Meighen McCrae has performed a singular service in writing a succinct history of the Supreme War Council (SWC), the major Allied coordinating agency of World War I. “Allies” is used in this review, as in McCrea’s book, as the wider coalition involving Britain, France, and Italy, and that included the United States, an “associated” power (1, fn. 1). She shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Council was no mere debating society. Rather it was of “landmark significance in the history of coalition warfare” (8). Indeed, it “provided the best and only mechanism for coordinating Allied strategy and resources” (252). McCrae reveals the development of Allied planning through the SWC, its all-important Permanent Military Representatives (PMR), and its committees that were devoted to shipping and raw materials.
H-Diplo | Robert Jervis International Security Studies Forum
Review Essay 91
Meighen McCrae, Coalition Strategy and the End of the First World War: The Supreme War Planning, 1917-1918. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108566711
Reviewed by Justus D. Doenecke, New College of Florida, Emeritus
25 January 2024 | PDF: http://issforum.org/to/RE91 | Website: rjissf.org | Twitter: @HDiplo
Editor: Diane Labrosse | Commissioning Editor: Thomas Maddux | Production Editor: Christopher Ball
Meighen McCrae has performed a singular service in writing a succinct history of the Supreme War Council (SWC), the major Allied coordinating agency of World War I. “Allies” is used in this review, as in McCrea’s book, as the wider coalition involving Britain, France, and Italy, and that included the United States, an “associated” power (1, fn. 1). She shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, the Council was no mere debating society. Rather it was of “landmark significance in the history of coalition warfare” (8). Indeed, it “provided the best and only mechanism for coordinating Allied strategy and resources” (252). McCrae reveals the development of Allied planning through the SWC, its all-important Permanent Military Representatives (PMR), and its committees that were devoted to shipping and raw materials.
McCrae acknowledges the rich literature already existing on how the SWC functioned, its contribution to unified command, and the way certain individuals, for example, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and American General Tasker H. Bliss, contributed to its effectiveness.[1] She also notes previous studies of American-French and American-British relationships, which describe the increasing tensions over war aims.[2] McRae situates the contribution of this book in the interrelationship of these allies plus Italy, all operating through the SWC.
Certain themes predominate. First, McCrae stresses the SWC’s continual focus on the need to inflict a decisive military defeat on Germany itself. Equally important, though, the Council deemed that the Allies would only be ready in 1919. Due to the collapse of the Russian front and the Italian disaster at Caporetto in the fall of 1917, the failures of the French and British offensives earlier that year, and the heavy toll taken by German U-boats, the Allies henceforth were overly prudent.
Second, manpower, not weaponry, continued to serve as the main ingredient to gain victory. Therefore, the mass infusion of American doughboys became increasingly crucial. Third, the US military and supporting civilian agencies, as well as their European counterparts, used the SWC as the essential vehicle for coordinating forces. Fourth, thanks to the Americans, the SWC assured that victory on the Western Front remained the essential military goal. Such areas as Palestine, Mesopotamia, and the Balkans were always secondary.
The book begins by discussing the SWC’s origins, organization, and functions. Its immediate creation was triggered in November 1917 by the fear that Russia’s recent defeat would enable the Germans to move substantial forces to the Western Front. The Allies deemed greater coordination absolutely essential, though not all national expectations were met. Lloyd George futilely hoped that an Allied war committee would back his “eastern strategy” of major strikes against the weaker Central Powers—Turkey, Bulgaria, and Austria-Hungary. Contrariwise, French Premier Georges Clemenceau was successful in establishing “unity of command,” that is, putting all the western armies under “Generalissimo” Ferdinand Foch (246).
Gathering at Versailles, the SWC met twice in 1917, and eight times in 1918. It was formally composed of the heads of government of Britain, France, Italy, and the United States. President Woodrow Wilson, however, remained aloof, fearing that his idealistic war aims would be compromised by collective political decisions. Hence, the SWC’s major activity lay with the Permanent Military Representatives, who met far more frequently. Little wonder that McCrae’s narrative focuses on PMR activity. Crucial in this regard is the role of Bliss, who filled his place on the Council with wisdom and tact. A former US army chief of staff, Bliss served as a major channel for communications between the European allies on the one hand, and Wilson, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, Chief of Staff Peyton C. March, and General John J. Pershing on the other.
