2021, https://thebulletin.org/2021/09/chinas-nuclear-missile-silo-expansion-from-minimum-deterrence-to-medium-deterrence/; Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40:2 (1 October 015): 7–50.
[9] Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press, “Should South Korea Build Its Own Nuclear Bomb?,” Washington Post, 7 October 2021, accessed 28 October 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/should-south-korea-go-nuclear/2021/10/07/a40bb400-2628-11ec-8d53-67cfb452aa60_story.html; Bell, Nuclear Reactions, 163.
[10] Bell writes that, theoretically, compromise could also be added to this list, yet in practice he sees no evidence of this behavior among newly nuclear-armed states.
[11] Robert Jervis, “The Nuclear Revolution and the Common Defense,” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 101:5 (1986): 689-703.
[12] S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007).
[13] Michael D. Cohen, “Fear and Loathing: When Nuclear Proliferation Emboldens,” Journal of Global Security Studies 3:1 (2018): 56–71.
[14] On the limited utility of nuclear coercion, see Todd S. Sechser and Matt Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).
[15] Paul C. Avey, Tempting Fate: Why Nonnuclear States Confront Nuclear Opponents (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019).
[16] For example, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in an Atomic Age (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020).
[17] Some recent books include: Nicholas L. Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Alexander Lanoszka, Atomic Assurance: The Alliance Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018); Rupal N. Mehta, Delaying Doomsday: The Politics of Nuclear Reversal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).
[18] Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospects of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989); Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984).
[19] S. Paul Kapur, “India and Pakistan’s Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,” International Security 30:2 (2005): 127–152; S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” International Security 33:2 (2008): 71–94.
[20] Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions and Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
[21] Elizabeth N. Saunders, “The Domestic Politics of Nuclear Choices—A Review Essay,” International Security 44:2 (Fall 2019): 146–184, doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00361.
[22] Nina Tannenwald, “The Vanishing Nuclear Taboo?: How Disarmament Fell Apart,” Foreign Affairs 97:6 (2018): 16–24.
[23] On strategic interaction and nuclear proliferation see: Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro, Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
[24] Nina Tannenwald, “Stigmatizing the Bomb: Origins of the Nuclear Taboo,” International Security 29:4 (2005): 5–49
[25] Anna-Mart Van Wyk, “South African Nuclear Development in the 1970s: A Non-proliferation Conundrum?” The International History Review 40:5 (2018): 1152-1173
[26] For a discussion of US non-proliferation policy see: Rebecca Davis Gibbons, The Hegemon’s Tool Kit: US Leadership and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022).
[27] Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, A Strategy for the 1980s (New York, Columbia University Press, 1983).
[28] Or Rabinowitz, “Signed, Sealed but Never Delivered: Why Israel Did Not Receive Nixon’s Promised Nuclear Power Plants,” The International History Review 40:5 (2018): 1014-1033, https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2018.1436581.
[29] For a review of the implications of recent work for the idea of the nuclear revolution, see Paul C. Avey, “Just Like Yesterday? New Critiques of the Nuclear Revolution,” Texas National Security Review 6:2 (2023).
[30] For works in this vein, see: Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989); Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Kenneth N. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” American Political Science Review 84:3 (1990): 730–745; Stephen van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), ch. 8.
[31] See, for example, Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security 34:3 (2010): 38-78.
[32] See, for example, Marc Trachtenberg, “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Security 10:1 (1985): 137-163.
[33] See, for example, Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).
[34] Rebecca Davis Gibbons, The Hegemon’s Toolkit: US Leadership and the Politics of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022). See also Francis J. Gavin, “Strategies of Inhibition: US Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation,” International Security 40:1 (2015): 9-46; Nicholas L Miller, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).