The book then moves to strategy in the Balkans, where the French government sought an offensive in Macedonia so as to relieve French forces on the Western Front. The British, however, wanted to use these forces to remain focused on the main German army located on the French-Belgian front. In the end, commanders in the field determined when the time was ripe and remained reluctant to pursue any operations.[3]
Similar controversy, as McCrae notes, took place in regard to the Ottoman Empire. Here the British sought increased commitments to Palestine and Mesopotamia whereas the United States opposed any further Middle East commitment. The US retained diplomatic relations with the Turks, feared that the Ottomans would massacre the entire Christian population, and opposed diverting forces from the Western Front.[4]
The book then turns to northern Italy, where again the coalition refused to risk possible gains on the war’s main theater. At the same time, however, the British, French, and American PMRs sought to alleviate Italy’s grievances. The presence in northern Italy of three French and three British divisions, plus an American infantry regiment, remained evidence of their commitment. Indeed, throughout 1918, it was the Italians themselves who greatly overestimated the strength of the Central Powers, which were by then no longer a viable fighting force on their frontier. Italians launched their own attack at Vittorio Veneto only three weeks before the Armistice.
In examining the Western Front, McCrae emphasizes the importance of America’s role. Once massive numbers of American troops arrived, which was projected to take place in in 1919, the Allies would possess a significant margin of forces and the great victory offensive would be launched. She treats in depth the entire “amalgamation” controversy, whereby American troops would temporarily be serving under the Entente command and could immediately be placed into combat. (By skillful maneuvering, Pershing ultimately squelched the proposal.) McCrae also highlights how the Allies overestimated German strength, even though their own intelligence continually revealed low morale and occasional mutinies. As late as fall 1918, the Allies had no idea that Germany was collapsing. At the time of the Armistice in November 1918, however, the Germans and Austrians had 3.5 million troops on the Western Front, the Allies 6.4 million.[5]
The final chapter deals with logistics, focusing on the shipping of American troops and munitions. Despite the immensity of its shipbuilding program, the United States never possessed sufficient craft to supply the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). Thanks, however, to subsidiary agencies of the SWC, namely its transport and munitions agencies, many bottlenecks were broken. McCrae notes that the Americans possessed a dysfunctional command structure, with Pershing and the War Department providing radically different figures concerning AEF needs. “It [was] difficult,” she writes, “for the coalition to support the American programme if the Americans themselves did not know what they required” (244).
McCrae concludes by observing that the PMRs sought with the Armistice to achieve what they believed they had been denied on the battlefield: complete victory. During the final armistice negotiations, the Allied political and military leadership still feared that Germany would use the winter to regroup, then mount a formidable defense. Even the sober-minded Bliss thought the terms insufficiently stringent. Wilson himself wanted a surrender, not a ceasefire (240). In evaluating the SWC, McCrae notes varied challenges it faced, including inexperience in conducting a multinational war effort. Most important is the lack of executive authority. The PMRs were far from the only advisers to the political leaders; they had to compete with various chiefs of staff and theater commanders. Contrary to myth, the PMRs reinforced, not undermined, Foch’s role as generalissimo (246).
Wilson insisted that the United States remain an “associated power” (1, fn. 1). The SWC, therefore, allowed the US to act as a functioning “ally” in coordinating resources and strategy. Indeed, the SWC served as the only place where the Entente could negotiate with the Americans on the all-important matter of US troop deployment in preparation for the projected 1919 offensive.[6] McCrae also stresses the valuable role that the SWC played in inter-allied communications, giving the member nations a solid understanding of their partners’ stance regarding the war’s varied theaters. Also important was the SWC’s role in resource coordination. For example, the Entente planned to reduce cereal imports in 1919 so as to help supply arriving American troops. In turn, Americans prioritized shell shipments to the Allies, doing so in exchange for ammunition. The British continued to transport AEF troops.
McCrae conducted extensive research for this book. The narrative covers numerous primary and secondary works as well as unpublished doctoral theses.[7] More important, she crossed continents in her pursuit of manuscripts. Among her sources are the SWC and the British war cabinet minutes at British National Archives; the Lloyd George papers at the House of Lords Record Office; the General Henry Wilson papers at the Imperial War Museum; and War Secretary Winston Churchill papers at Churchill College, Cambridge. At France’s Service Historique de la Défence at Château de Vincennes, she utilized the collection of the Conseil Supérior de la Guerre and the collections of Georges Clemenceau and André Tardieu. American manuscripts include those of Woodrow Wilson, Secretary of State Robert Lansing, Newton D. Baker, John J. Pershing, Tasker Bliss, and Peyton March (Library of Congress); Bliss again (the US Army Military History Institute); and the War Industries Board and US Shipping Board (National Archives).
One wishes that the book had explored the PMR’s role concerning the Russian front. Beginning in January 1918, the PMR began pressing the United States to send troops to Murmansk, Archangel, and Vladivostok. Several months later, Wilson reluctantly complied.[8] This topic deserves further discussion. A few quibbles: Certain locales in the text are not replicated on the relevant maps, which are quite small in size. Among them are Macedonia (38), Dobrudzha (51), the Mesta River (52), the Malakastra Heights (59), the Tiberias-Acre line (88), Tul Kéram (90), the Jordan River (90), the Baghdad-Hamadan-Enzeki road (92), and Mantua (104). The “Marista” (52) and the “Maritza” (61) both refer to the same river, which is not on the map of the Italian front. McRae refers to Mantua (104) but the map shows the alternative name of Montova. Historians usually refer to “Nelson Page,” American ambassador to Italy, as “Thomas Nelson Page” (133). Herbert Hoover was not the American “Food Controller” but “Food Administrator” (209).
All in all, McCrae has written a most valuable work. One cannot think of the Supreme War Council in the same way again.
Justus D. Doenecke is emeritus Professor of History at New College of Florida. He has written books on the Gilded Age and on American foreign policy from 1914 through the early Cold War. His latest book, More Precious Than Peace: A New History of America in World War I (University of Notre Dame Press, 2022), the sequel to his Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I (University Press of Kentucky, 2011).
[1] See, for example, David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 1917–1918 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1936); Frederick Palmer, Bliss, Peacemaker: The Life and Letters of General Tasker Howard Bliss (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1934).
[2] See, for example, Robert B. Bruce, A Fraternity of Arms: America and France in the Great War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2003), David Woodward, Trial by Friendship: Anglo-American Relations, 1917–1918 (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1993); Kathleen Burk, Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914–1918 (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1985).
[3] David Dutton, The Politics of Diplomacy: Britain and France in the Balkans in the First World War (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998)
[4] Justus D. Doenecke, More Precious Than Peace: A New History of America in World War I (South Bend, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2022), 227.
[5] Harry Rudin, Armistice 1918 (New Haven, CT.: Yale University Press, 1944; Bullitt Lowry, Armistice 1918 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000).
[6] David F. Trask, The United States in the Supreme War Council: American War Aims and Inter-Allied Strategy, 1917–1918 (Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press, 1973)
[7] Unpublished doctoral theses: Robert K. Hanks, “Culture Versus Diplomacy: Georges Clemenceau and Anglo-American Relations during the First World War” (University of Toronto, 2002); Thomas Daniel Shumate, “The Allied Supreme War Council 1917–1918” (University of Virginia, 1952).
[8] US-Russian involvement: Robert D. Warth, The Allies and the Russian Revolution: From the Fall of the Monarchy to the Peace of Brest-Litovsk (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1954); George F. Kennan, The Decision to Intervene (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1958; Robert Edward Bennett, “Frustrated Partnership: Russia’s Relations with Great Britain, France, and the United States during World War I” (PhD diss.; Texas Tech University, 1990).